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Yesterday — 2 May 2024Main stream

Okta Verify for Windows Remote Code Execution – CVE-2024-0980

By: b0yd
2 May 2024 at 17:41

This article is in no way affiliated, sponsored, or endorsed with/by Okta, Inc. All graphics are being displayed under fair use for the purposes of this article.

Poppin shells with Okta Verify on Windows

These days I rarely have an opportunity to do bug hunting. Fortunately, over the holiday break, I found some free time. This started as it usually does with me looking at what software was running on my computer.

A while back I had installed Okta Verify on my Windows box as it was required for some “enhanced” 2FA that I was required to have to access a thing. Months later it sat there doing whatever it does. I googled to see if Okta had a bug bounty program because even though I had some time, it’d be nice to get paid if I found a thing. I was thrilled to find that Okta had a bug bounty with Bugcrowd, Okta Verify is in it, and the payouts look good, almost too good.

I started with my usual bug hunting flow when approaching a random Windows service. This typically includes looking for the usual low hanging fruit. A good article for the types of things to look for can be found here.

Firing up Sysinternal’s Procmon, I saw there is a service called Okta.Coordinator.Service that is running as SYSTEM. Without going into the details (namely because Okta hasn’t fixed it or issued it a CVE), I found a thing. I submitted the report and was promptly paid.

Well that’s weird. The bug I submitted is an unequivocal 7.8 CVSS. Which without knowing the voodoo behind P ratings (P1-P4), seems like would be a P2 at least. Instead I get a P3 and paid out at the lower end.

Looking back on it, I’m betting this is probably an old bug bounty program trick to motivate researchers to dig deeper… because, it worked. I decided to take a closer look since I hadn’t even opened up the binary to see what it was doing – and I wanted to get that big payout.

Let’s Get Crackin’

I haven’t popped Okta.Coordinator.Service.exe into a disassembler yet, but I’m betting it’s a .NET application. My guess comes from its name and the fact that there’s an Okta.Coordinator.Service.exe.config file right there with it, which you usually see with .NET applications.

When I open up the executable in JetBrains dotPeek, I can confirm it is indeed a .NET application. The binary appears to be a service wrapper. It handles the service related functionality: install, uninstall, start, stop, etc.  It references a Okta.AutoUpdate.Executor class that just so happens to have a matching DLL in the same directory.

Moving on to the DLL in dotPeek, I found the code used by the service. The first thing I noticed was it sets up a NamedPipe server, which listens for commands to update the Okta Verify software. This is a common design paradigm in Windows for enabling low-privileged applications to communicate with a high-privileged service to perform updates, as these often require elevated privileges. It’s a complex mechanism that’s tricky to do right, and often a good place for finding bugs. I was able to confirm the existence of the named-pipe server with a little Powershell.

Next, I investigated how to initiate an update and what aspects of this process could be manipulated by an attacker. The handler for the named pipe processes a straightforward JSON message that includes several fields, some checked against expected values. The primary field of interest is the update URL. If the input data passes validation, the software will attempt to fetch details from the specified URL about the most recent update package available. As shown below, the URL (sub)domain is verified against a whitelist before proceeding. For now, I’ll avoid trying to meet/bypass this requirement and simply add an entry in the hosts file on my test machine.

Typically at this stage, I’d code up a proof of concept (POC) to send a JSON message to the named pipe and check if the software connected to a web server I control. But since I haven’t spotted any potential vulnerabilities yet, I skipped that step and moved on.

From here I took a look at the code responsible for processing the JSON message retrieved from the attacker controlled update server. The application is expecting a message that contains metadata about an update package including versioning and an array of file metadata objects. These objects contain several pertinent fields such the download URL, size, hash, type, and command line arguments. The provided download URL is validated with the same domain checking algorithm as before. If the check passes, the software downloads the file and writes it to disk. This is where things get interesting. The code parses the download URL from the received metadata and constructs the file path by calling the Path.Combine function.

Several factors are converging here to create a serious vulnerability. The most obvious is the use of the Path.Combine function with user supplied data. I went into depth about this issue in a previous blog post here. The TLDR is if a full path is provided as the second argument to this function, the first argument that typically specifies the parent folder, is ignored. The next issue is how the filename is parsed. The code splits the file location URL by forward slash and takes the last element as the filename. The problem (solution) is a full Windows path can be inserted here using back slashes and it’s still a valid URL. Since the service is running as SYSTEM, we have permissions to right anywhere. If we put all this together our payload looks something like the script below.

Copy to Clipboard

Now that I have a potential bug to test out, I craft the POC for the named pipe client to trigger the update. Luckily, this code already exists in the .NET DLL for me to repurpose.  With my web server code also in place I send the request to test out the file write. As I had hoped, the file write succeeds!

Cool, but what about impact!

I have the ability to write arbitrary files as SYSTEM on Windows. How can I leverage this to achieve on-demand remote code execution? The first thing that comes to mind is some form of DLL hijacking. I’ve used phantom DLL hijacking in the past but this is more appropriate for red team operations where time constraints aren’t really an issue. What I really need is the ability to force execution shortly after the file write.

