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Invisible Adware: Unveiling Ad Fraud Targeting Android Users

4 August 2023 at 13:36

Authored by SangRyol Ryu, McAfee Threat Researcher

We live in a world where advertisements are everywhere, and it’s no surprise that users are becoming tired of them. By contrast, developers are driven by profit and seek to incorporate more advertisements into their apps. However, there exist certain apps that manage to generate profit without subjecting users to the annoyance of ads. Is this really good?  

Recently, McAfee’s Mobile Research Team discovered a concerning practice among some apps distributed through Google Play. These apps load ads while the device’s screen is off, which might initially seem convenient for users. However, it’s a clear violation of Google Play Developer policy on how ads should be displayed. This affects not only the advertisers who pay for invisible Ads, but also the users as it drains battery, consumes data and poses potential risks such as information leaks and disruption of user profiling caused by Clicker behavior. 

The team has identified 43 apps that collectively downloaded 2.5 million times. Among the targeted apps are TV/DMB Player, Music Downloader, News, and Calendar applications. McAfee is a member of the App Defense Alliance focused on protecting users by preventing threats from reaching their devices and improving app quality across the ecosystem. We reported the discovered apps to Google, which took prompt action. Most apps are no longer available on Google Play while others are updated by the developer. McAfee Mobile Security detects this threat as Android/Clicker. For more information, and to get fully protected, visit McAfee Mobile Security. 

Many affected apps

How does it work? 

This ad fraud library uses specific tactics to avoid detection and inspection. It deliberately delays the initiation of its fraudulent activities, creating a latent period from the time of installation. What’s more, all the intricate configurations of this library can be remotely modified and pushed using Firebase Storage or Messaging service. These factors significantly add to the complexity of identifying and analyzing this fraudulent behavior. Notably, the latent period typically spans several weeks, which makes it challenging to detect. 

Getting latent period by using Firebase Messaging Service 

It is important to be cautious about the implications of granting permissions, such as excluding ‘power saving’ and allowing ‘draw over other apps’. These permissions can enable certain activities to occur discreetly in the background, raising concerns about the intentions and behavior of the applications or libraries in question. Allowing these permissions can result in more malicious behavior, such as displaying phishing pages, also to displaying ads in the background. 

Asked permissions to run in the background and keep it hidden 

When the device screen is turned off after the latent period, the fetching and loading of ads starts, resulting in users being unaware of the presence of running advertisements on their devices. This ad library registers device information by accessing the unique domain (ex: mppado.oooocooo.com) linked with the application. Then go to Firebase Storage to get the specific advertisement URL and show the ads. It is important to note that this process consumes power and mobile data resources. 

Observed traffic when the screen off 

If users quickly turn on their screens at this point, they might catch a glimpse of the ad before it is automatically closed. 

Example of an advertising site displayed when the screen is off 

In conclusion, it is essential for users to exercise caution and carefully evaluate the necessity of granting permissions like power saving exclusion, or draw over other apps before allowing them. While these permissions might be required for certain legitimate functionalities for running in the background, it is important to consider the potential risks linked with them, such as enabling hidden behaviors or reducing the relevance of ads and contents displayed to users because the hidden Clicker behavior. By using McAfee Mobile Security products, users can further safeguard their devices and mitigate the risks linked with these kinds of malware, providing a safer and more secure experience. For more information, visit McAfee Mobile Security

 

Indicators of Compromise (IoC’s)

Domains:

best.7080music.com 

m.gooogoole.com 

barocom.mgooogl.com 

newcom.mgooogl.com 

easydmb.mgooogl.com 

freekr.mgooogl.com 

fivedmb.mgooogl.com 

krlive.mgooogl.com 

sixdmb.mgooogl.com 

onairshop.mgooogle.com 

livedmb.mgooogle.com 

krbaro.mgooogle.com 

onairlive.mgooogle.com 

krdmb.mgooogle.com 

onairbest.ocooooo.com 

dmbtv.ocooooo.com 

ringtones.ocooooo.com 

onairmedia.ocooooo.com 

onairnine.ocooooo.com 

liveplay.oocooooo.com 

liveplus.oocooooo.com 

liveonair.oocooooo.com 

eightonair.oocooooo.com 

krmedia.oocooooo.com 

kronair.oocooooo.com 

newkrbada.ooooccoo.com 

trot.ooooccoo.com 

thememusic.ooooccoo.com 

trot.ooooccoo.com 

goodkrsea.ooooccoo.com 

krlive.ooooccoo.com 

news.ooooccoo.com 

bestpado.ooooccoo.com 

krtv.oooocooo.com 

onairbaro.oooocooo.com 

barolive.oooocooo.com 

mppado.oooocooo.com 

dmblive.oooocooo.com 

baromedia.oooocooo.com 

musicbada.oouooo.com 

barolive.oouooo.com 

sea.oouooo.com 

blackmusic.oouooo.com 

Android Packages 

Package Name  Application Name  SHA256  Google Play Downloads 
band.kr.com  DMB TV  f3e5aebdbd5cd94606211b04684730656e0eeb1d08f4457062e25e7f05d1c2d1  10,000+ 
com.dmb.media  DMB TV  6aaaa6f579f6a1904dcf38315607d6a5a2ca15cc78920743cf85cc4b0b892050  100,000+ 
dmb.onair.media  DMB TV  a98c5170da2fdee71b699ee145bfe4bdcb586b623bbb364a93bb8bdf8dbc4537  10,000+ 
easy.kr  DMB TV  5ec8244b2b1f516fd96b0574dc044dd40076ff7aa7dadb02dfefbd92fc3774bf  100,000+ 
kr.dmb.onair  DMB TV  e81c0fef52065864ee5021e1d4c7c78d6a407579e1d48fc4cf5551ff0540fdb8  5,000+ 
livedmb.kr  DMB TV  33e5606983526757fef2f6c1da26474f4f9bf34e966d3c204772de45f42a6107  50,000+ 
stream.kr.com  DMB TV  a13e26bce41f601a9fafdec8003c5fd14908856afbab63706b133318bc61b769  100+ 
com.breakingnews.player  뉴스 속보  d27b8e07b7d79086af2fa805ef8d77ee51d86a02d81f2b8236febb92cb9b242d  10,000+ 
jowonsoft.android.calendar  달력  46757b1f785f2b3cec2906a97597b7db4bfba168086b60dd6d58d5a8aef9e874  10,000+ 
com.music.free.bada  뮤직다운  a3fe9f9b531ab6fe79ed886909f9520a0d0ae98cf11a98f061dc179800aa5931  100,000+ 
com.musicdown  뮤직다운  5f8eb3f86fc608f9de495ff0e65b866a78c25a9260da04ebca461784f039ba16  5,000+ 
new.kr.com  뮤직다운  397373c39352ef63786fe70923a58d26cdf9b23fa662f3133ebcbc0c5b837b66  100,000+ 
baro.com  바로TV  3b4302d00e21cbf691ddb20b55b045712bad7fa71eb570dd8d3d41b8d16ce919  10,000+ 
baro.live.tv  바로TV  760aa1a6c0d1e8e4e2d3258e197ce704994b24e8edfd48ef7558454893796ebe  50,000+ 
baro.onair.media  바로TV  b83a346e18ca20ac5165bc1ce1c8807e89d05abc6a1df0adc3f1f0ad4bb5cd0c  10,000+ 
kr.baro.dmb  바로TV  84a4426b1f8ea2ddb66f12ef383a0762a011d98ff96c27a0122558babdaf0765  100,000+ 
kr.live  바로TV  cccfdf95f74add21da546a03c8ec06c7832ba11091c6d491b0aadaf0e2e57bcc  1,000+ 
newlive.com  바로TV  c76af429fabcfd73066302eeb9dd1235fd181583e6ee9ee9015952e20b4f65bf  50,000+ 
onair.baro.media  바로TV  6c61059da2ae3a8d130c50295370baad13866d7e5dc847f620ad171cc01a39e9  10,000+ 
freemusic.ringtone.player  벨소리 무료다운  75c74e204d5695c75209b74b10b3469babec1f7ef84c7a7facb5b5e91be0ae3e  100,000+ 
com.app.allplayer  실시간 TV  8d881890cfa071f49301cfe9add6442d633c01935811b6caced813de5c6c6534  50,000+ 
com.onair.shop  실시간 TV  1501dd8267240b0db0ba00e7bde647733230383d6b67678fc6f0c7f3962bd0d3  50,000+ 
eight.krdmb.onair  실시간 TV  bbd6ddbfee7482fe3fe8b5d96f3be85e09352711a36cd8cf88cfdeaf6ff90c79  10,000+ 
free.kr  실시간 TV  5f864aa88de07a10045849a7906f616d079eef94cd463e40036760f712361f79  10,000+ 
kr.dmb.nine  실시간 TV  ea49ad38dd7500a6ac12613afe705eb1a4bcab5bcd77ef24f2b9a480a34e4f46  100,000+ 
kr.live.com  실시간 TV  f09cff8a05a92ddf388e56ecd66644bf88d826c5b2a4419f371721429c1359a7  10,000+ 
kr.live.onair  실시간 TV  e8d2068d086d376f1b78d9e510a873ba1abd59703c2267224aa58d3fca2cacbd  100,000+ 
kr.live.tv  실시간 TV  1b64283e5d7e91cae91643a7dcdde74a188ea8bde1cf745159aac76a3417346e  50,000+ 
kr.media.onair  실시간 TV  bd0ac9b7717f710e74088df480bde629e54289a61fc23bee60fd0ea560d39952  100,000+ 
kr.onair.media  실시간 TV  d7dd4766043d4f7f640c7c3fabd08b1a7ccbb93eba88cf766a0de008a569ae4d  1,000+ 
live.kr.onair  실시간 TV  b84b22bc0146f48982105945bbab233fc21306f0f95503a1f2f578c1149d7e46  10,000+ 
live.play.com  실시간 TV  516032d21edc2ef4fef389d999df76603538d1bbd9d357a995e3ce4f274a9922  50,000+ 
new.com  실시간 TV  5d07a113ce389e430bab70a5409f5d7ca261bcdb47e4d8047ae7f3507f044b08  50,000+ 
newlive.kr  실시간 TV  afc8c1c6f74abfadd8b0490b454eebd7f68c7706a748e4f67acb127ce9772cdb  100,000+ 
onair.best  실시간 TV  6234eadfe70231972a4c05ff91be016f7c8af1a8b080de0085de046954c9e8e7  50,000+ 
com.m.music.free  음악다운  ded860430c581628ea5ca81a2f0f0a485cf2eeb9feafe5c6859b9ecc54a964b2  500,000+ 
good.kr.com  음악다운  bede67693a6c9a51889f949a83ff601b1105c17c0ca5904906373750b3802e91  100,000+ 
new.music.com  음악다운  fee6cc8b606cf31e55d85a7f0bf7751e700156ce5f7376348e3357d3b4ec0957  1,000+ 
play.com.apps  음악다운  b2c1caab0e09b4e99d5d5fd403c506d93497ddb2de3e32931237550dbdbe7f06  100,000+ 
com.alltrot.player  트로트 노래모음  469792f4b9e4320faf0746f09ebbcd8b7cd698a04eef12112d1db03b426ff70c  50,000+ 
com.trotmusic.player  트로트 노래모음  879014bc1e71d7d14265e57c46c2b26537a81020cc105a030f281b1cc43aeb77  5,000+ 
best.kr.com  파도 MP3  f2bbe087c3b4902a199710a022adf8b57fd927acac0895ab85cfd3e61c376ea5  100,000+ 
com.pado.music.mp3  파도 MP3  9c84c91f28eadd0a93ef055809ca3bceb10a283955c9403ef1a39373139d59f2  100,000+ 

 

 

The post Invisible Adware: Unveiling Ad Fraud Targeting Android Users appeared first on McAfee Blog.

COVID-19 – Malware Makes Hay During a Pandemic

By: Sriram P
7 May 2020 at 04:01

Special thanks to Prajwala Rao, Oliver Devane, Shannon Cole, Ankit Goel and members of Malware Research for their contribution and monitoring of related threats

As COVID-19 continues to spread across the world, it is no surprise that malware authors are exploiting the pandemic. McAfee recently released blogs around Covid-19 related threats – Staying safe while working remotely, COVID-19 Threat Update Now Includes Blood for Sale and Transitioning to a Mass Remote Workforce. The first discusses how attackers would like to leverage this pandemic as an opportunity to attack organizations, the second gives a preview of attackers playing on the fears of the general public grappling to get a hold of a cure, help manage this illness and stay safe while the third gives some direction to organizations on how to verify their security controls. In this blog we continue to discuss COVID-19 themed attacks and how to stay vigilant.

The weeks of quarantine have forced individuals and organizations to quickly adapt to a work from home model. A lot more time is spent indoors and online and there continues to be anxiety around when normalcy will be restored. For now, we continue to deal with a barrage of news articles around the pandemic, managing supply and demand of household goods in stores and online, and a shortage of medical supplies such as preventative masks, gloves and sanitizer. These are trying times for us and a feast for fear mongering malware criminals.

Over the last few months of 2020, McAfee researchers have been hard at work during this time to keep our customers safe by more directed monitoring and adaptation of our detection stack to better manage the COVID-19 threat landscape. This is not intended to be an exhaustive report due to the scope of a continually evolving landscape for COVID-19; therefore, we cover a subset of threats directed towards malware, spam and malicious/scam URL campaigns.

This blog serves to remind customers to utilize the various levers present in our endpoint product and our expanded portfolio such as McAfee’s Unified Cloud Edge. Please read our recommendation section and view our IOC section (partial IOC list based on this article), expert rules section (covers few tactics based on this article). McAfee utilizes several internal and external sourcing techniques for malware harvesting including collaboration with other industry partners as part of the Cyber Threat Alliance.

Table of contents:

Timeline

The timeline below shows a subset of prevalent malware families observed in our spam traps with references to COVID-19/Coronavirus. The malware shown in this timeline have been chosen due to their capacity for damage (such as ransomware) or their ability to propagate (Emotet for spam, or other worm like activities).

A weekly distribution of all known COVID related IOCs per week is shown below.

 

Malware

This section covers a subset of the Malware families included in the timeline above and shows the various IOCs that referenced the virus. For a more comprehensive list of IOCs please refer to the IOC section.

Ursnif

The first threat we observed taking advantage of the pandemic was Ursnif. Ursnif is a banking Trojan aimed to steal banking credentials and has been evolving to become more powerful. Ursnif collects system activities of the victims, record keystrokes, as well as keep track of network traffic and browser activity.

We have observed Ursnif using the COVID-19 filename to entice users since January 2020.

 

On executing the VBS file it drops a dll in C:\Programdata\FxrPLxT.dll and executes the .dll with rundll32.exe. The dll is injected into iexplorer.exe and communicates with its C&C server using http get requests.

IOCs

Type IOC Comment
Sha256 e82d49c11057f5c222a440f05daf9a53e860455dc01b141e072de525c2c74fb3 Filename: Coronavirus_disease_COVID-19__194778526200471.vbs
Sha256 8bcdf1fbc8cee1058ccb5510df49b268dbfce541cfc4c83e135b41e7dd150e8d Ursnif dll

 

MITRE ATT&CK™ MATRIX:

Technique ID Tactic Technique details
T1059 Execution Command-Line Interface
T1129 Execution Execution through Module Load
T1085 Defense Evasion, Execution Rundll32
T1060 Persistence Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1055 Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation Process Injection

 

Fareit

Fareit is an information stealer that steals data from web browsers, FTP programs, email clients and over a hundred different software tools installed on the infected machine. We have observed several Fareit phishing emails with the COVID/Coronavirus name. A few of them are shown below.

