While looking for avenues of injecting code into platform binaries back in macOS Monterey, I was able to identify a vulnerability which allowed the hijacking of Apple application entitlements. Recently I decided to revisit this vulnerability after a long time of trying to have it patched, and was surprised to see that it still works. There are some caveats introduced with later versions of macOS which we will explore, but in this post we’ll look at a vulnerability in macOS Sonoma which has been around for a long time, and remains an 0day, urm, to this day.
In this blog post, I'll discuss some of the post-exploitation techniques that I've found to be useful against Okta. Specifically, this post will look at how to use delegated authentication to our advantage, silver tickets, Okta AD agent spoofing, and finally how to deploy a fake SAML provider.
This year, LAPS 2.0 was released by Microsoft, and thankfully it now comes built-in to Windows. This time it comes ready for use with Active Directory, as well as being supported in Azure AD aka Entra ID. In this post, we’ll look at how LAPS 2.0 for Active Directory works under the hood, so you can make those fresh recommendations to your clients, and prepare yourself for the inevitable question... “But we just deployed LAPS.. what does LAPS 2.0 do differently?!”.
Steganography is experiencing a revival as a wrapper for delivering payloads. In this post we'll go back to basics and show just how steganography can be applied to a PNG image using the common least significant bit (LSB) encoding technique. No magic... just raw information... and a little C++.
In this blog we'll look at what it takes to construct an in-memory loader for Mach-O bundles within MacOS Ventura without using dyld. We'll walk though the lower-level details of what makes up a Mach-O file, how dyld processes load commands to map areas into memory, and how we can emulate this to avoid writing payloads to disk.
Up until recently, we've enjoyed in-memory loading of Mach-O bundles courtesy of dyld and its NSCreateObjectFileImageFromMemory/NSLinkModule API methods. And while these methods still exist today, there is a key difference.. memory modules are now persisted to disk. So in this post we'll take a look at just what was changed in dyld, and see what we can do to restore this functionality... hopefully keeping our warez in memory for a little longer.
This post looks at the recent trend of pulling Azure tokens from Office process memory and tries to identify just how these tokens were loaded, how Office handles a Microsoft Account (MSA), and how we can recover cached credentials from the Token Broker Cache.
In this post we'll explore just how SCCM uses its HTTP API to initialise a client, take a look at how Network Access Accounts are retrieved from SCCM, and see how we can decrypt these credentials without having to go anywhere near DPAPI.
With the leaking of code signing certificates and exploits for vulnerable drivers becoming common occurrences, adversaries are adopting the kernel as their new playground. And with Microsoft making technologies like Virtualization Based Security (VBS) and Hypervisor Code Integrity (HVCI) available, I wanted to take some time to understand just how vulnerable endpoints are when faced with an attacker set on escaping to Ring-0.
In this post, we'll dig into just how SMB over QUIC works, answer some of the immediate questions around which attacks are feasible, and show how we can repurpose some existing tooling to capture NTLM handshakes.
In this post we are going to look at one such technique that I thought was cool while playing around with the Windows Object Manager, and which should allow us to load an arbitrary DLL of our creation into a Windows process during initial execution, something that I've been calling "Object Overloading" for reasons which will hopefully become apparent in this post.
Recently I've been looking at the .NET CLR internals and wanted to understand what further techniques may be available for executing unmanaged code from the managed runtime. This post contains a snipped of some of the weird techniques that I found.
In this post, we are going to look at the Application Proxy protocol, how it works, and show how we can recreate enough functionality to allow us to create a custom inbound proxy into a client environment for our C2 traffic.
We've all been there, you've completed your initial recon, sent in your emails to gather those leaked HTTP headers, spent an age configuring your malleable profile to be just right, set up your CDNs and spun up your redirectors. Then it's time, you send in your email aaaaaand... nothing.
For a while I've wanted to explore the concept of leveraging a virtual machine on target during an engagement. The thought of having implant logic self-contained and running under a different OS to the base seems pretty interesting. But more so, I've been curious as to just how far traditional AV and EDR can go to detect malicious activity when running from a different virtual environment. While this is a nice idea, the issues with creating this type of malware are obvious, with increased comple...
While working on some tooling recently I revisited the topic of .NET unmanaged exports and wanted to know just why this works in the way that it does. After all, by now we've all seen the COM calls required to spin up the CLR, so what makes unmanaged exports so special?