Since the whole purpose behind this service is to install an update, can I just use it to execute my code? I reviewed the code after the file write to see what it takes to execute the downloaded update package. It appears the file type field in the file object metadata is used to indicate which file to execute. If the EXE or MSI file type is set, the application will attempt to validate the file signature before executing it, along with any supplied arguments. The process launcher executes the binary with UseShellExecute set to false so no possibility of command injection.

My original thought was to deliver a legitimate Okta Verify package since this would pass the signature check. I could then use ProcMon to identify a DLL hijack in the install package. Privileged DLL hijacks occur in almost all services because the assumption is you already require the permissions to write to a privileged location. Ironically though, I found the service binary actually contained a DLL hijack just prior to the signature verification to load the necessary cryptographic libraries. If I write a DLL to C:\Program Files (x86)\Okta\UpdateService\wintrust.dll, it will get loaded just prior to signature verification.

Great, so now I have a way to execute arbitrary code from an unprivileged user to SYSTEM. “Guessing” that this probably won’t meet the bar of P1 or P2, I start thinking of how to upgrade this to remote code execution. If RCE doesn’t get a P1 then what does? The interesting thing about named pipes is that they are often remotely accessible. It all depends on what permissions are set. Looking at the code below, it sets full control to the “BUILTIN\Users” group.

Testing from a remote system in my network confirms that I get permissioned denied when I try to connect to the named pipe. After a couple of days I had an idea. If a Windows system is part of a Active Directory domain, does the BUILTIN/Users group permissions automatically get converted to the “Domain Users” group in a domain? This would mean any user in an AD domain could remotely execute code on any system that has Okta Verify installed. Moreover, considering that this software is aimed at large corporate enterprises, it would likely be included in the standard build and deployed broadly. So not explicitly “Domain Admin” but a good chance of it. I had to find out, so I stood up a test AD network in AWS and the following video shows what happened.

Almost done

Well that seems like a big deal right? Maybe get a P1 (and 70k…)? I’m guessing the small detail about not having an Okta subdomain to download from may keep it from landing a P1. Having worked at big tech companies, I know that subdomain takeover reports are common. However, without having a subdomain takeover, it’s likely the bug’s significance will be minimized. I decided to dedicate some time to searching for one to complete the exploit chain. After going through the standard bug bounty subdomain takeover tools, I came up with only one viable candidate: oktahelpspot.okta.com.  It pointed to an IP with no open ports, managed by a small VPS provider named Arcustech.

After signing up for an account and some very innocent social engineering, I got the following response. And then a second email from the first person’s manager. Oh well, so much for that.

The next thing that came to mind was leveraging a custom Okta client subdomain. Whenever a new client registers with Okta, they receive a personalized Okta subdomain to manage their identity providers, e.g. trial-XXXXXXX.customdomains.okta.com. I found a way to set custom routes in the web management application that would redirect traffic from your custom domain to a user defined URL. Unfortunately, this redirect was implemented in Javascript, rather than through a conventional 302 or 301 HTTP redirect. Consequently, the .NET HTTP client that the Okta Verify update service uses did not execute the Javascript and therefore did not follow the redirect as a browser would.

Reporting

At this point, I decided it was time to report my findings to Okta. Namely, because they were offering a bonus at the time for what appeared to be Okta Verify, which I think they might have either forgotten or included without mentioning. Secondly, I didn’t want to risk someone else beating me to it. I am happy to report they accepted the report and awarded me a generous bounty of $13,337 as a P2. It wasn’t quite $70k, or a P1, but it’s nothing to sneeze at. I want to thank Okta for the bounty and quick resolution. They also kindly gave me permission to write this blog post and followed through with issuing CVE-2024-0980 along with an advisory.

One last note, if anyone reading this identifies a way to bypass the subdomain validation check I would be very interested. I attempted most of the common URL parsing confusion techniques as well as various encoding tricks all for naught. Drop me a line at @rwincey on X

What can we learn from the passwords used in brute-force attacks?

2 May 2024 at 18:00
What can we learn from the passwords used in brute-force attacks?

Brute force attacks are one of the most elementary cyber threats out there. Technically, anyone with a keyboard and some free time could launch one of them — just try a bunch of different username and password combinations on the website of your choice until you get blocked.  

Nick Biasini and I discussed some of the ways that organizations can defend against brute force attacks since detection usually doesn’t fall into the usual bucket (ex., there’s nothing an anti-virus program could detect running). But a good place to start just seems to be implementing strong password rules, because people, unsurprisingly, are still using some of the most obvious passwords that anyone, attacker or not, would guess. 

Along with our advisory on a recent increase in brute force attacks targeting SSH and VPN services Cisco Talos published a list of IP addresses associated with this activity, along with a list of usernames and passwords adversaries typically try to use to gain access to a network or service. 

There are some classics on this list — the ever-present “Password” password, Passw0rd (with a zero, not an “O”) and “123456.” This tells me that users still haven’t learned their lesson. It’s somewhat funny to think about some well-funded actor just being like, “Well, let me try to ‘hack’ into this machine by using ‘123456’” as if they’re in a parody movie, but if they already can guess a username based off someone’s real name, it’s not that unlikely that password is being used somewhere. 