Fareit Spam 1:

IOCs

Type IOC Comment
Sha256 da1443a25f433e23a43d35d50328a4f935d3cce840f1e3cca99b6bd6d49ed6a7 Dropped Binary
Sha256 9f4bb022b49bd6ba0766e9408139648d2ddfe2f0dd5ca14644e5bdb2982b5e40 Email

 

MITRE ATT&CK™ MATRIX:

Technique ID Technique Technique details
T1193 Initial Access Spear phishing Attachment
T1106 Execution Execution through API
T1130 Defense Evasion Install Root Certificate
T1081 Credential Access Credentials in Files
T101 Discovery Query Registry

 

Fareit Spam 2:

IOCs

Type IOC Comment
Sha256  2faf0ef9901b80a05ed77fc20b55e89dc0e1a23ae86dc19966881a00704e5846 Attachment
Sha256 38a511b9224705bfea131c1f77b3bb233478e2a1d9bd3bf99a7933dbe11dbe3c Email

 

MITRE ATT&CK™ MATRIX:

Technique ID Technique Technique details
T1193 Initial Access Spear phishing Attachment
T1106 Execution Execution through API
T1130 Defense Evasion Install Root Certificate
T1081 Credential Access Credentials in Files
T1012 Discovery Query Registry
T1071 C & C Standard Application Layer Protocol

 

Fareit Spam 3:

IOCs

Type IOC Comment
Sha256 11a834cda4a55c8adb663fbcdd4b1f1018715dd737d3089a731b9840b77e5e76 Dropped Binary
Sha256 45c6440bdd7b49023bb42f9661caae3b12b579dfd5ae9e64421923ef452a0faf Email
Sha256 095bfab52666648ff4d2636a3718a28eab4d99a6c178a8c7912197221dd1d195 Email

 

MITRE ATT&CK™ MATRIX:

Technique ID Technique Technique details
T1193 Initial Access Spear phishing Attachment
T1106, T1204 Execution Execution through API, User Execution
T1060 Persistence Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1130 Defense Evasion Install Root Certificate
T1081 Credential Access Credentials in Files
T1012 Discovery Query Registry
T1114 Collection Email Collection

 

Fareit Spam 4:

IOCs

Type IOC Comment
Sha256 f8e041bed93783bbd5966bfba6273fe7183464035ea54fe1d59ff85a679b3e3e Dropped Binary
Sha256 9e17f5e70c30ead347b68841fa137015d713269add98f0257fb30cc6afdea4fe Attachment
Sha256 ada05f3f0a00dd2acac91e24eb46a1e719fb08838145d9ae7209b5b7bba52c67 Email

 

MITRE ATT&CK™ MATRIX:

Technique ID Technique Technique details
T1193 Initial Access Spear phishing Attachment
T1204 Execution User Execution
T1071 Command and Control Standard Application layer Protocol

 

COVID-19 Ransomware

It was no surprise that a new Ransomware family appeared on the scene. Once executed, Ransomware-GVZ will delete shadow copies with vssadmin and then proceed to encrypt all non-pe file types.  Once a whole folder has been encrypted the ransom note file below is created.

Ransomware-GVZ will also create a lock screen component so that when the machine is rebooted the following message is displayed.

 

IOCs

Type IOC Type
Sha256 3299f07bc0711b3587fe8a1c6bf3ee6bcbc14cb775f64b28a61d72ebcb8968d3 Binary

 

MITRE ATT&CK™ MATRIX:

Technique ID Tactic Technique details
T1486 Impact Data Encrypted for Impact
T1083 Discovery File and Directory Discovery
T1490 Impact Inhibit System Recovery

 

Emotet

Emotet is another prevalent threat distributed via phishing emails. We observed the following email being distributed which translated to English is:

Subject: 

Break !!! COVID-19 solution announced by WHO at the end How a total control method is discovered

Email Body:  

As published in the newsletter of the World Health Organization 3/17/2020 7:40:21 a.m. A new collaborative study identified and studied antibodies to the COVID-19 virus which could be used to design effective universal therapies against many different species of COVID-19 viruses. The results have recently been published in Nature Microbiology.

These are based on natural activities and how heat helped inhibit the virus from growing.

The COVID-19 virus causes a serious disease with high mortality badgers in humans. Several strategies have been developed to treat COVID-19 virus infection, including ZMapp, which has proven effective in non-human primates and has been used below compassionate treatment protocols in humans …

 

Please download the full text in the attached document …

Also share with all contacts to ensure quick epidermal control.

The email contains a zipped Emotet executable which once executed will use the process hollowing technique to inject into regasm.exe. It will then contact its C&C server and being to send spam email out.

IOCs

Type IOC Comment
Sha256 ca70837758e2d70a91fae20396dfd80f93597d4e606758a02642ac784324eee6 Attachment
Sha256 702feb680c17b00111c037191f51b9dad1b55db006d9337e883ca48a839e8775 Email

 

MITRE ATT&CK™ MATRIX:

Technique ID Tactic Technique details
T1121 Defense Evasion, Execution Regsvcs/Regasm
T1093 Defense Evasion Process Hollowing

Azorult

Azorult is a malware that steals data from victim’s machine which includes username, passwords, cryptocurrencies, browsing history and cookies. It also can download additional malware onto the victim’s machine. What sets Azorult apart from the other Malware described in this report, is that the creators of Azorult created a fake Coronavirus infection map website (corona-virus-map[.]com). The fake website appears as below:

IOCs

Type IOC Comment
Sha256 c40a712cf1eec59efac42daada5d79c7c3a1e8ed5fbb9315bfb26b58c79bb7a2 Jar file from domain
URL H**p://corona-virus-map.net/map.jar
Sha256 63fcf6b19ac3a6a232075f65b4b58d69cfd4e7f396f573d4da46aaf210f82564 Dropped Binary

 

MITRE ATT&CK™ MATRIX:

Technique ID Technique Technique details
T1059 Execution Command-Line Interface
T1012 Discovery Query Registry

 

NetWalker

Another Ransomware which has leveraged COVID-19 is Netwalker. The Ransomware used the filename “CORONAVIRUS_COVID-19.vbs” to trick users into executing it. The VBS file contained the embedded Ransomware payload.

On execution of vbscript, the Ransomware is dropped in “C:\Users\<UserName>\AppData\Local\Temp\qeSw.exe” and executes it.

It Deletes the shadow copies from the machine with vssadmin.exe to make file recovery more difficult.

Below shows the Obfuscated vbscript

The ransomware iterates through the folders of the infected machine and encrypts the files. Once encrypted the file extension is changed to <filename>.1fd385. A ransom note is also dropped in each folder where files were encrypted. This note is shown below.

IOCs

Type IOC Comment
Sha256 9f9027b5db5c408ee43ef2a7c7dd1aecbdb244ef6b16d9aafb599e8c40368967 CORONAVIRUS_COVID-19.vbs
Sha256 8639825230d5504fd8126ed55b2d7aeb72944ffe17e762801aab8d4f8f880160 Dropped Binary

 

MITRE ATT&CK™ MATRIX:

Technique ID Tactic Technique details
T1204 Execution User Execution
T1064 Execution Scripting
T1106 Execution Execution through API
T1490 Impact Inhibit System Recovery
T1486 Impact Data Encrypted for Impact

 

 

Nanocore RAT

NanoCore is a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) and its highly customizable plugins allows attackers to tailor its functionality to their needs. This RAT is also found to be using COVID-19 to distribute itself by using email subjects such as “Covid-19 Urgent Precaution Measures”.

IOCs

Type IOC Comment
Sha256 ca93f60e6d39a91381b26c1dd4d81b7e352aa3712a965a15f0d5eddb565a4730 Dropped Binary
Sha256 89b2324756b04df27036c59d7aaaeef384c5bfc98ec7141ce01a1309129cdf9f Iso Attachment
Sha256 4b523168b86eafe41acf65834c1287677e15fd04f77fea3d0b662183ecee8fd0 Email

 

MITRE ATT&CK™ MATRIX:

Technique ID Technique Technique details
T1193 Initial Access Spear phishing Attachment
T1053 Execution Scheduled Task
T1060 Persistence Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1143 Defense Evasion Hidden Window
T1036 Defense Evasion Masquerading
T1497 Defense Evasion Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1012 Discovery Query Registry
T1124 Discovery System Time Discovery
T1065 Command and Control Uncommonly Used Port

 

 

Hancitor

Hancitor trojan has also uses COVID–19 themes to spread itself by posing as an email from insurance company. The email contains a link to download a fake invoice which downloads a VBS file.

On executing the VBS, the Hancitor dll temp_adobe_123452643.txt is created in the %AppData/Local/Temp folder. The DLL is executed using the Regsvr32.exe and then begins to communicate with its C&C.

 

IOCs

Type IOC Comment
Sha256 2f87dd075fc12c2b6b15a1eb5ca209ba056bb6aa2feaf3518163192a17a7a3 Downloaded Binary
Sha256 0caef2718bc7130314b7f08559beba53ccf00e5ee5aba49523fb83e1d6a2a347 Downloaded Binary
Sha256 375d196227d62a95f82cf9c20657449ebea1b512d4cb19cdfe9eb8f102dd9fa Downloaded Binary
Sha256 0b8800734669aa7dbc6e67f93e268d827b5e67d4f30e33734169ddc93a026 Downloaded Binary
Sha256 9c40426f157a4b684047a428428f882618d07dc5154cf1bf89da5875a00d69c Email

 

MITRE ATT&CK™ MATRIX:

Technique ID Technique Technique details
T1192 Initial Access Spear phishing Link
T1064 Execution Scripting
T1117 Execution Regsvr32
T1071 Command and Contro Standard Application layer

Protocol

 

Heat Map

This detection heat map shows a snapshot of the various countries where McAfee has observed a detection for known IOC’s since mid-January. We have observed detections in almost all the countries which have been impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Spam

There have been thousands of COVID-19-themed spam emails sent daily. They range from medical supply scams to extortion. Below are a few examples of the ones we have observed.

 

URL

We have observed the number of Malicious URLs with references to COVID-19 and Coronavirus spike in the last few weeks. The numbers increased from 1,600 a few weeks ago to over 39,000 in week 13. This highlights the importance of being vigilant when clicking on links and accessing websites as the number of malicious sites is increasing exponentially.

 

Here are examples of malicious websites we have. False advertising is a common practice during such pandemics. At the time of this writing, there aren’t any quick testing kits available. Also testing is initiated by health care providers and therefore it is important to educate yourself and others around you to not buy into scams.

The following is an example of a fake website which offers Coronavirus testing services.

Face masks have been in high demand and in many places have run out. Additionally, there has been a shortage of masks even with the health care community. At times of panic and shortage, it is common for spammers to send out links to fake sites claiming to have medical supplies equipment. Here is a screenshot of fake online shop selling face masks.

GTI provides categorization and classification of links serving malware, phishing, scamming etc. McAfee products leverage GTI for URL protection. Also, McAfee’s Unified Cloud Edge provides secure access and expands your capabilities for URL protection.

Read about an example of one McAfee researcher is giving back by 3D printing masks and shields.

IOCs

Below is a partial list of IOCs we have observed in the field which have taken advantage of the Covid-19 outbreak. The IOCs in this section are a subset of those detected by McAfee’s solutions. We have broader coverage provided by our GTI Cloud, gateway, ATP and other products in our portfolio.