A few other example passwords stood out to me: “Mart1x21,” because I can’t tell if this is just someone named “Martin” or a play on the month of March, and things like “Spring2024x21” and “April2024x21” because I appreciate the idea that someone using that weak of a password thinks that adding the extra three characters onto “April2024” is really going to throw an attacker off. 

Looking at this list got me thinking about what some potential solutions are to the internet’s password problem, and our ever-present battle to educate users and warn them about the dangers of using weak or default passwords. 

Going passwordless is certainly one option because if there just are no passwords to log in, there’s nothing text-based an attacker could just start guessing. 

The best solution I’ve seen recently is that the U.K. literally made a law requiring hardware and software manufacturers to implement stronger security standards. The Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure (PSTI) that went into effect last month contains a range of security protections companies must follow, but they now include mandatory password rules that will force users to change default passwords when registering for new accounts and stop them from using easy-to-guess passwords like “Admin” and “12345.”  

It would be great if users would just stop using these credentials on their own, but if attackers are still thinking that someone out there is using “Password” as their password, they probably are.  

The one big thing 

For the first time in several quarters, business email compromise (BEC) was the most common threat in Cisco Talos Incident Response (Talos IR) engagements during the first quarter of 2024. BEC made up 46 percent of all engagements in Q1, a significant spike from Q4 2023, according to the latest Talos IR Quarterly Trends Report. Ransomware, which was the top-observed threat in the last quarter of 2023, decreased by 11 percent. Talos IR also observed a variety of threats in engagements, including data theft extortion, brute-force activity targeting VPNs, and the previously seen commodity loader Gootloader. 

Why do I care? 

BEC is a tactic adversaries use to disguise themselves as legitimate members of a business and send phishing emails to other employees or third parties, often pointing to a malicious payload or engineering a scheme to steal money. The use of email-hiding inbox rules was the top-observed defense evasion technique, accounting for 21 percent of engagements this quarter, which was likely due to an increase in BEC and phishing within engagements. These are all valuable insights from the field provided in Talos IR’s full report. 

So now what? 

There are some known indicators of compromise that customers can look for if they suspect The lack of MFA remains one of the biggest impediments for enterprise security. All organizations should implement some form of MFA, such as Cisco Duo. The implementation of MFA and a single sign-on system can ensure only trusted parties are accessing corporate email accounts, to prevent the spread of BEC. If you’d like to read about other lessons from recent Talos IR engagements, read the one-pager here or the blog post here

Top security headlines of the week 

The chief executive of UnitedHealth Group testified to U.S. Congress on Wednesday regarding the recent cyber attack against Change Healthcare. Change’s operations went nearly completely dark for weeks earlier this year after a data breach, which likely resulted in millions of patients’ records and personal information being accessed. Lawmakers questioned whether UnitedHealth was too involved in the nation’s medical systems, as Change manages a third of all American patient records and processes more than 15 billion transactions a year at doctor’s offices, hospitals and other medical providers. As a result of the outage, some healthcare practitioners went more than a month without being paid, and many had to tap into their personal funds to keep offices open. UnitedHealth’s CEO told Congress the company was still working to figure out the full extent of the campaign and was talking to U.S. agencies about how to best notify individuals who were affected. The hearing has also generated a conversation around consolidation in the American healthcare industry and whether some groups are controlling too much of the patient base. (The New York Times, CNBC

Vulnerabilities in a popular phone tracking app could allow anyone to view all users’ locations. A security researcher recently found that iSharing, which allows users to see the exact location of a device, contains a vulnerability that prevented the app's servers from conducting proper checks of user data access. iSharing is advertised as an app for users who want to track friends' and family members’ locations or as an extra layer of security if their device were to be lost or stolen. The flaws also exposed users’ names, profile pictures, email addresses and phone numbers. The researcher who discovered the vulnerability was able to show a proof-of-concept exploitation almost immediately after creating a brand new account on the app. Representatives from the developers of iSharing told TechCrunch that the company’s logs did not show any signs of the vulnerability being exploited prior to the researcher’s disclosure. These types of apps can also be used as “stalkerware,” in which someone who knows a targeted user quietly downloads the app on a target’s phone, and then uses it to remotely track their location. (TechCrunch

Adversaries are hiding malware in GitHub comments, disguising malicious code as URLs associated with Microsoft repositories, and making the files appear trustworthy. Although some security researchers view this as a vulnerability, Microsoft maintains that it is merely a feature of using GitHub. While adversaries have so far mainly abused this feature to mirror Microsoft URLs, it could theoretically be used to create convincing lures on any GitHub repository. When a user leaves a comment in GitHub, they can attach a file, which is then uploaded to GitHub’s CDN and associated with the related project using a unique URL. GitHub automatically generates the link to download that attachment after adding the file to an unsaved comment, allowing threat actors to attach malware to any repository without the administrators knowing. This method has already been abused to distribute the Readline information-stealing trojan by attaching comments to Microsoft’s GitHub-hosted repositories for “vcpkg” and “STL.” The malicious URL will even still work if the poster deletes the comment, allowing them to reuse the GitHub-generated URL. (Bleeping Computer, Dark Reading

Can’t get enough Talos? 

 

Upcoming events where you can find Talos

RSA (May 6 - 9) 

San Francisco, California    

ISC2 SECURE Europe (May 29) 

Amsterdam, Netherlands 

Gergana Karadzhova-Dangela from Cisco Talos Incident Response will participate in a panel on “Using ECSF to Reduce the Cybersecurity Workforce and Skills Gap in the EU.” Karadzhova-Dangela participated in the creation of the EU cybersecurity framework, and will discuss how Cisco has used it for several of its internal initiatives as a way to recruit and hire new talent.  

Cisco Live (June 2 - 6) 

Las Vegas, Nevada  

Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week 

This section will be on a brief hiatus while we work through some technical difficulties. 

CVE-2024-34025

2 May 2024 at 16:53

CWE-259: USE OF HARD-CODED PASSWORD

The application code contains a hard-coded set of authentication credentials. This could result in an attacker bypassing authentication and gaining administrator privileges.

Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could result in an attacker bypassing authentication and gaining administrator privileges, forging JWT tokens to bypass authentication, writing arbitrary files to the server and achieving code execution, gaining access to services with the privileges of a PowerPanel application, gaining access to the testing or production server, learning passwords and authenticating with user or administrator privileges, injecting SQL syntax, writing arbitrary files to the system, executing remote code, impersonating any client in the system and sending malicious data, or obtaining data from throughout the system after gaining access to any device.

CVE-2024-33615

2 May 2024 at 16:53

CWE-23: RELATIVE PATH TRAVERSAL

A specially crafted Zip file containing path traversal characters can be imported to the server, which allows file writing to the server outside the intended scope, and could allow an attacker to achieve remote code execution.

Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could result in an attacker bypassing authentication and gaining administrator privileges, forging JWT tokens to bypass authentication, writing arbitrary files to the server and achieving code execution, gaining access to services with the privileges of a PowerPanel application, gaining access to the testing or production server, learning passwords and authenticating with user or administrator privileges, injecting SQL syntax, writing arbitrary files to the system, executing remote code, impersonating any client in the system and sending malicious data, or obtaining data from throughout the system after gaining access to any device.

CVE-2024-32053

2 May 2024 at 16:53

CWE-798: USE OF HARD-CODED CREDENTIALS

Hard-coded credentials are used by the platform to authenticate to the database, other services, and the cloud. This could result in an attacker gaining access to services with the privileges of a Powerpanel application.

Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could result in an attacker bypassing authentication and gaining administrator privileges, forging JWT tokens to bypass authentication, writing arbitrary files to the server and achieving code execution, gaining access to services with the privileges of a PowerPanel application, gaining access to the testing or production server, learning passwords and authenticating with user or administrator privileges, injecting SQL syntax, writing arbitrary files to the system, executing remote code, impersonating any client in the system and sending malicious data, or obtaining data from throughout the system after gaining access to any device.

CVE-2024-32047

2 May 2024 at 16:53

CWE-489: ACTIVE DEBUG CODE

Hard-coded credentials for the test server can be found in the production code. This might result in an attacker gaining access to the testing or production server.

Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could result in an attacker bypassing authentication and gaining administrator privileges, forging JWT tokens to bypass authentication, writing arbitrary files to the server and achieving code execution, gaining access to services with the privileges of a PowerPanel application, gaining access to the testing or production server, learning passwords and authenticating with user or administrator privileges, injecting SQL syntax, writing arbitrary files to the system, executing remote code, impersonating any client in the system and sending malicious data, or obtaining data from throughout the system after gaining access to any device.

CVE-2024-32042

2 May 2024 at 16:53

CWE-257: STORING PASSWORDS IN A RECOVERABLE FORMAT

The key used to encrypt passwords stored in the database can be found in the application code, allowing the passwords to be recovered.

Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could result in an attacker bypassing authentication and gaining administrator privileges, forging JWT tokens to bypass authentication, writing arbitrary files to the server and achieving code execution, gaining access to services with the privileges of a PowerPanel application, gaining access to the testing or production server, learning passwords and authenticating with user or administrator privileges, injecting SQL syntax, writing arbitrary files to the system, executing remote code, impersonating any client in the system and sending malicious data, or obtaining data from throughout the system after gaining access to any device.

CVE-2024-31856

2 May 2024 at 16:53

CWE-89: IMPROPER NEUTRALIZATION OF SPECIAL ELEMENTS USED IN AN SQL COMMAND ('SQL INJECTION')

An attacker with certain MQTT permissions can create malicious messages to all Power Panel devices. This could result in an attacker injecting SQL syntax, writing arbitrary files to the system, and executing remote code.

Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could result in an attacker bypassing authentication and gaining administrator privileges, forging JWT tokens to bypass authentication, writing arbitrary files to the server and achieving code execution, gaining access to services with the privileges of a PowerPanel application, gaining access to the testing or production server, learning passwords and authenticating with user or administrator privileges, injecting SQL syntax, writing arbitrary files to the system, executing remote code, impersonating any client in the system and sending malicious data, or obtaining data from throughout the system after gaining access to any device.