Type Value
SHA256 2ec4d4c384fe93bbe24f9a6e2451ba7f9c179ff8d18494c35ed1e92fe129e7fa
SHA256 7e52f7a7645ea5495196d482f7630e5b3cd277576d0faf1447d130224f937b05
SHA256 69724a9bd8033bd16647bc9aea41d5fe9fb7f7a83c5d6fbfb439d21b7b9f53f6
SHA256 f92fecc6e4656652d66d1e63f29de8bfc09ea6537cf2c4dd01579dc909ba0113
SHA256 a5ab358d5ab14b81df2d37aedf52716b5020ab45da472dedc8b8330d129d70bf
SHA256 8028f988c145b98ddd4663d3b5ec00435327026a8533924f7b8320c32737acf4
SHA256 aab93bf5bb0e89a96f93a5340808a7fa2cebf4756bd45d4ff5d1e6c8bdccf75d
SHA256 2e93fe77fafd705e6ca2f61f24e24a224af2490e0a3640ed53a17ea4bf993ec8
SHA256 f850f746f1a5f52d3de1cbbc510b578899fc8f9db17df7b30e1f9967beb0cf71
SHA256 dd78b0ecc659c4a8baf4ea81e676b1175f609f8a7bba7b2d09b69d1843c182cb
SHA256 e352c07b12ef694b97a4a8dbef754fc38e9a528d581b9c37eabe43f384a8a519
SHA256 e82d49c11057f5c222a440f05daf9a53e860455dc01b141e072de525c2c74fb3
SHA256 8bcdf1fbc8cee1058ccb5510df49b268dbfce541cfc4c83e135b41e7dd150e8d
SHA256 95489af84596a21b6fcca078ed10746a32e974a84d0daed28cc56e77c38cc5a8
SHA256 002c9e0578a8b76f626e59b755a8aac18b5d048f1cc76e2c12f68bc3dd18b124
SHA256 da1443a25f433e23a43d35d50328a4f935d3cce840f1e3cca99b6bd6d49ed6a7
SHA256 08c1aca51ae6917ed138ec70cc7768b935d13fbd743e85191877006626fdc530
SHA256 a9864b548d71c95333efd81d9fb000347bc715c7430e24f37f5bbbde4f2adf39
SHA256 8deba9fb53096d6ea5e2090b662244293829096eee03d06108deb15e496a807e
SHA256 c3477ca9a51e9eb1a93188fe2bd412830163f44b0954573d225736c530dd5fd2
SHA256 3e6166a6961bc7c23d316ea9bca87d8287a4044865c3e73064054e805ef5ca1a
SHA256 11a834cda4a55c8adb663fbcdd4b1f1018715dd737d3089a731b9840b77e5e76
SHA256 bc03c23a46a545addd1831e133b74bd2e62eb920041f18a23ec9719ea052e642
SHA256 8075381d210f7e79ee387927b7d6d690521c01ba6d835d07c4e8f023b3c164ce
SHA256 75d7d989deea561443c1c204ad22537d0c131f57820594ab5f07baba16dbc58b
SHA256 0cc54663439a55191b77e0735b7460a7435dc01542e910d75eae20ce7bb513e5
SHA256 c40a712cf1eec59efac42daada5d79c7c3a1e8ed5fbb9315bfb26b58c79bb7a2
SHA256 63fcf6b19ac3a6a232075f65b4b58d69cfd4e7f396f573d4da46aaf210f82564
SHA256 ca93f60e6d39a91381b26c1dd4d81b7e352aa3712a965a15f0d5eddb565a4730
SHA256 9f9027b5db5c408ee43ef2a7c7dd1aecbdb244ef6b16d9aafb599e8c40368967
SHA256 8639825230d5504fd8126ed55b2d7aeb72944ffe17e762801aab8d4f8f880160
SHA256 0caef2718bc7130314b7f08559beba53ccf00e5ee5aba49523fb83e1d6a2a347
SHA256 375d196227d62a95f82cf9c20657449ebea1b512d4cb19cdfe9eb8f102dd9fae
SHA256 0b8800734669aa7dbc6e67f93e268d827b5e67d4f30e33734169ddc93a026d2e
SHA256 12f87dd075fc12c2b6b15a1eb5ca209ba056bb6aa2feaf3518163192a17a7a3b
SHA256 f8e041bed93783bbd5966bfba6273fe7183464035ea54fe1d59ff85a679b3e3e
SHA256 ca93f60e6d39a91381b26c1dd4d81b7e352aa3712a965a15f0d5eddb565a4730
SHA256 da1443a25f433e23a43d35d50328a4f935d3cce840f1e3cca99b6bd6d49ed6a7
SHA256 3386dc7dc67edd5e84244376b6067e3767e914a1cc1fc7fd790a6aa68750a824
SHA256 3fc33b537fb38e1f586ddb3ebbbe152458dcde336c2f26da81d756e290b5ef00
SHA256 7cbcad4d6e9ad8438e5febd3830bff9aef4729b98d23935ad7f9e6d290272732
SHA256 0a84308348fee6bbfe64a9ef23bb9c32cb319bcdf5cf78ddfda4a83dadea4b8e
SHA256 ba4297978b6a6b5fe2b66c32ead47bbd1f2e2f549beed5cd727eb9ae3fed6b6a
SHA256 c9d3c250ab6d8535b7a4114a1e9545f0b9bc24e4e277640c59b7555f38727885
SHA256 37354a04f6d423809602e198e590469173cc8e930cc7fdd4da2c2072977251e9
SHA256 3a7a8518b41dd6c05289a08974c95a0038be4e5d1b0588edfd0589fcf22b0c8f
SHA256 ea3a0a223474592635d1fb7a0731dd28a96381ad2562e3e064f70e2d4830c39d
SHA256 140da6b610a45f84c6438207ab11942d79eb37831551810f87baae80cfff4593
SHA256 2c9c1e04d806ad8890dd6bf4477efb4ea6c78b8185a9996876bcaea568a04e70
SHA256 8a724fc60bde738694779751d6c63a7ed1caa03518b8f26b9acb36d5c1b29930
SHA256 d765980228492758a11e534e45924311aef681cb5859f701cd457b6b871c2d06
SHA256 d8183919d675978d58cd1f134768f88adeea9ce53b167c917e54fff855c6d9f9
SHA256 ac416780fa4aa340fff2787e630351c5813faceb823424817eb10e82254b785d
SHA256 3cd099efe4cb426fdc6276380c224b5478d0841c5c44d2c0a088d039d529d258
SHA256 c135f36d3346699e6d2bf9f5f5f638fd9475c0b12144a15a0652b8f1ebb25c12
SHA256 49cfa1b3cbe2bf97079c0dd0a9f604e3f2e7d9fbb6d41128a9889e068aa884f6
SHA256 5e20a0ab563950eab76c023101b1dd374becac2a5149a74320b23b59a7f16256
SHA256 7a9f249978c959e1f11f2992a8ce4a70ba333c8dbdc2638c780bbbe62de4808e
SHA256 c6dc408d60c2354a13e835bf826300a6d5258b72b8826e8c46d946cbc1f0b455
SHA256 b04584ee8b3ba565541cb0f4d8787ed6e8942b6bdec5b1acdc03488b93aeb3cb
SHA256 b283e4f841e328f0cc12ebdf76aafb819ebadba7df863681994b69697731cf96
SHA256 adde95e8813ca27d88923bd091ca2166553a7b904173ef7a2c04bb3ddf8b14a9
SHA256 bf178911f2c063c9592020652dc22076d02ca87d14a7ed7862074d334470ae32
SHA256 3981d933de93f55641fdf8cfe980e40a0bf52ce8b022735e8ebc4f08cbb19104
SHA256 aa6ceb17ced471e1695c99c0718bc24c710311f0daa256cb0783d82218d772c9
SHA256 f7209d1099c75acccbef29450271d821fd78ad52176f07aa8a93a9e61e9eaa7f
SHA256 eab14b1bfa737644f14f7bb7ace007d418230285364e168e35bd718a6517b316
SHA256 b34f4ec4ae8d66b030f547efe3acc2a71c9ab564f78aac68719ec91dab613bb3
SHA256 006dc4ebf2c47becdc58491162728990147717a0d9dd76fefa9b7eb83937c60b
SHA256 e17dca7c2c05139fc81302e76e0e9aaa29368b60cb147208cbcb5c8df113f6f6
SHA256 2e47f37bef4dea338e366ce30fe54888e5aaa2d47a5c0db4a3c3e9e5c25f8ace
SHA256 21182b7834a7e13033be7b370a68b3d3639f4cae12fe80e2a908404cbd4cd324
SHA256 46f81af256c630969f55554ea832037bc64df4374ec0f06ac83a1c4b89869314
SHA256 89a0147dec8d6838f14815b577ae41dbcf54953c66e7f5f999ab91fea6ec08fa
SHA256 2f3ee4688a31c8d249b8426f46e392d9c55b85bfad9fb31fb362eb32d38bd9b3
SHA256 f2a2bea86ce1a4803345b4aa46824c25d383a0b40b10bb69e528c72305552a2a
SHA256 698eb726345c71eca7b4a531bfa76ab6e86ef100f943a727fb5866a84ec79289
SHA256 92af9c8c539ff9f99f79cce8453b1c483d117c095e2e0ffe384d96e35f72dc8b
SHA256 7cf8f24d7e8b1e2f63bfa7a18cd420a03fff44126e80aed8cb90fba3c4e986ac
SHA256 1e4b01e3e146ff01a3782b01680a5165432af556331d599ec6ad35b4983b216f
SHA256 cba1c3070f76e1a2705afee16bd987b6a8ffa45900cab8cf3b307f60a7b89ac9
SHA256 e32cca6446f2ddd8430400b16fc171ab3163cf8222669d7d9144e9c85904d5f5
SHA256 8c0a8d6876a6c7fe44962883561d9f48615ee67f4544872ec98f47edcf516509
SHA256 a080d763c60efd4ef2781ad3090c997d1092ac726707366d92d647f26ee2965f
SHA256 9d58ca5383fef5dc837ca9d4251d247bed4ead4a6b90a9aae30568be80e20543
SHA256 345d8b4c0479d97440926471c2a8bed43162a3d75be12422c1c410f5ec90acd9
SHA256 39c17475bdb019010453085830e7f8aa1ef41ca182982491306fcf75166b8e08
SHA256 bdcef0f16c70086414ff95b69fdbbe7eb0c9814308d3d60143b6c04dfc077257
SHA256 7a97fc7bdd0ad4ef4453c2e52dd8f44dee9b4e91ff3b5518e311ef1ebac3b667
SHA256 2437ef90b60cf3d6bd0c3eebf3f41ed1e403bc31b024b52b0f41ec648d80a583
SHA256 a537c75de9a95be0c071fd6437cbaf3696752f02c3cd5afa1c9cc47c4c755f75
SHA256 9367f3ea7460ae40ca69d41398327f97136a93656ef5fad1285a0b82f81522a4
SHA256 78cf7ea3c1da98941e164f4ac3f75b57e9bce11467bc5a6c6877846f1adcf150
SHA256 e55efa92d87484cf6b251f2302a0c0c7650acd7ea658bf9997bf761b64fe472a
SHA256 51f0e9b151bde97ebeb813d6eed8a11f02551a6530049f53dc29fc1a20b6699d
SHA256 e382ee1ce9d99f4e8e18833bac121c14ee2e5dc29a8b5382ca5b4eda9db7f1aa
SHA256 e250d977e47e7809086dd35a2767f9ef557591dd00e9ce96ef4071e4f0d8c670
SHA256 50a3bea4b9686bcf5cac144d4fc18aa178f66c8368205f9065cd1d9a2c41f026
SHA256 722a60dfd59a595daa487f2fb759ef6f9ccaabcdf20605d5ae9450cba4a9b9b2
SHA256 1c3532d143212078e204d0f81a782deacd58e8f0e7253472e0509491fd1e5201
SHA256 980de93ad93ecaabc048c9fcc9d62e43eeb32f216c4177963cf1bd94ad53074b
SHA256 a286e3be694b9525530ec6a65b71a8a91e04042c3471e8a9e440f503fe8ce995
SHA256 dbcef5c217a027b8e29b1b750c42a066650820a129543f19364bcb64ac83bc07
SHA256 80f8877406e899c6274331aa991b8d1f4f087e3233c36d39fbaebb729c294899
SHA256 32753598f94412fe3dc382dc12dcf2edf7881d9f07814c82aeec36481b9362b5
SHA256 0fdc97da1c297e6fef93910008fc5c47cbdcd3e2987bc163467b34f56de112ff
SHA256 501cc107e410b245d1b95b64ae0afdae758375b4b3724acfda44041bad963232
SHA256 31cb82cd750af6af9ecf369fd26d47dc913f6b56be6ea12b10fe6dd90ef1b5df
SHA256 da87521ecc146a92a7460a81ebb5ca286450f94c8c9af2a4b3c6c8a180d421c5
SHA256 2bcd35bfb7e4dbdbbf64fce5011199947794425093be7bc74829bfeadb89f0a3
SHA256 90c3d8d13ea151bce21a1f4b842d0ed4eaff09842b23311b2326cf63957fc2b2
SHA256 257afe9f4d7b282b1c0b2f3ebb7e1e80e96c8e0214f1b80ea2b7b636a4e7747d
SHA256 587840d28f2585dd5207731d7fda86a0966c82fa592a26f9148b2de45526db55
SHA256 80ee20c604d5d4b51a30dc21da271651f3c085c40281e3ff3e2ee0175d2ca98d
SHA256 11b4519b76957b0758381f8e19c5e15d8744f7974716642aeb586c615dde38fa
SHA256 6c34cca35d98e464c2f74abd9be670c7f8f707f37cd3f0fd4746c49f8fcf6b07
SHA256 0a8aa3f413a8989bb89599dfc2404f7d34dfbb2e3ce26e900d228e9e8c8908b8
SHA256 c57fa2a5d1a65a687f309f23ca3cfc6721d382b06cf894ee5cd01931bbc17a46
SHA256 9f27a826b4b873c9ea23e023f54d5291a50004d67dd5fe64d1f8c8e8b51b74e3
SHA256 2037c7cc809ed3eddd1338d2bec6266cdb449dbf8ff3510fd360a08d229d4f40
SHA256 8f91d27d3a59c08ab4c453b2679f4620696ba67c56280a4c3757368acb20aad3
SHA256 e8221acccdb8381b5da25a1f61f49dda86b861b52fafe54629396ed1e3346282
SHA256 dc66811ce189240c510733be9e1a2175079dddb80ebf02faaa044fce1f7134d0
SHA256 5b7db5046ba22a6242d5ff6e8f538ad43bba53810117d5eb8f023215aad26e6b
SHA256 f6879431b901df789082452c1c4ffa29e857d247886e421df6dda5fb3d81ca5e
SHA256 4a272dd4a5c6261e983d667dd676875054dd4a4ea11620f16c553fcfd2c44861
SHA256 cc2507ddd53a6f00265f3be51d7217def786914bd1d700ec3c74a2a7107b3476
SHA256 9e4cb963e509fbde6de003a81a3e19cfc703be1c41d20f4b094a0fa89d6ad02c
SHA256 b14d70827d5d668aeb31e94be512fea9fb38ead8ec12cdf7617616801c76b6e9
SHA256 b49c9eba58537f8d856daded80bc9493a83c508d73423b98686d4e8b232d61c3
SHA256 4c9e35f3d5f555dda5f4373cf23fbb289c6067c70841be7022ba6da62e49cccb
SHA256 acec0bb9d9bd199d3e6a77b763cebee8f67275996d3c55af8c617fef76f2e87f
SHA256 7cbcad4d6e9ad8438e5febd3830bff9aef4729b98d23935ad7f9e6d290272732
SHA256 c9c0180eba2a712f1aba1303b90cbf12c1117451ce13b68715931abc437b10cd
SHA256 c322d10ef3aa532d4625f1c2589eae0f723208db37a7c7e81e4f07e36c3a537e
SHA256 3c756d761e89a0ea1216e2b7e57250ac76a80d5fe4f072e3b4b372e609ece74e
SHA256 2a42f500d019a64970e1c63d48eefa27727f80fe0a5b13625e0e72a6ec98b968
SHA256 679a8519587909f655bacea438168cbb4c03434aede9913d9a3a637c55a0eae7
SHA256 e9766b6129d9e1d59b92c4313d704e8cdc1a9b38905021efcac334cdd451e617
SHA256 80392bebe21245128e3353eec7f499bdc5550e67501eceebf21985644d146768
SHA256 215c72df44fe8e564d24f4d9930c27409e7f76e2045c67940cdcecdbdbd3b04f
SHA256 9e12094c15f59d68ad17e5ed42ebb85e5b41f4258823b7b5c7472bdff21e6cee
SHA256 1c98a36229b878bae15985c1ae0ff96e42f36fa06359323f205e18431d780a3b
SHA256 e9621840e1bfaf16eaee37e2d1e9d1f0032158a09e638eaebff6d8626d47c95a
SHA256 c51658ed15a09e9d8759c9fbf24665d6f0101a19a2a147e06d58571d05266d0a
SHA256 5187c9a84f5e69ba4b08538c3f5e7432e7b45ac84dec456ea07325ff5e94319a
SHA256 ddb24e0a38ba9194fe299e351e54facb2cca9e6011db2f5242210284df91f900
SHA256 69724a9bd8033bd16647bc9aea41d5fe9fb7f7a83c5d6fbfb439d21b7b9f53f6
SHA256 d7f15f750cceeb9e28e412f278949f183f98aeb65fe99731b2340c8f1c008465
SHA256 238fa49ed966cb746bffee3e7ca95b4a9db3bb0f897b8fd8ae560f9080749a82
SHA256 69724a9bd8033bd16647bc9aea41d5fe9fb7f7a83c5d6fbfb439d21b7b9f53f6
SHA256 f92fecc6e4656652d66d1e63f29de8bfc09ea6537cf2c4dd01579dc909ba0113
SHA256 5b12f8d817b5f98eb51ef675d5f31d3d1e34bf06befba424f08a5b28ce98d45a
SHA256 3b701eac4e3a73aec109120c97102c17edf88a20d1883dd5eef6db60d52b8d92
SHA256 b49c9eba58537f8d856daded80bc9493a83c508d73423b98686d4e8b232d61c3
SHA256 acec0bb9d9bd199d3e6a77b763cebee8f67275996d3c55af8c617fef76f2e87f
SHA256 4c9e35f3d5f555dda5f4373cf23fbb289c6067c70841be7022ba6da62e49cccb
URL https[:]//onedrive[.]live[.]com/download?cid=265DAF943BE0D06F&resid=265DAF943BE0D06F%21171&authkey=AMI1YV6jNxclaec
URL http[:]//popeorigin[.]pw
URL http[:]//dewakartu[.]info/wp-includes/BRVMFYvIR/
URL http[:]//drhuzaifa[.]com/wp-includes/2i48k7-evv28gw-205510/
URL http[:]//dewarejeki[.]info/wp-includes/up58jauc-pum2w-630352/
URL http[:]//rasmus-plius[.]tomasjs[.]com/wp-admin/KfesPCcG/
URL http[:]//easytogets[.]com/xfxvqq/UxbKAbm/
URL https[:]//cloud-security[.]ggpht[.]ml
URL http[:]//secure[.]zenithglobalplc[.]com/assets/plugins/bootstrap-wizard/system_x64[.]exe
URL http[:]//motivation[.]neighboring[.]site/01/index[.]php
URL https[:]//onedrive[.]live[.]com/download?cid=265DAF943BE0D06F&resid=