CVE-2024-31410

2 May 2024 at 16:53

CWE-321: USE OF HARD-CODED CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY

The devices Power Panel manages use identical certificates based on a hard-coded cryptographic key. This can allow an attacker to impersonate any client in the system and send malicious data.

Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could result in an attacker bypassing authentication and gaining administrator privileges, forging JWT tokens to bypass authentication, writing arbitrary files to the server and achieving code execution, gaining access to services with the privileges of a PowerPanel application, gaining access to the testing or production server, learning passwords and authenticating with user or administrator privileges, injecting SQL syntax, writing arbitrary files to the system, executing remote code, impersonating any client in the system and sending malicious data, or obtaining data from throughout the system after gaining access to any device.

CVE-2024-31409

2 May 2024 at 16:53

CWE-285: IMPROPER AUTHORIZATION

Certain MQTT wildcards are not blocked on the system, which might result in an attacker obtaining data from throughout the system after gaining access to any device.

Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could result in an attacker bypassing authentication and gaining administrator privileges, forging JWT tokens to bypass authentication, writing arbitrary files to the server and achieving code execution, gaining access to services with the privileges of a PowerPanel application, gaining access to the testing or production server, learning passwords and authenticating with user or administrator privileges, injecting SQL syntax, writing arbitrary files to the system, executing remote code, impersonating any client in the system and sending malicious data, or obtaining data from throughout the system after gaining access to any device.

Today — 3 May 2024Main stream

MasterParser - Powerful DFIR Tool Designed For Analyzing And Parsing Linux Logs


What is MasterParser ?

MasterParser stands as a robust Digital Forensics and Incident Response tool meticulously crafted for the analysis of Linux logs within the var/log directory. Specifically designed to expedite the investigative process for security incidents on Linux systems, MasterParser adeptly scans supported logs, such as auth.log for example, extract critical details including SSH logins, user creations, event names, IP addresses and much more. The tool's generated summary presents this information in a clear and concise format, enhancing efficiency and accessibility for Incident Responders. Beyond its immediate utility for DFIR teams, MasterParser proves invaluable to the broader InfoSec and IT community, contributing significantly to the swift and comprehensive assessment of security events on Linux platforms.


MasterParser Wallpapers

Love MasterParser as much as we do? Dive into the fun and jazz up your screen with our exclusive MasterParser wallpaper! Click the link below and get ready to add a splash of excitement to your device! Download Wallpaper

Supported Logs Format

This is the list of supported log formats within the var/log directory that MasterParser can analyze. In future updates, MasterParser will support additional log formats for analysis. |Supported Log Formats List| | --- | | auth.log |

Feature & Log Format Requests:

If you wish to propose the addition of a new feature \ log format, kindly submit your request by creating an issue Click here to create a request

How To Use ?

How To Use - Text Guide

  1. From this GitHub repository press on "<> Code" and then press on "Download ZIP".
  2. From "MasterParser-main.zip" export the folder "MasterParser-main" to you Desktop.
  3. Open a PowerSehll terminal and navigate to the "MasterParser-main" folder.
# How to navigate to "MasterParser-main" folder from the PS terminal
PS C:\> cd "C:\Users\user\Desktop\MasterParser-main\"
  1. Now you can execute the tool, for example see the tool command menu, do this:
# How to show MasterParser menu
PS C:\Users\user\Desktop\MasterParser-main> .\MasterParser.ps1 -O Menu
  1. To run the tool, put all your /var/log/* logs in to the 01-Logs folder, and execute the tool like this:
# How to run MasterParser
PS C:\Users\user\Desktop\MasterParser-main> .\MasterParser.ps1 -O Start
  1. That's it, enjoy the tool!

How To Use - Video Guide

https://github.com/YosfanEilay/MasterParser/assets/132997318/d26b4b3f-7816-42c3-be7f-7ee3946a2c70

MasterParser Social Media Publications

Social Media Posts
1. First Tool Post
2. First Tool Story Publication By Help Net Security
3. Second Tool Story Publication By Forensic Focus
4. MasterParser featured in Help Net Security: 20 Essential Open-Source Cybersecurity Tools That Save You Time


CrowdStrike Named a Leader in IDC MarketScape for Worldwide MDR

29 April 2024 at 18:31

The #1 global managed detection and response (MDR) provider and pioneer continues to dominate. Today, CrowdStrike was named a Leader in the 2024 IDC MarketScape: Worldwide Managed Detection and Response 2024 Vendor Assessment1 among the 19 vendors evaluated in the report. 

CrowdStrike was also recently named a Leader in Frost & Sullivan’s 2024 Frost Radar: Managed Detection and Response.

The global demand for MDR continues to surge as businesses face a harsh reality: While many struggle to recruit the cybersecurity talent they need, adversaries are getting faster and stealthier. To stay ahead of emerging threats, organizations must operate at maximum efficiency and employ the right blend of skills, processes and cutting-edge technology. 