265DAF943BE0D06F%21171&authkey=AMI1YV6jNxclaec

URL http[:]//tailuong[.]com[.]vn/[.]xxx/playbook/onelove/fre[.]php
URL https[:]//www[.]onetimeroma[.]com/lost/rockstar[.]php
URL https[:]//www[.]chapeauartgallery[.]com/SUPPORTS/locals[.]php
URL http[:]//www[.]discusshoops[.]com/DISQUS[.]php
URL https[:]//chomyflozy[.]duckdns[.]org
URL http[:]//www[.]slacktracks[.]info/e12/?LJfxZ=hO3hBkxu1F/QQoVtLv3IhDwCcknmtRcJonnhtJ3R0BM0GC3rHSS1kgq0DEskVYHjDJX+/Q==&Vp8h=cz7tTz9p-90h4gt
URL http[:]//www[.]webfeatusa[.]net/e12/?LJfxZ=1CbYOqydIT70m9XPNsNZ3X3NgDEVQnw/rRrz+k+vF8uL+qJ4J3WKysbsjxdZCzgGrC1++w==&Vp8h=cz7tTz9p90h4gt&sql=1
URL http[:]//www[.]makeupprimerspray[.]com/e12/?LJfxZ=NSQopDdawCOOQSyQXUSgSx+w/7t91r6e8z0AUnmVGKAxI+P615MDhQgbvUIoIJuh35rtRQ==&Vp8h=cz7tTz9p90h4gt&sql=1
URL http[:]//mercadosonntag[.]com[.]br/sK2vbV3
URL https[:]//corona-virus-map[.]net/map[.]jar
URL http[:]//corona-virus-map[.]com
URL http[:]//arinnnnnnnn[.]ddns[.]net
URL http[:]//tailuong[.]com[.]vn/[.]xxx/playbook/onelove/fre[.]php
URL http[:]//bralibuda[.]com/4/forum.php
URL http[:]//greferezud[.]com/4/forum[.]php
URL http[:]//deraelous[.]com/4/forum[.]php
URL http[:]//bslines[.]xyz/copy/five/fre[.]php
URL http[:]//dewakartu[.]info/wp-includes/BRVMFYvIR/
URL http[:]//dewarejeki[.]info/wp-includes/up58jauc-pum2w-630352/
URL https[:]//healing-yui223[.]com/cgi-sys/suspendedpage[.]cgi
URL http[:]//109[.]236[.]109[.]159/vnx8v
URL http[:]//www[.]drhuzaifa[.]com/wp-includes/2i48k7-evv28gw-205510/
URL http[:]//85[.]96[.]49[.]152/6oU9ipBIjTSU1
URL https[:]//urbanandruraldesign[.]com[.]au/cdcgov/files/
URL http[:]//198[.]23[.]200[.]241/~power13/.xoiaspxo/fre.php
URL http[:]//helpvan[.]su/
URL http[:]//erasmus-plius[.]tomasjs[.]com/wp-admin/KfesPCcG/
URL https[:]//share[.]dmca[.]gripe/jUuWPW6ONwL1Wkux[.]bin
URL https[:]//gocycle[.]com[.]au/cdcgov/files/
URL https[:]//onthefx[.]com/cd[.]php
URL http[:]//186[.]10[.]98[.]177/faHtH2y
URL http[:]//dewakartu[.]info/wp-includes/BRVMFYvIR/
URL http[:]//drhuzaifa[.]com/wp-includes/2i48k7-evv28gw-205510/
URL http[:]//dewarejeki[.]info/wp-includes/up58jauc-pum2w-630352/
URL http[:]//erasmus-plius[.]tomasjs[.]com/wp-admin/KfesPCcG/
URL http[:]//easytogets[.]com/xfxvqq/UXbKAbm/
URL http[:]//dw[.]adyboh[.]com
URL http[:]//wy[.]adyboh[.]com
URL http[:]//feb[.]kkooppt[.]com
URL http[:]//compdate[.]my03[.]com
URL http[:]//jocoly[.]esvnpe[.]com
URL http[:]//bmy[.]hqoohoa[.]com
URL http[:]//bur[.]vueleslie[.]com
URL http[:]//wind[.]windmilldrops[.]com
URL http[:]//vahlallha[.]duckdns[.]org
URL http[:]//cloud-security[.]ggpht[.]ml
URL http[:]//kbfvzoboss[.]bid

 

Recommendation

This section contains some recommendations which we encourage you to follow. In addition, please also read the following blog also provides some guidance for organizations that have a workforce working remotely and about how McAfee Unified Cloud Edge can help.

Software Updates

As with all our publications, we encourage all our customers to keep their McAfee software up to date. This ensures that you will have the latest signatures and rules to help protect against similar threats to the ones mentioned in this report.

We also recommend installing the latest OS patches, VPN Patches and all other software updates on your machine. In addition we highly recommend utilizing SASE solutions such as McAfee’s Unified Cloud Edge.

Spotting Spam/Phishing emails

The best way to protect yourself is to not open unsolicited emails as malicious files are often distributed via email with the use of attachments or links. To help identify malicious emails, please read this blog: How to Spot Phishing Lures

Global Threat Intelligence (GTI)

McAfee GTI uses heuristics and file reputations checks on suspicious files through on-access scanning and on-demand scanning. This can provide near real time protection. The following KB Article contains the steps for changing the GTI sensitivity level on McAfee products.

You can configure the sensitivity level that McAfee GTI uses when it determines if a detected sample is malware. The McAfee GTI sensitivity level is set to Medium by default. Configure the sensitivity level for each scanner in the On-Access Scan and On-Demand Scan settings.

Sensitivity Level:

  • Very low — High confidence detections. Less aggressive GTI Setting, also least FP prone.
  • Low — This setting is the minimum recommendation for systems with a strong security footprint.
  • Medium — default setting on most products.
  • High — Use this setting for deployment to systems or areas which are regularly infected.
  • Very high — Most aggressive. Detections found with this level are presumed malicious but haven’t been fully tested. McAfee recommends using this level for systems that require highest security but may also result in higher false positive rate.

Endpoint Security (ENS) Product

ENS is our Endpoint Security product and provides a broad range of default protection, self-help protection and detection abilities.

Expert Rules

Expert Rules are text-based custom rules that can be created in the Exploit Prevention policy in ENS Threat Prevention 10.5.3 and above.

Expert Rules provide additional parameters and allow much more flexibility than the custom rules that can be created in the Access Protection policy. It also allows system administration to control / monitor an endpoint system at a very granular level. This is a very useful toolkit for administrators and SOC’s and allow quick creation and deployment of powerful extensions to detect and protect ability. You can author monitoring and blocking for processes, files, memory injection, module load and unload events, etc.

We recommend reading the following blog which describes how to use Expert Rules and gives some good examples which would help block potentially malicious activity.

 

Here are some examples of quick expert rules you can formulate to utilize at your endpoint against Covid-19 related threats

Example Rule – 1

The following rule helps block archived corona named executables accessed from inside archived email attachments

Rule {

Process {

Include OBJECT_NAME { -v “**” }

}

Target {

Match PROCESS {

Include OBJECT_NAME { -v “**\\appdata\\Local\\temp\\Rar*\\*corona*.exe” }

Include OBJECT_NAME { -v “**\\appdata\\Local\\temp\\Rar*\\*covid*.exe” }

Include -access “CREATE”

}

}

}

 

Example Rule – 2

The following rule helps block COVID named document containing macros accessed from email attachments or downloaded locations

Rule {

Process {

Include OBJECT_NAME { -v “**\\winword.exe” }

Include PROCESS_CMD_LINE { -v “**corona**” }

Include PROCESS_CMD_LINE { -v “**covid**” }

}

Target {

Match SECTION {

Include OBJECT_NAME { -v “**\\vbe7.dll” }

Include OBJECT_NAME { -v “**\\vbe7intl.dll” }

}

}

}

 

Example Rule – 3

The following Expert rule prevents certain version of Foobar Communication software from executing.

Rule {

Process {

Include OBJECT_NAME { -v “**” }

}

Target {

Match PROCESS {

Include DESCRIPTION { -v “FooBar Communications ” }

Include VERSION { -v “4,5,**” }

Include -access “CREATE”

 

}

}

}

 

Expert rules are flexible that the SOC analyst / author can test the rules in report only mode and then check for potential falses in the environment. Finally, they can be turned on to block mode.

JTI Rules

JTI Rules are released fortnightly and they target suspicious process chains and command-line threats. They also additionally detect suspicious files based on locations / characteristics. From the collection of JTI rules, we recommend turning on the few of Evaluate or HighOn rules for advanced threat protection. These rules can be turned default on from the EPO console.

  • Protection from suspicious Command line parameters where malware invokes PowerShell with command-line parameters for malicious activities. This rule is identifiable in the EPO console with the rule id 262.
    • Rule:262 – Identify suspicious command parameter execution for Security rule group assignments
  • Protection from malware launching suspicious command-line based script applications like WScript, CScript, and PowerShell. This rule is identifiable in the EPO console with the rule id 320.
    • Rule:320 – Prevent cmd.exe from launching other script interpreters such as CScript or PowerShell by default only in Security rule group assignments
  • Protection from files being executed from non-standard locations like \windows\fonts or \windows\resources location. This rule also protects spawning of wmiprvse.exe from suspicious process’s like foobar.exe, etc. This rule is identifiable in the EPO console with the rule id 238
    • Rule 238 – Identify abuse of common process’s spawned from non-standard locations

Fortnightly released JTI rules are normally released in Evaluate or HighOn setting. We recommend EPO admins to go through the release notes of the product and enable rules that suits their environment.

Enable AMSI

AMSI by default is set to observe mode. We recommend changing this to block mode as it will detect a vast majority of threats which are often email based such a JavaScript downloaders.

Please read this blog to find out more about AMSI and which threats it helps detect.

Suspicious Email attachment detection

As shown in this report, Email remains a top vector for attackers.  McAfee endpoint products use a combination of product features and content for increased agility.  In McAfee Endpoint Security (ENS) 10.5 and above, such protection is enabled via the ‘Detect suspicious email attachments’ option and maintained through DAT content.  This capability goes beyond the level of protection offered by email clients by not only blocking applications and scripts, but also a variety of threat types in their native form, as well as those compressed and contained within archives and other formats.

For a guide on how to enable this please read this blog: McAfee Protects Against Suspicious Email Attachements

ATP (Adaptive Threat Protection)

McAfee ATP (Adaptive Threat Protection) utilizes Machine Learning via our Real Protect Module. This provides pre and post execution monitoring of threats using ML models that are deployed locally and in the cloud. In addition, ATP provides and additional layer of protection with advanced rules for threat evaluation based on static and behavioral features.

We recommend enabling Real Protect at the default settings at the minimum. ATP rules come in three forms: Evaluate, DefaultOn and HighOn.

  • Evaluate rules are tested in the field by McAfee to determine if they are robust enough to detect malicious activity. They do not block by default but log activity in the ATP log. Such rules can be enabled by administrators via EPO to Block. McAfee researchers on a regular basis analyze performance of such rules and make modifications to promote them to DefaultOn (Rule Assignment to Balanced (default)) or HighOn (Rule Assignment to Security). Prior to manual enablement for Block mode, it is recommended that you observe triggers via the ATP logs to ensure they suite your environment.
  • DefaultOn rules are high confidence rules that block by default within ENS ATP and MVISION Endpoint. They can be turned off if required by administrators from within EPO.
  • HighOn rules detect behavior that is known to be malicious but may have some overlap with non-malicious applications. These rules work as Evaluate in balanced posture but act as DefaultOn in Security posture. Administrators are encouraged to utilize this setting to during high malware activity events for monitoring and default blocking.

For details on Rule descriptions, security posture and settings please refer this KB Article: https://kc.mcafee.com/corporate/index?page=content&id=KB82925

Unified Cloud Edge

Get a SASE (Secure Access Service Edge) architected web protection solution like McAfee’s Unified Cloud Edge. This delivers anytime/anywhere protection (like WFH scenarios) for web traffic, cloud-native and cloud-to-cloud traffic – whether you’re on a VPN, or directly connected to the internet. As an example, even if you access a link from a malicious email or visit a hostile site in a non-VPN setting, you will continue to benefit from our GTI and cloud-based threat to protect against malicious sites and downloads. Unified Cloud Edge can expand your capabilities for URL protection by providing the following:

  1. Malicious URL – blocked via GTI and URL
  2. Block any download from a benign URL (example: onedrive.live.com) – possible to block via tenant restrictions. For example: corporate Onedrive permitted, personal (live.com) or other companies blocked.
  3. Malicious download – blocked by the cloud gateway file engines, including AV, GAM, and GTI.
  4. 3rd party Malicious upload (placing a payload in an open share on the company Onedrive) – blocked via API-based scanning of the corporate sanctioned services, same AV/GAM/GTI layers of inspection.

MVISION Unified Cloud Edge protects data from device to cloud and prevents cloud-native threats that are invisible to the corporate network. This creates a secure environment for the adoption of cloud services, enabling cloud access from any device and allowing ultimate workforce productivity.

Conclusion

As you can see from this report, there are various threats which are taking advantage of this pandemic. We will continue to enable our customers to use our recommendations to remain safe during this challenging time. Be extra vigilant online and stay safe and healthy always!

As we continually provide recommendations based on current data, we encourage regular reading of McAfee blogs where you will find regular updates on threat patterns and protection information.

The post COVID-19 – Malware Makes Hay During a Pandemic appeared first on McAfee Blog.

Tales From the Trenches; a Lockbit Ransomware Story

Co-authored by Marc RiveroLopez.

In collaboration with Northwave

As we highlighted previously across two blogs, targeted ransomware attacks have increased massively over the past months. In our first article, we discussed the growing pattern of targeted ransomware attacks where the primary infection stage is often an info-stealer kind of malware used to gain credentials/access to determine if the target would be valuable for a ransomware attack. In the second part, we described the reconnaissance phase of an attacker that controls an infected host or a valid account to access a remote service. Many of them are using a similar manual modus operandi as we highlighted in the earlier blogs.

We believe there is real opportunity to learn from incident response cases and previous attacks, hence why this blog is dubbed ‘tales from the trenches’. In collaboration with Northwave, this article describes a real-life case of a targeted ransomware attack. During one of their recent incident responses, Northwave encountered a relatively new family of ransomware called LockBit performing a targeted attack. First sighted in late 2019, under the name .abcd virus, this piece of ransomware was more a revision than evolution when compared with earlier attacks. Like the previous posts in this blog series, we describe the different stages of the attack and recovery, including a thorough analysis of the ransomware and the attackers behind it.

In this blog we’ll cover:

LockBit Telemetry Map

We gathered telemetry through our McAfee Global Threat Intelligence GTI database on the different LockBit samples we analyzed in our research. The global spread is currently limited as this ransomware is relatively new and heavily targeted.

Figure 1: Telemetry map

Initial Access

As in all ransomware cases, the attacker has to gain initial access to the network somehow. In this particular case the attacker performed a brute force attack on a web server containing an outdated VPN service. Based on our research it took several days for the brute force to crack the password of the ‘Administrator’ account. With this account, belonging to the administrator group, the attacker immediately obtained the proverbial “keys to the kingdom” with all the necessary permissions to perform a successful attack. Unfortunately, this is not a unique case; external facing systems should always have multi-factor authentication enabled when possible. Besides, a security organization should have a least privilege strategy when it comes to accessing systems. Targeted ransomware attackers are successfully leveraging the “human factor” integrally. It is no longer the typical “end-user clicking on a malicious link” causing the complete lock-up of a company. The human factor in targeted ransomware attacks goes much deeper. Attackers successfully leverage weaknesses in security policy and misconfigurations across an entire organization; from end-user to Domain Administrator.

Infiltrating the Network

To infiltrate the network, the attacker had to take several steps to make sure the ransomware attack was successful. An attacker always wants to infect as many systems as possible to effectively halt the business process and urge the victim to pay the ransom.