CrowdStrike Falcon® Complete delivers 24/7 managed detection and response, powered by the AI-native CrowdStrike Falcon® XDR platform. Operating as a seamless extension of customers’ teams, Falcon Complete combines advanced threat detection, investigation and response with industry-leading threat intelligence and threat hunting to accelerate mean-time-to-respond (MTTR), narrow the cybersecurity skills gap and thwart even the most sophisticated attacks.

As a pioneer in MDR, the emerging cloud detection and response (CDR) category and adversary intelligence, CrowdStrike is consistently recognized by customers, analysts and third-party awards programs for its industry-leading MDR offering. 

IDC MarketScape: CrowdStrike a Leader in WW MDR

CrowdStrike has been named a Leader in the 2024 IDC MarketScape for worldwide MDR report. CrowdStrike was also named a Leader in the IDC MarketScape: U.S. Managed Detection Response Services 2021 Vendor Assessment.2

SOURCE: “IDC MarketScape: Worldwide Managed Detection and Response 2024 Vendor Assessment” by Craig Robinson, April 2024, IDC # US49006922.

 

IDC MarketScape vendor analysis model is designed to provide an overview of the competitive fitness of ICT suppliers in a given market. The research methodology utilizes a rigorous scoring methodology based on both qualitative and quantitative criteria that results in a single graphical illustration of each vendor’s position within a given market. The Capabilities score measures vendor product, go-to-market and business execution in the short-term. The Strategy score measures alignment of vendor strategies with customer requirements in a 3-5-year timeframe. Vendor market share is represented by the size of the circles. Vendor year-over-year growth rate relative to the given market is indicated by a plus, neutral or minus next to the vendor name.

The report noted…

“Falcon Complete offers a unique flat analyst operating model for MDR by eliminating analyst tiers and forming interchangeable “Fire Teams” — with each respective Fire Team capable of operating independently and delivering MDR services to customers 24×7. In this approach, every MDR security analyst is an experienced incident response expert capable of investigating and responding to any endpoint, cloud, identity, or multidomain threat they encounter. This model enables Falcon Complete to more efficiently and nimbly scale and balance resources across all Fire Teams while delivering positive security outcomes to every supported customer. The CrowdStrike Falcon platform and Falcon Complete MDR services are 100% cloud native and cloud delivered.”

Speed is a defining characteristic of Falcon Complete. With the fastest observed adversary breakout time down to just over two minutes in 2023, organizations are under immense pressure to quickly identify and stop attacks. 

“Falcon Complete’s multi-domain detection and response capabilities accelerate the time it takes to find and stop sophisticated, lateral-moving attacks.”

CrowdStrike’s elite security analysts and threat hunters deliver a seamless MDR service enriched with integrated threat intelligence and high-fidelity telemetry from the Falcon platform. This allows for faster and more effective detection and response to stop breaches. 

“IDC recognizes that there is a push ‘to the platform’ that is occurring in cybersecurity. This is worthy of mention as CrowdStrike has a wide depth and breadth of capabilities built into their Falcon platform that provides the technology muscle for their MDR offering.”

Frost & Sullivan: CrowdStrike Growth Leader in MDR

CrowdStrike was also named a Leader in the Frost Radar: Managed Detection and Response 2024. In the report, Frost & Sullivan named CrowdStrike the growth leader among 22 vendors evaluated and an “innovator and powerhouse” in the MDR sector.

“CrowdStrike delivers its services to companies of all sizes and across all industry verticals …. The company leverages its success in other security product and service domains, including endpoint security, cloud security, identity protection, XDR and more to power and cross-sell its MDR services while offering complimentary services that provide additional value for customers looking to address specific use cases.”

Our continued growth in MDR is accelerated by Falcon Complete for Service Providers, which allows service providers to enhance their offerings and provide their customers the highest level of protection powered by our industry-leading MDR service.

“In September 2023, CrowdStrike launched Falcon Complete for Service Providers, which allows MSSPs and MSPs to license the company’s Falcon Complete MDR service, leveraging its expert team and technology to deliver 24/7 monitoring and security to their customers. This program is flexible, allowing service partners to co-brand, white-label and customize the services they provide to unlock significant growth potential.”

Ranking CrowdStrike high in innovation, Frost & Sullivan called Falcon Complete a “world-class security service” in the MDR sector, also stating:

“CrowdStrike leverages its impressive R&D budget and expert understanding of the challenges and trends in the security space to hold on to its position as an innovator and powerhouse in the MDR sector and in the cybersecurity industry as a whole.”

Frost & Sullivan also noted CrowdStrike’s technology advantage of delivering Falcon Complete from the unified Falcon platform. This approach allows us to extend our MDR capabilities across endpoints, identities, cloud workloads and third-party data to deliver end-to-end response and remediation across key attack surfaces.

“CrowdStrike recently expanded its MDR portfolio, extending its 24/7 managed detection and response service to incorporate trusted third-party telemetry, data sources, and automated response actions. These integrations are powered by more than 20 CrowdStrike alliance partners, including Cisco, Fortinet, Mimecast, Proofpoint and Zscaler.”

Gold Standard of MDR

As the pioneer of MDR, CrowdStrike remains the gold standard, delivering outcomes, not homework, for thousands of organizations worldwide. 

Falcon Complete received the highest detection coverage and was the only MDR to detect 99% of adversary techniques in the 2022 MITRE Engenuity ATT&CK® Evaluations for Managed Security Services. And our best-in-class CrowdStrike Breach Prevention Warranty gives customers additional peace of mind knowing we stand behind our claims.

Thank you to the IDC MarketScape and Frost & Sullivan for the recognition and to all of the hardworking CrowdStrikers for delivering the best MDR service on the market! 

Additional Resources

 

  1.  Doc #US49006922, April 2024
  2. Doc #US48129921, August 2021

CrowdStrike Named Overall Leader in Industry’s First ITDR Comparative Report

30 April 2024 at 09:10

The industry’s first identity detection and response (ITDR) analyst report names CrowdStrike an Overall Leader and a “cyber industry force.”

In KuppingerCole Leadership Compass, Identity Threat Detection and Response (ITDR) 2024: IAM Meets the SOC, CrowdStrike was named a Leader in every category — Product, Innovation, Market and Overall Ranking — and positioned the highest for Innovation among all eight vendors evaluated. We received the top overall position in the report and a perfect 5/5 rating in every criteria, including security, functionality, deployment, interoperability, usability, innovativeness, market position, financial strength and ecosystem.

CrowdStrike pioneered ITDR to stop modern attacks with the industry’s first and only unified platform for identity protection and endpoint security powered by threat intelligence and adversary tradecraft — all delivered on a single agent. The market has continued to recognize our leadership, with CrowdStrike being positioned furthest to the right of all eight vendors evaluated in KuppingerCole’s report.

Figure 1. The Overall Leader chart in the KuppingerCole Leadership Compass, Identity Threat Detection and Response (ITDR) 2024: IAM Meets the SOC

A Leader in Innovation

In 2023, 75% of attacks used to gain initial access were malware-free, highlighting the prevalence of identity-based attacks and use of compromised credentials. Since releasing CrowdStrike Falcon® Identity Threat Protection in 2020, CrowdStrike has been constantly innovating on the product to deliver a mature solution that stops modern identity attacks.

In the report, CrowdStrike was positioned furthest to the right and highest in Innovation, demonstrating our commitment to delivering cutting-edge technology. “CrowdStrike is a cyber industry force, and its Falcon Identity Protection demonstrates real attention to detail where threats are related,” KuppingerCole states.

The cloud-native architecture of Falcon Identity Protection is another point of differentiation, delivering the speed and scale that businesses need, with minimal hardware requirements.

“Offered as a cloud-native SaaS service, Falcon Identity Protection component requires a minimal on-premises footprint, requiring only a lightweight Falcon sensor on the Active Directory (AD) domain controllers. This architecture also enables packet-level inspection and real-time alerting of suspicious events,” states the report.

CrowdStrike Focuses Where Threats Are

In our mission to stop breaches, CrowdStrike focuses where identity threats often originate: in Microsoft identity environments. This is reflected in the report, with KuppingerCole describing Microsoft environments as “the entry point to attack vectors.”

“Falcon Identity Protection excels at its deep coverage of Microsoft environments, including on-premises AD and Azure-based environments. The coverage ranges from aging AD protocols for domain controller replication, to password hash synchronization over AD Connect, to Azure based attacks on Entra ID,” states the report.

CrowdStrike’s protection of Microsoft identity stores extends into specific product features and services that KuppingerCole also highlighted in its report.

“Given CrowdStrike’s long history in InfoSec and SOC practices, Falcon Identity Protection offers unique features to help bridge identity administration performed by IT and identity security. It does this by providing guidance to InfoSec personnel who may not have deep knowledge of AD and Entra ID.”

With these features and our continuing emphasis on stopping identity-based attacks on Microsoft environments, KuppingerCole said CrowdStrike delivers “very strong protection for Microsoft environments” in its report.

Delivered from the Unified Falcon Platform

CrowdStrike firmly believes ITDR is a problem that cannot be addressed in isolation by point products. Of all of the vendors evaluated in the report, CrowdStrike is the only one that delivers identity security as a capability tightly integrated into a unified platform.

Our innovative approach of combining endpoint and identity protection into the AI-native CrowdStrike Falcon® platform with a single agent, powered with threat intel and adversary tradecraft, is key to stopping identity breaches in real time. The unified approach is shown to accelerate response time with projections calculating up to 85% faster detection of identity attacks and lower total cost of ownership, delivering up to $2 million USD in savings over three years.

Another CrowdStrike advantage is our extensive partner network that delivers industry-leading capabilities such as real-time response as part of Falcon Identity Protection.

“The company’s API ecosystem offers REST and GraphQL APIs for most of its functionalities, including real-time response to identity threats. This approach not only offers compliance with current tech standards but also portrays CrowdStrike’s forward-thinking strategy, promising near-term enhancements to further open up their platform.”

The Future of Identity Security

With this report, CrowdStrike is the proven leader in identity threat protection, parallelling our industry leadership in endpoint security, cloud security, managed detection and response, threat intelligence and risk-based vulnerability management.