Credentials & Privileges

As mentioned previously, the attacker was successful in guessing the password of the Administrator account using a brute force attack. With this, the attacker immediately had all the necessary privileges for deploying the ransomware successfully. In other cases, as we described in our second blog, the attacker often uses known post-exploitation frameworks, for privilege escalation, lateral movement and performing any additional actions on their objective. Since quite a few of these frameworks are readily available we often call this the “GitHubification” of attack tools. In this case however, the attacker could actually skip this step and continue with the network reconnaissance and deployment of the ransomware immediately, since a high privileged account was already compromised.

Lateral Movement

With the administrator-level account, the attacker used SMB to perform network reconnaissance, resulting in an overview of accessible hosts. Subsequently, the attacker used the internal Microsoft Remote Access Server (RAS) to access these systems using either the administrator or the LocalSystem account. The LocalSystem account is a built-in Windows account. It is the most authoritative account on a Windows local instance (more potent than any admin account). Using these accounts, the attacker owned these systems and could do anything they wanted, including turning off any end-point security products. Interestingly, both the lateral movement and the deployment of the ransomware was entirely automated.

Deployment of the Ransomware

This specific case was a classic hit and run. After gaining access to the initial system using the brute-forced administrator account, the attacker logged in and deployed the ransomware almost immediately. For the attacker, this was a relatively straightforward process since the ransomware spreads itself. The deployment of the ransomware on one single host remotely instructed the other hosts in the network to run the following PowerShell command:

Figure 2: PowerShell execution to download LockBit

This command retrieves a .png file from a website that has probably been compromised. There are two versions of the .png file, one for .NET version 4 and one for version 3.5. The PowerShell command checks which version it needs by getting the version number of the common language runtime that is running the current process. If this starts with ‘V4’, the .png for version 4 is downloaded; otherwise it downloads the .png for version 3.5 via the URLs below:

  • https://espet[.]se/images/rs35.png
  • https://espet[.]se/images/rs40.png

What is interesting in this case is that each distinct host downloads the ransomware itself. Hence, the attacker only needed access to one system with an account having enough privileges to automatically make all other hosts in the network download and execute it.

Malware Analysis

For our analysis, we will use the file found in our investigation, the details of which are:

  File name: rs35.png
SHA1 488e532e55100da68eaeee30ba342cc05810e296
SHA256 ca57455fd148754bf443a2c8b06dc2a295f014b071e3990dd99916250d21bc75
size 546.00 KB
PDB c:\users\user\work\code\dotnet\regedit-64\regedit-64\obj\release\rs35.pdb
guid 84e7065-65fe-4bae-a122-f967584e31db

Technical Analysis

The file we found in our investigation was a dropper renamed as a .png file. When first opening the .png files we were expecting a real image file, with perhaps some steganography inside, but what we saw instead was the header of a portable executable, so no steganography pictures this time. The PE was compiled in Microsoft Visual C# v7.0 / Basic .NET, .NET executable -> Microsoft.

Figure 3: Static analysis of LockBit

Entropy-wise it seems quite tidy too, not showing any stray sections or big spikes in the graph. This behavior indicates that the writer of the malware did not use obfuscation.

Figure 4: Entropy analysis

Figure 5: Portex visualization of LockBit

This file is a .NET launcher. Examining the Main() function in the code shows that an array containing a particularly long AES encrypted base64 string (in the variable named ‘exeBuffer’) carries the executable for the actual ransomware.

Figure 6: .NET launcher buffer

This encrypted string is decrypted using the key ENCRYPTION29942. The first 32 bytes of the long ExeBuffer string are used as the salt in the encryption scheme, where ENCRYPTION29942 is the passphrase.

Figure 7: Launcher calls & functions

Remarkably, the script checks for the existence of vbc.exe on its designated host. Usually, this binary is a digitally signed executable from Microsoft; however, in this case, the malware uses it for process hollowing.

By statically analyzing the file we can spot the usage of:

  • NtUnmapViewOfSection
    • LockBit uses this API in order to unmap the original code in execution
  • NtWriteVirtualMemory
    • The malware writes the base address of the injected image into the PEB via NtWriteVirtualMemory
  • VirtualAllocEx
    • To allocate the space before injecting the malicious code

The VBC utility is the visual basic compiler for Windows and LockBit uses it to compile and execute the code on the fly directly in execution. If the vbc utility does not exist on the system, the malware downloads the original vbc.exe file from the same malicious URL as seen before. After executing vbc.exe, the malware replaces the objects in memory with the code for deploying the ransomware (as deduced from the exeBuffer).

Figure 8: If VBC does not exist, the launcher will download it

Payload Analysis

Analysis of the exeBuffer shows several appealing elements. It starts with a UAC Bypass via {3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7} exploiting the ICMLuaUtil elevated COM Interface-Object[1], as seen in other ransomware families like Trickbot and MedusaLocker.

Subsequently, the script uses another variant of the UAC Bypass. The CLSID {D2E7041B-2927-42fb-8E9F-7CE93B6DC937} refers to the ColorDataProxy COM Object which is classified as the same Bypass method in hfiref0x’s UACME #43[2].

In order to be stealthier, LockBit ransomware loads its modules dynamically instead of having them hardcoded in the IAT and uses LoadLibraryA. This method is employed to avoid detection by static engines.

Figure 9. Name of the modules in the code

In execution, the malware accesses the Service Manager using the function “OpenSCManagerA” and saves the handle. It checks if it fails the last error with the “GetLastError” function, against the error ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED.

Figure 10. Access to the Service Manager

Upon access to the Service Manager, LockBit creates a thread to manage services, terminate processes and delete the shadow volumes plus the contents of the recycle bin.

In this thread the malware has the name of services that it will try to manage hardcoded to try to make them more obfuscated:

Figure 11. Hardcoded service names

The list of services LockBit tries to stop are:

  • DefWatch (Symantec Antivirus)
  • ccEvtMgr (Norton AntiVirus Event Manager)
  • ccSetMgr (Common Client Settings Manager Service of Symantec)
  • SavRoam (Symantec Antivirus)
  • sqlserv
  • sqlagent
  • sqladhlp
  • Culserver
  • RTVscan (Symantec Antivirus Program)
  • sqlbrowser
  • SQLADHLP
  • QBIDPService (QuickBooksby Intuit.)
  • QuickBoooks.FCS (QuickBooksby Intuit.)
  • QBCFMonitorService (QuickBooksby Intuit.)
  • sqlwriter
  • msmdsrv (Microsoft SQL Server Analysis or Microsoft SQL Server)
  • tomcat6 (Apache Tomcat)
  • zhundongfangyu (this belongs to the 360 security product from Qihoo company)
  • vmware-usbarbitator64
  • vmware-converter
  • dbsrv12 (Creates, modifies, and deletes SQL Anywhere services.)
  • dbeng8 (Sybase’s Adaptive Server Anywhere version 8 database program)
  • wrapper (Java Service?)

If one of these services is found by the malware querying the status of it, with the function “QueryServiceStatusEx”, LockBit will get all the depending modules when correct and safe and it will stop the service with the function “ControlService”.

Figure 12. Stopping target service

LockBit will prepare Unicode obfuscated strings that contain a command to delete the shadow volumes and disable the protections in the next boot of the system.

Figure 13. Prepare the commands to delete shadow volumes and disable protections on boot

The malware has these strings in the rdata section, as widely observed in all malware families, and in its own code as show in the previous screenshots. The malware uses both strings.

During its execution, LockBit will create a snapshot of the processes running in the system and will search to see if certain processes are part of this list with the function “OpenProcess” and, in case the process is present, it will finish it with the “TerminateProcess” function.

The list of processes that LockBit will check are:

wxServer wxServerView
sqlservr RAgui
supervise Culture
RTVScan DefWatch
sqlbrowser winword
QBW32 QBDBMgr
qbupdate QBCFMonitorService
axlbridge QBIDPService
httpd fdlauncher
MsDtSrvr tomcat6
zhudongfangyu vmware-usbarbitator64
vmware-converter dbsrv12

This “process check function” is performed through a trick using the “PathRemoveExtensionA” function and removing the .exe extension from the list. Using this technique, the check process is more obfuscated.

Figure 14. Remove extension and check the process name

In our analysis, we saw how the ransomware dynamically uses the function “IsWow64Process” to check if the victim OS is running a x64 system and then uses the functions “Wow64DisableWow64FsRedirection” and “Wow64RevertWow64FsResdirection”. If the malware can access the functions, it will use the first to destroy all shadow volumes and the protections of the OS in the next boot and, later, will recover the redirection with the other function. In the case that it cannot get these functions, LockBit will delete the shadow volume directly through the function “ShellExecuteA” or with the function “CreateProcessA”.

Deletion of files within the recycle bin is executed with the function “SHEmptyRecycleBinW”.

Figure 15. Delete the contents of the recycle bin

Static analysis of the sample shows that LockBit will check the machine to see if it has support for  AES instructions in the processor with the “cpuid” opcode.

Figure 16. Check for AES instruction support in the CPU

Another check made by the ransomware is for the existence of the SS2 set of instructions:

Figure 17. Check for SSE2 instructions in the CPU

After finishing this process, the malware will try to delete itself with the next command using “ShellExecuteExW”:

Image 18. Auto-deletion of the malware

The Ransom Note

The ransom note is rather compact because the author hardcoded the content right in the code without using any obfuscation or encryption. The text file containing the ransom note is created in every directory after encryption and called Restore-My-Files.txt.

Figure 19: Content that is placed in Restore-My-Files.txt

Victim Information Stored in the Registry Key

LockBit in execution will create two keys in the infected system with the values full and public.

Those keys are created in the following hive HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\LockBit. The data stored in these keys belongs to the infected victim in order to be able to identify them in the future.

Figure 20: LockBit registry keys

Lastly, after finishing the encryption, the desktop wallpaper is changed to a message for the user, saying that LockBit encrypted the host.

Figure 21: LockBit wallpaper after encryption

LockBit Filemarker

Some of the ransomware we analyzed shares a common file marker across all the encrypted files in order to verify the origin. This digital marker can be used there in the control panel in order to verify that this was the ransomware that encrypted the files.

This is an example for the first version of LockBit, where file marker was using:

C8 41 D0 BE AB 3F 0D 59 7B BF CF 40 C8 81 63 CD

If we compare two encrypted files, we can spot how the file marker matches in both encrypted files:

Figure 22: File marker used by LockBit

SMB Spreading

Analyzing LockBit in our environment, we identified the possibility to spread locally in the same local network. Analyzing the network traffic, we spotted the use of multiple ARP requests to find other hosts in the same network segment.

Figure 23: LockBit ARP traffic captured in the analysis

If these ARP requests finally find a host alive, LockBit will start a legitimate SMB connection to be able to deploy the ransomware in other machines.

Figure 24: LockBit SMB traffic captured in the analysis

If the SMB connection is successful, LockBit will execute the following PowerShell command to download the .NET launcher that will decompress and execute LockBit in a new system:

LockBit Ransomware Evolution:

LockBit is new on the scene, but we noticed the authors added several new features and improved the ransomware several times. That means there is an active group behind it which is probably getting feedback on its actions. This is an example of the development cycle; this graph was extracted, analyzing statically all the internal functions and comparing them across the samples:

For this investigation, we found different LockBit versions with different features between them:

LockBit Version 1

This first version contains unique features compared to other versions we found in the wild.

These features are:

  • IPLO (IPLogger geolocalization service)
  • Persistence through the COM interface and the HIVE Current Version Run
  • A different extension used in the encrypted files
  • Debug file created for debugging purposes
  • HIGH CPU Usage in the encryption process
  • The reusage of a MUTEX observed in other ransomware families

IPLO.RU geo-localization service:

One of the interesting items we found was that LockBit tries to identify the victim’s geo-location, through the URL IPLO.RU, requesting a static TXT file in that service.

Figure 25: LockBit IPLO.RU geolocation traffic captured in the analysis

The communication to this page is through HTTPS; we intercepted the traffic to get the reply from the remote server:

Figure 26: SSL decrypted traffic

Analyzing statically the code in LockBit, we found that this URL is not resolved dynamically in execution; it is hardcoded in the binary:

Figure 27: Hardcoded URL of IPLO service

Creating persistence through Current version Run and COM task schedule:

There are many ways to gain persistence in a system. This first version of LockBit uses a task schedule through the COM interface to gain persistence.

Figure 28: Persistence using the COM interface

LockBit also uses a reboot persistence method by using the Windows registry hive:

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

Using the CurrentVersion\Run hive serves to survive the reboot if the system shuts down.

LockBit is actually using two persistence methods, CLSID and CurrentVersion\Run

.abcd extension used:

The first version of LockBit uses the .abcd extension every time it encrypts a file; this is a unique difference between this version and the other versions found.

Ransom note used:

LockBit in this first version used a different ransom note with a different message:

Figure 29: LockBit ransomware note

Debug file created in execution:

LockBit’s first version has some files that are skipped in the encryption process and every time it skips one it will create resultlog6.reg with the log information:

Figure 30: Debug file created by LockBit

High CPU usage:

We analyzed the performance of the encryption and we noted how LockBit uses the CPU heavily in the encryption process:

Figure 31: LockBit performance in execution

PhobosImposter static MUTEX used:

In October 2019, the community saw how PhobosImposter was using the mutex XO1XADpO01 in its executions and the same mutex is used by LockBit in this first version. We analyzed the base code of both samples and we did not find any code overlap but is a quite a random string to use casually.

This is the function used to create the mutex:

Figure 32. Creation and check of the hardcoded mutex

LockBit Version 2

This LockBit version came out with the following changes:

  • Appended extension changed
  • The debug function removed
  • Some of the samples came packed wither with UPX or a Delphi packer
  • One sample digitally signed

Appended extension changed:

For this version, LockBit started to append the extension .lockbit in all the encrypted files as a file marker:

Debug log function removed:

LockBit, in this new version, removed the functionality whereby it stored all the skipped files in the encryption process.

Sample delivery with different protections:

In this version we found LockBit samples packed in UPX and other custom packers, adding certain protections to the samples:

  • Extensive usage of PEB during the execution
  • The use of IsDebuggerPresent, OutputDebugString and GetLastError

All these protections are enabled by the use of packers in the delivery.

Mutex change:

The prior version of LockBit used a static mutex in all the encryptions but, in this release, it changed to be a dynamic value for every infection.

Samples digitally signed:

For all the versions we found for LockBit, only this version had a sample digitally signed:

Figure 33: LockBit sample digitally signed

LockBit Version 3

Ransomware note changed:

For this version LockBit adapted the ransomware note and used a new one:

Figure 34: LockBit 2nd version of the ransomware note

LockBit debug enabled:

After all the hunting progress we made, we found several samples of LockBit with some kind of status feature enabled, showing a progress window during the encryption:

Figure 35: LockBit debug enabled

This mode was only available for certain sample compilations and the status screen was different depending on the LockBit sample analyzed:

Figure 36: LockBit sample digitally signed

Tales from the Underground

When we researched the underground community for LockBit we came across a posting on several popular underground forums.  A threat actor named Lockbi or LockBit is offering LockBit as a “bespoke” ransomware as a service for limited partners/affiliates. We suspect LockBit ransomware to be more “bespoke”, not only from its own announcements, but subsequently we have not seen any affiliate identifiers present in the ransomware, which is normally a clear sign of an actor trying to upscale operations and service a larger number of affiliates.

The advertisement provides a general description that matches the LockBit behavior we have seen in the wild and from our analysis. As many other cyber-criminal services, LockBit does not allow the use of the software in any of the CIS countries. This is commonly done to avoid prosecution if the threat actor resides in one of those nations.

What we also noticed was a mention around multi-threading. Ransomware families are often programmed to run multi-threaded to ensure quick and overall encryption and prevent the encryption process getting stuck on a large file. However, LockBit was specifically advertised as single threaded and the threat actor Lockbi ensures that there are no speed issues when it comes to its encryption capability.

Figure 37: The LockBit advertisement

In the advertisement it is listed that one of the features of the ransomware is a local subnet scanner and SMB propagation method, something we can confirm based on our analysis.

Also noteworthy is the use of a Jabber-bot to perform the essential functions, such as chatting, decryption and banning, replacing the need for a labor intensive admin panel that is hosted somewhere on the internet.

Figure 38: LockBit profile including the 10,5 BTC deposit

It seems that LockBit has joined the underground scene with a clear determination to do business; the authors have put a down a deposit in excess of 10,5 BTC, a bit shy of 75K USD. Putting a deposit in escrow is a way to demonstrate that the seller is invested financially and not out to scam potential partners. The seller would lose their deposit if they did not keep to their end of the deal. Our telemetry shows that LockBit activity is still limited today but we can definitely expect to see more bespoke LockBit attacks in the near future.

Recovery

Going back to the real-life case, there were no recent offline backups. So, with the backup servers (including the backups) encrypted as well and a complete rebuild not being an option, there was no way for a successful and swift recovery other than by paying the ransom.

Both McAfee’s and Northwave’s perspective is that ransoms should not be paid. Paying does not only support the criminal business model, but as we have shown in our research, it also finances other forms of crime, such as the online drug trade.

In this specific case the victim chose to pay the ransom. The first step for recovery was to get in contact with the hacker following the instructions from the ransom note (Restore-my-files.txt) as depicted below.

Figure 39: LockBit ransomware note

Interestingly, as opposed to earlier known cases of LockBit (or .abcd virus) where contact with the attacker occurred via email addresses mentioned in the ransom note, in this case, the attacker developed an online ‘help desk’ accessible via a .onion address. Helpful as the hacker is, they even provided clear instructions on how to access this .onion address with the Tor browser. Although the ransom note claims there was private data obtained, Northwave did not find any evidence for this on the compromised systems.

Figure 40: LockBit recovery page

The image above shows the helpdesk which the attacker uses for communication with their victims. It provides the functionality for a trial in which two files can be decrypted ‘for warranty’, showing that the attacker indeed has the correct key(s) for restoring the data. For this, it is always essential to test files from different (critical) servers since keys might differ per server. In negotiations with an attacker, always try to obtain this knowledge since it is also relevant for your recovery strategy. If it is only one key, you know you can use one tool for the entire network; however, if encrypted servers use distinct keys, recovery becomes increasingly more difficult.

After successful decryption of two different files (from distinct servers), the chat with the attacker began. They started by asking for a network domain name (to identify the correct victim), then the attacker addressed the ransom amount. Usually, the attackers do proper research on their victims and tailor the ransom amount accordingly, which was the case here as well. Hence, negotiating on the amount of the ransom did not prove to be useful:

“We know who you are, so don’t play negotiate games.”

Trouble in Hacker Paradise

Subsequently, making the bitcoin transaction to the provided address, the helpdesk page would automatically update after six confirmations and show the download link for the decryptor.

“After 6 transaction confirmations, in a few hours decryptor will be built automatically. Don’t worry you will get it instantly once it’s built.”

Since there was nothing else to do than wait and hope for the decryptor now, an attempt was made into obtaining some more information from the attacker by asking about their methods. See a snippet of this conversation below.

Figure 41: Attacker communication

The ‘weak passwords’ is, of course, entirely in line with the brute force attack mentioned earlier. Additionally, this conversation indicates that there is a larger group behind this attack, where roles between different participants are separated. The helpdesk seems to be an actual helpdesk, merely following a script of actions.

After waiting for several hours and six confirmations further, the decryption tool should have been ready for download. However, this is where things progressed differently. There seemed to be some technical issues causing the decryptor not to generate automatically for which the helpdesk kindly apologized. Unfortunately, this continued for two dubious days with multiple excuses before the attacker sent a link to the decryptor via the chat. It appeared that they were ineffective in solving the technical issues; hence they chose to send it via SendSpace.

Once downloaded, the recovery phase could start. In this phase, all servers were decrypted, scanned and cleaned (or rebuilt) in a quarantined network. Subsequently, after implementing the appropriate technical and security measures, each host joined a new clean network.

Conclusion

As we highlighted in the first two articles, targeted ransomware attacks have increased massively over the past months. Many of them are all using a similar, quite manual, attack pattern as we highlighted. In this article, we provided an in-depth view of a relatively new ransomware family named LockBit. Based on a real-life case as encountered by Northwave, we described a typical ransomware attack including the modus operandi of attackers, the recovery process, an insight in the underground that advertises the ransomware and a full technical break-down of the ransomware itself. Additionally, during our analysis, we were able to obtain multiple samples of the LockBit ransomware with which we could provide an extensive list of IOCs. McAfee will continue monitoring this threat.

Learn from the articles, identify which technology can give you visibility inside your network. What digital evidence sources do you have, and can you detect fast enough to preserve and respond? If you were not able to prevent the ‘initial access stage’, make sure to have a strong Defense-in-Depth by having multiple defence technologies in place. In case a ransomware attack does strike your organization, have a proper backup procedure in place to successfully restore operations on your own? For additional ransomware prevention tips please visit www.NoMoreRansom.org.

To learn more about how McAfee products can defend against these types of attacks, visit see our blog on how ENS 10.7 Rolls Back the Curtain on Ransomware.

MITRE TAXONOMY

Technique ID Technique Description
T1107 File Deletion
T1055 Process Injection
T1112 Modify Registry
T1215 Kernel Modules and Extensions
T1060 Registry Run Keys / Start Folder
T1179 Hooking
T1055 Process Injection
T1179 Hooking
T1124 System Time Discovery
T1046 Network Service Scanning
T1083 File and Directory Discovery
T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery
T1012 Query Registry
T1082 System Information Discovery
T1057 Process Discovery
T1063 Security Software Discovery
T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
T1035 Service Execution
T1075 Pass the Hash

IOC’s

SHA256 Compile TimeStamp
ffbb6c4d8d704a530bdd557890f367ad904c09c03f53fda5615a7208a0ea3e4d 1992:06:20
286bffaa9c81abfb938fe65be198770c38115cdec95865a241f913769e9bfd3f 2009:02:12
76a77def28acf51b2b7cdcbfaa182fe5726dd3f9e891682a4efc3226640b9c78 2009:02:12
faa3453ceb1bd4e5b0b10171eaa908e56e7275173178010fcc323fdea67a6869 2009:02:12
70cb1a8cb4259b72b704e81349c2ad5ac60cd1254a810ef68757f8c9409e3ea6 2019:11:29
ec88f821d22e5553afb94b4834f91ecdedeb27d9ebfd882a7d8f33b5f12ac38d 2019:12:01
13849c0c923bfed5ab37224d59e2d12e3e72f97dc7f539136ae09484cbe8e5e0 2019:12:11
6fedf83e76d76c59c8ad0da4c5af28f23a12119779f793fd253231b5e3b00a1a 2019:12:17
c8205792fbc0a5efc6b8f0f2257514990bfaa987768c4839d413dd10721e8871 2019:12:18
15a7d528587ffc860f038bb5be5e90b79060fbba5948766d9f8aa46381ccde8a 2020:01:23
0f5d71496ab540c3395cfc024778a7ac5c6b5418f165cc753ea2b2befbd42d51 2020:01:23
0e66029132a885143b87b1e49e32663a52737bbff4ab96186e9e5e829aa2915f 2020:01:23
410c884d883ebe2172507b5eadd10bc8a2ae2564ba0d33b1e84e5f3c22bd3677 2020:02:12
e3f236e4aeb73f8f8f0caebe46f53abbb2f71fa4b266a34ab50e01933709e877 2020:02:16
0f178bc093b6b9d25924a85d9a7dde64592215599733e83e3bbc6df219564335 2020:02:16
1b109db549dd0bf64cadafec575b5895690760c7180a4edbf0c5296766162f18 2020:02:17
26b6a9fecfc9d4b4b2c2ff02885b257721687e6b820f72cf2e66c1cae2675739 2020:02:17
69d9dd7fdd88f33e2343fb391ba063a65fe5ffbe649da1c5083ec4a67c525997 2020:02:17
0a937d4fe8aa6cb947b95841c490d73e452a3cafcd92645afc353006786aba76 2020:02:17
1e3bf358c76f4030ffc4437d5fcd80c54bd91b361abb43a4fa6340e62d986770 2020:02:17
5072678821b490853eff0a97191f262c4e8404984dd8d5be1151fef437ca26db 2020:02:20
ca57455fd148754bf443a2c8b06dc2a295f014b071e3990dd99916250d21bc75 2020-02-20

 

The post Tales From the Trenches; a Lockbit Ransomware Story appeared first on McAfee Blog.

Nemty Ransomware – Learning by Doing

2 April 2020 at 18:21

Executive Summary

The McAfee Advanced Threat Research Team (ATR) observed a new ransomware family named ‘Nemty’ on 20 August 2019.

We are in an era where ransomware developers face multiple struggles, from the great work done by the security community to protect against their malware, to initiatives such as the No More Ransom project that offer some victims a way to decrypt their files. Not only that, but the underground criminal community around such ransomware developers can also be hyper critical, calling out bad code and choosing not to purchase ransomware that is not professionally developed.

After one such developer, going by the name jsworm, announced Nemty on underground forums, we noted how the ransomware was not well received by some users in the criminal community. Certain sectors of that forum started to rebuke jsworm for technical decisions made about the functions in the ransomware, as well as the encryption mechanism used.

Jsworm replied to all the comments, adding evidence about how the critical statements made were wrong and showcased the value of their new versions. They also fixed some ugly bugs revealed by users in the forum:

One of the users in the forum highlighted a function for how Nemty detects extension dupes in a system, which needed to be re-written by the author:

Despite the shortcomings in their ransomware, the Nemty developers are still in the underground forum, releasing new samples and infecting users through their affiliate program.

Telemetry

Based on our telemetry, we have seen Nemty activity in these locations:

FIGURE 1. Telemetry Map

Nemty Technical Analysis

Nemty runs on a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. We’ve observed it being delivered using:

  • RIG Exploit Kit in September 2019
  • Paypal dummy sites
  • RDP attacks through affiliates in their campaigns
  • Botnet: Distributed through Phorpiex botnet in November 2019
  • Loader: SmokeBot

FIGURE 2. Nemty ransomware announcement

In the release announcement the Nemty developers offered two types of collaboration: affiliation or private partnership. We found two aliases advertising Nemty, one of which is jsworm, who is quite active in the forums and announces all the news and updates there.

This is the timeline of the operations performed by the Nemty crew:

We observed how the Nemty developers adopted some characteristics from other old ransomware families like the defunct Gandcrab. One example of this is the reuse and reference to a URL that leads to an image featuring Russian text and a picture of the Russian president, like Gandcrab had in its code.

FIGURE 3. Hardcoded URL inside the Nemty ransomware pointing to the same image as GandCrab

The Nemty authors released different versions of their ransomware. In this research article we will highlight how the first version works and the significant changes added in subsequent versions.

Hash:                    505c0ca5ad0552cce9e047c27120c681ddce127d13afa8a8ad96761b2487191b

Compile Time:    2019-08-20 19:13:54

Version:                1.0

The malware sample is a 32-bit binary. The packer and malware are written in the C/C++ language as the author announced on the underground forum.

The compilation date in the PE header is the 20th of August 2019.

FIGURE 4. EXEInfo Image

Nemty uses RunPE in execution, meaning it unpacks in memory before execution.

Analyzing the sample, we could find how the developer added certain protections to their code, such as:

  • Decrypting certain information in the memory only if the encryption process is working as planned
  • Clearing the memory after finishing some operations
  • Information sharing between different memory addresses, cleaning the previous memory space used

Ransomware Note Creation Process

In order to create the ransomware note, Nemty takes each string and saves it into memory. When the ransomware compiles all the required strings it will join them together to create the entire ransomware note. In this operation, Nemty will decrypt line by line, moving the data to another memory address and cleaning the previous one to leave the information only in the new memory space.

For the first version of Nemty, the encryption method was not applied consistently to all the strings, which is why it is possible to see some strings and spot part of the functionalities or juicy files from them.

FIGURE 5. Clear strings in Nemty

Nemty and the Logical Units

In execution, Nemty will check all the logical units available in the system, saving the information about them in a static list with the following information:

  • Type of unit
  • Available free space

Through the use of the Windows API, ‘GetDriveTypeA’, the ransomware will differentiate units between:

  • Removable
  • Fixed
  • Network

FIGURE 6. Checking the type of logic units

To check the free space available in the system, Nemty will use “GetDiskFreeSpaceExA”, again through the Windows API:

FIGURE 7. Checking free disk space

Extracting Public IP Address from the Victim

Since the first version, Nemty has implemented a functionality to extract the public IP address of the victim. The information is extracted through a request to the IPIFY service at http://api.ipify.org. These types of services are frequently used by RaaS to check the location where the victim was infected.

FIGURE 8. Nemty getting the public IP

The User-agent for some of the Nemty versions was the ‘Chrome’ string. The user-agent is hardcoded as a single string in the ransomware instead of using an original user-agent.

FIGURE 9. Getting the IP address of the victim machine

The IPIFY service is used to retrieve the public IP address of the victim and, with the extracted data, Nemty makes another connection to http://api.db-api.com/v2/free/countryName using the data previously obtained as an argument. The extracted IP address and country data is used later used as a part of the ransomware note creation.

FIGURE 10. Getting the country name strings based on the IP address

Victim Information Extraction

Nemty will extract the following information from the victim:

  • Username
    • Using the windows API GetUserNameA
  • Computer name
    • Using the windows API GetComputerNameA
  • Hardware profile
    • Using the windows API GetCurrentHwProfileA

With this data, the authors ensure that the infected victim is unique, which helps the RaaS operators quantify how many victims they were able to infect themselves or through the use of affiliates.

FIGURE 11. Get Username, Computer Name and Hardware Profile from the victim machine

Nemty 1.0, Wrongly Applying the Country Protection

RaaS families usually apply some protections to prevent infecting certain geographic regions. In the first version, Nemty still had this feature in development as our analysis showed that the ransomware did not check whether the victim belonged to any of the supposed blacklisted countries. During our analysis of ransomware it is quite usual to find functions that are still in development and are then incorporated in future versions.

If the detected country is in the blacklist, Nemty returns the string “true” and keeps it in the config. If the country is not found, the value of the field will be false.

FIGURE 12. Check the country name and return true or false string

Nemty Encryption Keys

Immediately after making this check, Nemty will decode, from base64, the value of the master key and keep it in a memory address to use later. In parallel, it will prepare a random string with a fixed size of 7 characters and use it with the string “_NEMTY_” to create the ransomware note with the specific extension used in the encrypted files. Nemty will create a pair of RSA keys, one public and one private, in this process.

FIGURE 13. Export public RSA and private keys

Within this operation, Nemty will encode those keys in base64:

FIGURE 14. Encode of RSA keys generated

After this encoding, Nemty will decode again the victim RSA public key and import it for later use.

FIGURE 15. Decoding of the RSA public key for later use

The same operation is again used but this time with the master RSA public key from the ransomware developers.

Nemty Encryption Keys

In the encryption process, with all the data collected from the user, Nemty will create their config file, all in memory. The config file is a JSON structured file with all the collected data and the AES key previously created. Regarding the key used, it is the same for all of the files, however Nemty uses a different IV for each file.