Thanks to all of the CrowdStrike customers that use our platform every day to stop breaches. We’re committed to delivering the best technology and services on the market for you!

Additional Resources

CrowdStrike Named the Only Customers’ Choice in 2024 Gartner® “Voice of the Customer” for External Attack Surface Management

30 April 2024 at 16:17

As adversaries become faster and stealthier, they relentlessly search for vulnerable assets to exploit. Meanwhile, your digital footprint is expanding, making it increasingly challenging to keep track of all of your assets. It’s no wonder 76% of breaches in 2023 were due to unknown and unmanaged internet-facing assets.

Against this backdrop, it’s more critical than ever for organizations to maintain a continuous and comprehensive understanding of their entire attack surface. This is where CrowdStrike Falcon® Exposure Management comes in:

In the field of exposure management, the value of external attack surface management (EASM) cannot be overstated. In short, EASM helps organizations identify known and unknown internet-facing assets, get real-time visibility into their exposures and vulnerabilities, and prioritize remediation to reduce intrusion risk.

Integrated into Falcon Exposure Management are the robust EASM capabilities of CrowdStrike Falcon® Surface, which uses a proprietary real-time engine to continuously scan the internet, and map and index more than 95 billion internet-facing assets annually. This gives organizations a vital “outside-in” perspective on the exposure of these assets and helps security teams prioritize and address vulnerabilities — not based on generic vulnerability severity scores but based on real-world adversary behavior and tactics from CrowdStrike® Counter Adversary Operations threat intelligence.

The EASM capabilities of Falcon Exposure Management are best-in-class. But don’t just take it from us. Here’s what CrowdStrike customers had to say.

93% Willing to Recommend CrowdStrike

CrowdStrike is the only vendor named Customers’ Choice in the 2024 Gartner “Voice of the Customer” Report for External Attack Surface Management, with 93% of respondents saying they are willing to recommend CrowdStrike.

The “Voice of the Customer” is a document that synthesizes Gartner Peer Insights’ reviews into insights for IT decision makers. Here’s a sampling of the individual reviews and ratings on the Gartner Peer Insights page:

Falcon Surface is the EASM you need.”

“The tool gives critical insight into your attack surface helping to show what you don’t know.”

Strategic assessing for internet exposed assets.”

“A market analysis of external vulnerability analysis was carried out and after testing the product we were convinced to purchase it for the company.”

Effective ASM solution byte per byte.”

“Easy and continuous vulnerability assessment, effective risk prioritization, accuracy on remediations guidance.”

Our mission is clear: to stop breaches. Understanding and reducing risk is critical to stopping the breach, and we thank our customers for their support and validation of the unified CrowdStrike Falcon® XDR platform as the definitive cybersecurity platform.

Falcon Exposure Management: A Critical Component of the Falcon Platform

Organizations are embracing cybersecurity consolidation to reduce cost and complexity while improving security outcomes. Understanding the reduction of cyber risk across the modern attack surface is a critical component of any organization’s cybersecurity strategy. 

Falcon Exposure Management unifies real-time security data from Falcon Surface for EASM, CrowdStrike Falcon® Discover for asset, account and app discovery, and CrowdStrike Falcon® Spotlight for vulnerability management. CrowdStrike received a Customers’ Choice distinction in the 2024 Gartner® Peer Insights™ Voice of the Customer for Vulnerability Assessment

With AI-powered vulnerability management and a comprehensive visual mapping of all connected assets, Falcon Exposure Management dramatically speeds up detection and response times, transforming reactive operations into proactive cybersecurity strategies to stop breaches before they happen. Integration with real-time threat intelligence correlates exposures with adversary behavior to help prioritize based on business impact and the likelihood of real-world exploitation. 

While traditional approaches to exposure management use disjointed products, only CrowdStrike delivers Falcon Exposure Management from the Falcon platform, making it fast and easy for customers to deploy the exposure management capabilities that customers love using the single lightweight Falcon agent and single console.

By deploying Falcon Exposure Management on the Falcon platform, organizations can realize incredible benefits such as a projected 200% faster CVE prioritization to respond quickly to critical vulnerabilities, up to 75% reduction in attack surface to lower the risk of a breach and up to $200,000 USD in annual savings by consolidating point products.

 

*Based on 32 overall reviews as of December 2023.

GARTNER is a registered trademark and service mark, and PEER INSIGHTS is a trademark and service mark, of Gartner, Inc. and/or its affiliates in the U.S. and internationally and are used herein with permission. All rights reserved.

This graphic was published by Gartner, Inc. as part of a larger research document and should be evaluated in the context of the entire document. The Gartner document is available upon request from CrowdStrike. Gartner Peer Insights content consists of the opinions of individual end users based on their own experiences with the vendors listed on the platform, should not be construed as statements of fact, nor do they represent the views of Gartner or its affiliates. Gartner does not endorse any vendor, product or service depicted in this content nor makes any warranties, expressed or implied, with respect to this content, about its accuracy or completeness, including any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.

Additional Resources

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