Nemty Configuration File:

An example of the information collected by Nemty and later used in the config file can be found below:

This is an example Nemty configuration file:

FIGURE 16. Nemty config file

The different fields for the configuration file are:

The configuration file will be saved on the disk encrypted with a RSA public key of 8192 bits and encoded in base64.

FIGURE 17. Crypt the config file and encode in base64

Nemty will get the username logged in the system through ‘SHGetFolderPathW’ and will save and encrypt it with the .nemty extension on that folder.

FIGURE 18. Getting the user’s root folder

FIGURE 19. Creation of the config file on the disk

Nemty Encryption Threads

For the encryption, Nemty will create a new thread per each logic unit found in the system in order to encrypt the files.

The method used to encrypt the files is similar to other RaaS families, getting all the files using the function ‘FindFirstFileW’ and ‘FindNextFileW. Nemty will avoid encrypting folders with the following names:

  • .
  • ..

The encryption process will also avoid using files with the following names:

FIGURE 20. Check of the blacklisted folder and file names

This check is done using the insensitive function “lstrcmpiW”. Where Nemty is encrypting a file it will try two combinations, one in lower case, one in uppercase.

The extensions checked are:

 

FIGURE 21. Check of the file extensions

If Nemty has successful checks, it will create a random IV and encrypt part of the file with the AES keys previously generated. It then begins the IV using the victim’s RSA public key and appends it to the encrypted file.

FIGURE 22. Write the crypted file and put the IV in it

Nemty will put the information required to decrypt the file in the encrypted part of it and then add the extension “.nemty” and continue with the next folder or file.

FIGURE 23. Renaming of the new file with the Nemty extension

After finishing the encryption process Nemty will use the function ‘WaitForSingleObjects’ and wait for all the pending threads. It will also download the Tor Browser and open a connection in the loopback with the configuration file.

As a final action, Nemty will execute the command prompt of the machine with the hardcoded word “cmd.exe” and open the ransomware note.

FIGURE 24. Opening the ransom note

The style of the ransomware note changed across the different versions that the Nemty developers released.

FIGURE 25. Different ransom notes between versions

On the left side, we can see Nemty version 1.4. On the right side, the ransomware note belongs to Nemty version 1.0.

Like other ransomware families, Nemty will perform these actions at the end:

  • Delete the shadow copies using vssadmin
  • Disable boot protections with bcedit and wbadmin
  • Delete the Windows catalog with WMIC using the class shadow copy

All these calls are made with the function “ShellExecuteA” with the “cmd.exe” string as the main program and the other as an argument.

FIGURE 26. Deletion of the shadow volumes, disabling boot protections, and deleting the catalog

Mutex

Nemty will create a specific mutex in the system every time it infects a system:

The ransomware will check the existence of the mutex using the function “GetLastError”.

FIGURE 27. Creation of the hardcoded mutex

If the system was infected previously with Nemty and it contains the mutex, the ransomware will finish the execution using the function “ExitThread”. This call will end the main thread of the malware, finishing the execution and returning the control to the operative system.

The “ExitProcess” function is often used to avoid simple API monitoring.

Nemty uses RC4 to encrypt its strings and, in execution, those will be decrypted and decoded from base64 and then be used as a part of the ransomware note.

FIGURE 28. Calculating the size of memory to decode from base64

The RC4 key used for Nemty 1.0 is ‘f*ckav’. Other malware families also often use offensive names or expressions regarding the security industry in their implementations.

For decryption, the developers implemented a function through the API to reserve the needed space with ‘malloc’ and later decode the string in memory. As a protection, if the ransomware fails to get the size or on the decoding operation, the execution will finish using “ExitThread”.

FIGURE 29. Decrypt the data with RC4

Nemty – Learning by Doing

Since the first version of Nemty was released, the authors started to evolve their ransomware by adding new capabilities and fixing aspects of its code.

Analyzing the early versions of Nemty, we can state that they were more advanced in techniques and obfuscation compared to other RaaS families, but the first version still contained functions with some mistakes, such as references to API calls that were not used by the ransomware.

At the time we wrote this article, the developers behind the ransomware have released 9 different versions:

Changelog Nemty 1.4

We have observed changes across the different versions of Nemty. For version 1.4, the developers applied the following changes:

  • The ransomware will gather information regarding the logical units after checking if the victim has the Nemty mutex.
  • Language check
    • In this version, Nemty will respect and avoid encrypting files for victims inside the CIS countries.

FIGURE 30. Check to avoid crypting if the language is blacklisted

CHANGES IN VERSION 1.5

Compared with Nemty 1.4, this newer version was a major release, adding the following changes:

  • Victim information stored in the registry
  • Persistence
  • Ability to kill processes and services
  • New mutex
  • Hardcoded image change
  • C2 panel publicly accessible
  • 4 new blacklisted countries

Victim Information Stored in the Registry

The first major change in this version of Nemty was the use of the Windows registry to store information about the infected machine. The hive used is HKCU with the NEMTY identifier.

FIGURE 31. Information saved in the registry

Ability to Kill Processes and Services

The second feature added is the possibility to kill certain processes to facilitate file encryption in the system, something that is commonly implemented by other RaaS families.

In order to kill those processes, Nemty will use taskkill /im PROCESSNAME.

FIGURE 32. Termination of processes

Among certain kill processes, Nemty will stop certain services in the system with the same objectives:

To stop the services Nemty, will use “net stop” and the service name.

FIGURE 33. Stop of services on the victim machine

Persistence

The first versions of Nemty did not have any persistence technique, so the author decided to add it in version 1.5. The persistence is done through a scheduled task, “create /sc onlogon”. The binary is copied into the main user directory with the name hardcoded (this can be adapted for every binary released) “AdobeUpdate.exe” and the task launched using “ShellExecute”.

FIGURE 34. Creation of a schedule task to persistence

Hardcoded Image Change

Regarding the picture hardcoded in the first versions, for this version, Nemty decided to change it and include a new one.

FIGURE 35. New image referenced in the malware

C2 Panel Publicly Accessible

The author, decided to swap TOR for a public C2 panel where Nemty will send the victim’s data.

https://nemty.hk/public/gate?data=<victim_data>

4 New Blacklisted Countries

For this version, the author added four new countries to the blacklist:

Changes in Version 1.6

Compared with the previous version, Nemty in the 1.6 version only implemented one single change. The author used their own implementation of the AES algorithm instead of using the CryptoAPI.

The way that the malware previously generated the random key was based on functions of time but with version 1.6 it mostly used some other value to generate the random key.

FIGURE 36. Changes in the key generation function

One of the partners in the No More Ransom project, Tesorion, decided to publish a free decryptor for victims infected by Nemty. After the announcement, the Nemty authors released a new version utilizing a proper AES function using CryptoAPI.

FIGURE 37. New implementation of the AES crypto using CryptoAPI

Like in a game of cat and mouse, Tesorion released a new decryptor for this specific version. The Nemty authors responded by including a harcoded message to Tesorion in the samples:

Tesorion “tesorion, thanks for your article”.

Second Version of 1.6

Instead of changing the Nemty version number in this new binary, the authors released a new version of 1.6 with some changes.

The changes added for this version are:

  • New vssadmin utility used
  • New processes and services to kill
  • FakeNet feature

This new version was released just 2 days after the first 1.6 version was released; this means that the actor is quite active in developing this ransomware.

New Vssadmin Utility Used

The first change for this version is how the logical units where enumerated. The Nemty author implemented the use of the utility “vssadmin” and also reduced the capacity of the shadow volumes to 401MB. This change probably helped the ransomware in terms of performance.

FIGURE 38. Resize of the shadow volumes in the target logic unit

The idea of this change was to remain more stealthy against endpoint security products, instead of just deleting the shadow copy and executing queries through WMI, BCEDIT, etc. The author changed their approach to use vssadmin with the delete flag.

New Processes and Services to Kill

The Nemty authors added new processes to kill in order to facilitate file encryption:

In addition to new processes, the author also included new services:

FakeNET Feature

For this version the Nemty authors decided to add one interesting feature. The ransomware in execution had implemented a function to retrieve the victim’s public IP address. In the case that Nemty cannot connect with the external IP address, the ransomware will add fake data in order to continue the encryption process. The fake data will be:

 

FIGURE 39. Nemty using fake IP address and country name information if it cannot connect to the URL to get a WAN IP

This feature implemented by Nemty will expose users in the protected countries as it will encrypt the system, even if the user belongs to one of the countries specified in the static blacklist.

Version 2.0

In this version the developers decided to remove certain features and added a new encryption process:

  • The FakeNet feature was deleted and Nemty only used the old mechanism to check the victim’s region.
  • An initial function that prepares a container to use the RC4 algorithm with the name “rc4” and get a key based in the hardcoded string (can change in other samples) “sosorin :)”. This key is used to decrypt part of the ransom note and certain strings. It changes the use of the authors’ own RC4 implementation to now use the RC4 algorithm with CryptoAPI.
  • A new generation of RSA containers of keys, improving the key generation process.
  • The ransom note text included “NEMTY REVENGE” instead of “NEMTY PROJECT” and also added the sentence: “Don’t trust anyone. Even your dog”.

FIGURE 40. Nemty ransomware note

Version 2.2

For this version, the Nemty developers only made two minor changes:

  • Change of the mutex name
  • A new ransom note:

FIGURE 41. Example of the new ransom note

Version 2.3

In this version, we found major changes compared with the prior version:

  • A new mutex value
  • The service used to get the public IP changed from https://api.ipify.org to https://www.myexternalip.com/raw
    • In case the lookup fails, the external address changes from NONE to NOT_DEFINED.
  • The Windows OS check for XP was duped in prior versions and now only has one specific check.
  • The configuration fields changed, certain fields were removed and new ones were added.
    • This is an example for the new configuration file:

{

   “fileid”:”NEMTY_E1EIVPU”,

   “configid”:”mArJi2x3q3yFrbvL8EYkKezDeGPgWeOG”,

   “compid”:”{a3cande1-f85f-1341-769f-806d6172f54544}”,

   “ip”:”NONE”,

   “country”:”{    ”   “errorCode”   “: ”   “INVALID_ADDRESS”   “,    ”   “error”   “: ”   “invalid addr”   “,”   “version”   “:”   2.3   “,”   “computer_name”   “:”   “USERPC”   “,”   “username”   “:”   “User”   “,”   “os”   “:”   “Windows XP”   “,”   “pr_key”   “:”   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   “,”   “drives”   “:[{”   “drive_type”   “:”   “FIXED”   “,”   “drive_letter”   “:”   “C”:”/”   “,”   “total_size”   “:”   9GB   “,”   “used_size”   “:”   9GB   “},{”   “drive_type”   “:”   “NETWORK”   “,”   “drive_letter”   “:”   “E”:”/”   “,”   “total_size”   “:”   9GB   “,”   “used_size”   “:”   9GB   “\”}]}”

 

  • The User-agent changed to a new one, “Naruto Uzumake”.
  • Concatenating a lot of taskkill commands through the use of “ShellExecuteA”; this version of Nemty kills a lot of new processes.

FIGURE 42. Killing processes with CMD

  • For this version, the authors added PowerShell executions using a command prompt with the function “ShellExecuteA” :

FIGURE 43. Launching a PowerShell command

  • This version added a new subkey in the registry key “Run” in the hive HKEY_CURRENT_USER with the name “daite drobovik”:

FIGURE 44. Creating persistence

  • The ransom note was again changed for this version:

FIGURE 45. Example of the ransom note in version 2.3

Version 2.4

This version was a minor release like Nemty 2.2. In our analysis we only noted changes for the ransom note:

FIGURE 46. Example of the ransom note in version 2.4

Version 2.5

This is the last version of Nemty we discovered. This one represents a minor release and we only spotted two changes for this version:

  • A new mutex value
  • A new ransom note:

FIGURE 47. Example of the ransom note in version 2.5

Relationship between JSWORM and Nemty

Our Advanced Threat Research (ATR) team followed the activity of the user jsworm in the underground forums, and uncovered another piece of their ransomware, called JSWORM ransomware. Below is an announcement they made on the same forum on which they presented Nemty:

FIGURE 48. JSWORM ransomware and Nemty announcement

We analyzed all the samples we had of JSWORM and Nemty and could not find any relationship in the code base between them, but it is clear that both pieces of ransomware belong to the same moniker.

HASH FAMILY Compilation timestamp
0b33471bbd9fbbf08983eff34ee4ddc9 Nemty 2019-08-29 08:31:32
0e0b7b238a06a2a37a4de06a5ab5e615 Nemty 2019-08-19 04:34:25
27699778d2d27872f99ee491460485aa JSWORM 1992-06-19 22:22:17
31adc85947ddef5ce19c401d040aee82 JSWORM 2019-07-19 05:21:52
348c3597c7d31c72ea723d5f7082ff87 Nemty 2019-08-25 11:58:28
37aaba6b18c9c1b8150dae4f1d31e97d Nemty 2019-08-20 19:13:54
4ca39c0aeb0daeb1be36173fa7c2a25e Nemty 2019-08-13 14:46:54
5126b88347c24245a9b141f76552064e Nemty 2019-08-21 16:16:54
5cc1bf6122d38de907d558ec6851377c Nemty 2019-08-21 14:27:55
74701302d6cb1e2f3874817ac499b84a JSWORM 2019-07-10 08:44:29
7def79329823f3c81a6d27d2c92460ef JSWORM 2019-07-09 18:54:23
dcec4fed3b60705eafdc5cbff4062375 Nemty 2019-08-21 19:25:16
de9e1a5fc0f0a29b97eb99542d1f297a JSWORM 2019-07-09 20:25:14
f270805668e8aecf13d27c09055bad5d Nemty 2019-08-21 18:42:10
f796af497399c256129f2ce61eb8855b JSWORM 2019-07-19 05:24:00
fbf7ba464d564dbf42699c34b239b73a JSWORM 1992-06-19 22:22:17
0f3deda483df5e5f8043ea20297d243b Nemty 2018-12-04 11:00:39

Some of the samples released contain custom packers so the compilation timestamp is not accurate for those cases.

Based on the data of the binaries we found, we can see how Nemty activity started some time after the JSWORM ramsomware disappeared. This could indicate that the threat actor jsworm was developing both pieces of ransomware at the same time.

Free Decryptor Available Through No More Ransom

One of the partners of NoMoreRansom was able to release a working version of a Nemty decryptor. If someone is affected by this ransomware, it is possible to contact them through NoMoreRansom to get a decryptor.

Nemty Releases Customer Data Publicly

In our analysis of the Nemty ransomware, we spotted a new trend in how its authors managed the data of their victims.

In this instance, much like we have seen with other ransomware families like Maze, Nemty has its own website on which customer data is publicly released.

Image source: Bleeping Computer

Conclusion

Despite the number of RaaS families that appeared this year, Nemty represents another piece to observe and follow. Since we started to watch the activities of this ransomware, the criminals behind it have released multiple new versions with bug fixes and improvements. Such activity suggests that ransomware authors are feeling pressure from the great work done by security researchers and organizations, and in the case of Nemty, even from the underground criminal community which itself was quick to criticize some of its functions and implementations.

Tesorion, now a partner in No More Ransom, released a working decryptor for Nemty and so we now expect that the author will change the ransomware again to continue their activities. The last action we observed from this group was the website shown above, created to leak customer data.

Mitre ATT&CK

The sample uses the following MITRE ATT&CK™ techniques:

Technique ID Technique Description
T1124 System Time Discovery
T1083 File and Directory Discovery
T1012 Query Registry
T1057 Process Discovery
T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
T1035 Service Execution
T1215 Kernel Modules and Extensions
T1179 Hooking
T1112 Modify Registry
T1107 File Deletion
T1089 Disabling Security Tools
T1055 Process Injection
T1179 Hooking
T1055 Process Injection
T1132 Data Encoding

Coverage

Generic Trojan.si

GenericRXIS-SF!348C3597C7D3

GenericRXIS-SF!37AABA6B18C9

GenericRXIS-SF!5CC1BF6122D3

GenericRXIU-OJ!0B33471BBD9F

Ransom-Nemty!09F3B4E8D824

Ransom-Nemty!2FAA102585F5

Ransom-Nemty!65B07E2FD628

Ransom-Nemty!9D6722A4441B

RDN/GenDownloader.alr

RDN/Generic.fps

RDN/Generic.fqr

RDN/Generic.fry

RDN/Generic.ftv

RDN/Generic.fxs

RDN/Generic.fyy

RDN/Ransom.gg

RDN/Ransom.gn

Trojan-FRGK!484036EE8955

Indicators of Compromise

Hash PE TimeStamp
64a1ce2faa2ab624afcbbbb6f43955e116b6c170d705677dba6c4818770903aa 1992:06:20 00:22:17+02:00
c537c695843ab87903a9dbc2b9466dfbe06e8e0dde0c4703cbac0febeb79353a 1992:06:20 00:22:17+02:00
8e6f56fef6ef12a9a201cad3be2d0bca4962b2745f087da34eaa4af0bd09b75f 1992:06:20 00:22:17+02:00
ca46814881f2d6698f64f31e8390fe155b9fd0d8f50b6ab304725a2251434aa7 2009:08:13 23:36:24+01:00
5d04d789d66152e3fc0a2d84a53c3d7aa0f5d953c1a946619deeb699f3866e26 2017:01:02 12:16:24+01:00
a743d29eb16f9b4a59b2fd8c89e59053bdccce362f544fe82974e80d580c88f6 2018:03:27 07:09:32+02:00
5439452012a052851fdd0625abc4559302b9d4f4580e2ec98680e9947841d75d 2018:04:17 01:50:07+02:00
20d432c171ec17e7c5105f032210a96ea726ffc52154b79ec43acd62d6e3f304 2018:06:09 22:43:06+02:00
9fad280bb034a4683be9ab4a35d2859e61dc796a6134436b4403c2cb9a9ebfea 2018:06:09 23:45:15+00:00
7c1aaccca9dd236b9271c734d987d0fccc3e91bfa4c445c5e1c7c41e61ffe3ca 2018:06:16 17:31:40+02:00
2f2aeb72dd127057fac1eeefdc0539fc3fa7bdff36d288bd7e20f2756194253d 2018:06:16 23:24:06+02:00
6b3fea34cb8bb5cc6d698e30933884e1fe55c942d8768da85eb1c8085525bb41 2018:06:20 00:56:49+01:00
345380e840249081cba552af4ab28d7c65d4052f6e4bedd748b673b8853e6e96 2018:06:20 01:56:49+02:00
0f6e82387a5fe0f64d7cec15466b17a623aa8faaf9971df3c49ab65d49d1422e 2018:07:06 02:30:25+02:00
4b86f102eff21382c1a40a28bd4db19356e1efd323336bcec6645e68592e754a 2018:07:07 17:59:57+01:00
b604a25ae4a668170bf28bfc885d0e137f4ff3a29eb7f772ba7098ecfb9bacb3 2018:07:08 12:47:46+02:00
664b45ba61cf7e17012b22374c0c2a52a2e661e9c8c1c40982137c910095179a 2018:07:14 02:09:27+01:00
536209365d143bf90a44f063eff9254639d7976b2f77edcc2a0ff6ac1e5a5464 2018:07:23 22:32:23+02:00
e29d154b067f298bab794d9f85ee7b3d58ebf17b56f6cff6601fb6ce48482f09 2018:08:01 20:19:32+02:00
c2a32b7094f4c171a56ca9da3005e7cc30489ae9d2020a6ccb53ff02b32e0be3 2018:08:06 17:50:00+02:00
5d58c85ba5bd7a4ca3d5ade7bff08942a12399f82defa370691524d8797a1095 2018:08:09 01:11:34+02:00
c8d44e8c91ed028626a8e2b3a526627790a2ac3e7078316172e35371fb984eee 2018:08:09 01:11:34+02:00
7eb2b5125f9fbcc2672c05031456b6a2432c8921e9fa561bb7d7fa72010638b0 2018:08:22 21:17:21+01:00
06c1428e1a41c30b80a60b5b136d7cb4a8ffb2f4361919ef7f72a6babb223dd3 2018:08:22 22:17:21+02:00
66e55d3ffc0dcc4c8db135474cb8549072f8b1015742038f2ebb60d8c5dbd77c 2018:08:24 01:21:20+02:00
7fab9295f28e9a6e746420cdf39a37fe2ae3a1c668e2b3ae08c9de2de4c10024 2018:08:27 18:49:08+02:00
bf3368254c8e62f17e610273e53df6f29cccc9c679245f55f9ee7dc41343c384 2018:08:28 00:50:58+02:00
eb98285ef506aa5b6d38bbd441db692b832f7ed1b9cb1dc4e2fec45369c8432a 2018:08:29 19:54:20+02:00
676224fb3ab782fc096351c2419ebd8f7df95a9180407f725c57e72d2bbec5b1 2018:08:29 20:05:56+02:00
9b5067d5e7f7fbf52b5069f5557d5b0cf45752a6b720f5a737b412600da8c845 2018:09:07 18:40:54+02:00
30832d5709f93b16a6972fca9159fbd886a4e9815ef0f029fade5ca663e9761e 2018:09:08 01:26:36+01:00
e5527d1bfc8b1448dcd698f23ac7142a066bb19b6109ef1c92df4d6214aa2d6a 2018:09:11 22:58:35+02:00
c09272b4a547aa5e675f9da4baf70670bd192b1dfd8dd33b52a42ee83f782cac 2018:09:30 18:36:38+02:00
aa36aa7425e9591531d5dad33b7e1de7ffbe980376fc39a7961133f5df8ab31a 2018:10:03 22:27:20+02:00
a54bca66aac95cb281d313375e38cd8058ace1e07c5176995531da241c50dbd6 2018:10:06 10:02:23+02:00
63ed68751000f7004bf951bc4a4c22799a94d28602f4022d901b6558ff93b46b 2018:10:09 22:04:03+02:00
fe639627cf827e72c30992c627fffd458f7afb86d5b87e811415b87c2276e59c 2018:10:12 20:11:41+02:00
74f8c39f3b0e4338eeaabad97c9303139336be9ebe059501a78174570540eb9e 2018:10:14 01:10:44+02:00
0a472cb6772f554afc9720064a0ba286ddc02250b9249cace39b3bdd77b5265c 2018:10:20 16:38:09+02:00
0a0fb6e146bf8473b8931c3775529b2a0c8baf0db9afae7d3bb53f3d1da8c6ca 2018:10:21 23:30:07+02:00
0285a046ecaa82e685275ea53ae56134cb992991ef0d2ac5af3f5c15ebd136cc 2018:10:25 23:28:29+02:00
3d852ca618763ced2e280f0c0079e804935b70dcd4adc3912c2e2b3965e196c4 2018:11:03 16:59:21+01:00
4f3c6b42a2182b530f44d37fb82df8c2e1ca3858bfdd6d921aa363efe3e6e7bb 2018:11:03 16:59:21+01:00
3d9742b2ca3756645f88e885d1dadb2827a19f01ca6fb4a5170f2888cced35e1 2018:11:03 16:59:21+01:00
a2f6c36cb8f46207028fbd3f3b69e306d3bdc4fc0391cfda5609812df880be07 2018:11:10 17:30:47+01:00
b3dbfbd64088691b4bf07b9001890bc60ff7f95fb44acdc20d95e8dd3c72c050 2018:11:11 00:53:46+01:00
5e4a090b75ca915fc42a149c7ddfba0dbe1a6846fe3b36249923549656c31218 2018:11:25 19:51:19+01:00
a5590a987d125a8ca6629e33e3ff1f3eb7d5f41f62133025d3476e1a6e4c6130 2018:12:04 12:00:39+01:00
a7558decb9516122781243e791c982977660152813817fb7ed00359365fcb0d3 2018:12:06 17:53:43+01:00
b2c11e6126a7de326e5fef14679279bf9fa920b7ba7142984d99790d89155b69 2018:12:06 17:53:43+01:00
4379f688682395f0ebcd70acd14c304a1074928198b4d0bebb5362d56328f76e 2018:12:06 21:13:33+01:00
8dca973cccf5073a9f53f055fa275215520ba67416b5d206c673df533532efe5 2018:12:07 01:04:23+01:00
9913afe01dc4094bd3c5ff90ca27cc9e9ef7d77b6a7bdbf5f3042a8251b96325 2018:12:10 19:04:48+01:00
17864c4e21c0ebaf30cca1f35d67f46d3c3c33a5b8ea87d4c331e9d86d805965 2018:12:15 23:24:41+01:00
36bd705f58c11c22529a9299d8c0c1a33cf94fb9b7cce0a39a79e4d8f523308d 2018:12:16 21:12:50+01:00
1b18d04d4ca37ecc25bd8d4f229121c89a57c80615d40ff94868f380cdfaed7c 2018:12:24 21:33:38+01:00
b0bd94cf4f409bb5ba2661d875e0488e59492c95a539508172e2670d74feb0ea 2018:12:27 21:42:57+01:00
b9ff00a4b426742892e21601a68b19ffa44668f3274ec250e60843c3224b6b42 2018:12:30 01:14:36+01:00
4f5bb92d861601642aec31ecbd7864b2dcca9027ef3ff7256c0d12915580181b 2019:01:10 22:35:38+01:00
2a5f9e5d72b4841538a73ee2556865d8ed76e3da38571f00148368874edf55c8 2019:01:19 23:44:33+01:00
708922215acc1ddbe35a9549afce408aaa0aa74caa78feca96150e755ebf7b98 2019:02:02 11:07:14+01:00
03e46ba0d430afd4c85eaef47dcb38faf8cd7ef78ef25f8aa911c216a598245c 2019:02:02 23:01:04+01:00
cbb016cab1718c610f2bd98e0190bb5a426a2de38ddfccfec86196294e47bca0 2019:02:05 04:34:44+01:00
2ebe4c68225206161c70cf3e0da39294e9353ee295db2dc5d4f86ce7901210c5 2019:02:08 18:17:02+01:00
947bddf40d6dcf4cbbf174b2067a9f5e09fa2eb03d039974feba1d398ddeb184 2019:02:11 23:26:07+01:00
3207b5da6ecf0d6ea787c5047c1e886c0ee6342a5d79e4bcb757e7e817caa889 2019:02:16 17:40:03+01:00
ee3a8512f4109ec7a21831aee68ba53fb431d5eac613b66bf9877f50118c0cd4 2019:02:16 19:26:22+01:00
9caae99f53cc1446f04703754fa03b98a6303882e0999653c2c5fbfe656e3164 2019:02:26 00:00:02+01:00
cfe5682a41c5b4a3fd9c09070262171a05e0ce99868ef0e2058a5d65385ed681 2019:03:10 18:09:02+01:00
1ac0c87c3ff27dc6d630cb3f543311fb48edfc88d33470836438b1d388ae9687 2019:03:12 20:03:50+01:00
57a73c98866cd1aa0e57b84c0a13a54901077d23b6683d16b713d652d74fd1c7 2019:03:24 20:58:51+01:00
f2c6e0a2500876a3426b191cfbd3b65625bb182f23fda68d256f56a644f4f123 2019:04:02 11:44:51+02:00
5078a0940abc31a7fa271483ac345044a91a0e21c517bceb85091cd3fca310f7 2019:04:03 01:09:42+01:00
92981ed851493d6897339df02a77799645a0edf078daa8cf6cf09293f0801b7c 2019:04:06 02:29:49+02:00
084da93689b04f0a162bcd6fa2d43937f84182ac94d40b871d8650d89501c2bd 2019:04:10 00:40:47+01:00
e563bfae9ee7effe4c9766ded059dc2e91f7f76830973dfdadfb203c47fe8c2a 2019:04:12 17:33:50+01:00
a77beff2bf75a2a82b7c96438e9c55e2839cba2ea057892422b714876b8def58 2019:04:12 21:09:21+01:00
d341571f9b8ea62f52b9563ca1fb77bee5127a2a5b93d00682622eb116db0275 2019:04:12 22:26:26+01:00
510c0746a5d8b0175e80e2fbbbfbf194c8e20e56cccd5a9ec5fac4ad2e2f77f7 2019:04:15 19:01:48+02:00
e070a88883634bf7105f9744123adfd3890947e8da4754d2560293e68f809f10 2019:04:17 01:57:08+02:00
44c6edb224810748a0b15512a47647f5e35157fdaa30357d2820c1eb250273e4 2019:04:17 20:57:27+01:00
db25fd682243d4449c423a57591bd0d69a98f3e6149b815e6c556a76b5fbb71a 2019:04:19 19:05:12+02:00
405df2b5aa985c8386d347b6e7f269e546231a02abd1e793ae792010248bc9da 2019:04:27 00:59:44+02:00
081444b3b8b82c06c631d3106859ab530435af68292a8009c4b6eb2285cb9929 2019:04:27 22:03:27+02:00
a380640490d3aa7380255ed9269bb967a4daee6d2d20353a50154e7e6d399746 2019:04:28 23:52:25+02:00
fe244ab332b490623a8a313a8b64a1d280f3e03b2457f6c3235d01ee8f21c701 2019:04:29 00:49:00+02:00
abf148370f7cc9c16e20c30590a08f85208f4e594062c8a9e59c0c89cd8ff43f 2019:04:29 02:32:07+02:00
034b86e971f24282bd0c1b74a257c7c60ec7d83fa45ac5d5321e7c436675be89 2019:05:04 17:03:52+02:00
859e8f98203fa9b8fb68cf1e4c6f9a1143c970bd2830601841b83ee49b2a72ba 2019:05:05 22:59:32+02:00
2e436f4277a6cac69c5b484284160559752ef0679e27e2af8112e78c9074a17c 2019:05:07 23:20:09+02:00
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a08dc1e27b9e92ba70dcd2bce611fa51ec3601e4a2e7cdbb7713b656160c3773 2019:05:28 21:36:33+02:00
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505c0ca5ad0552cce9e047c27120c681ddce127d13afa8a8ad96761b2487191b 2019:08:20 20:13:54+01:00
6a07996bc77bc6fe54acc8fd8d5551a00deaea3cc48f097f18955b06098c4bd3 2019:08:21 16:27:55+02:00
d421d9b0cc9ce69fc4dea1d4bd230b666b15868e4778d227ead38b7572463253 2019:08:21 17:16:54+01:00
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30ad724c9b869ff9e732e95c7e3b94a0d118297c168ffd4c24bac240e0cba184 2019:10:04 13:01:21+01:00
62c3b52b5310393dbf0590bc246161249632a1d2f21c3aa7fb779dc8018a0edf 2019:10:05 03:10:25+01:00
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5e2c0b6d2f74605f11047a6b6ebff7026035471bccd3e2c6ba03df576eef08cd 2019:10:12 20:12:30+02:00
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0c18068dab291fcdd5a9aa94fb6cb07b8aeec1e4ecbab3746c3b0586e7bbd692 2019:10:26 06:58:37+01:00
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1d3f2ba1c701ecf04c288b64d9f2470c6f58744d5284174c1cb8e8b3753f3fae 2019:12:15 09:55:10+01:00
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0a14d4313ded36716d9de16b8487ac91b0dcf6a77c9f0c21531916c31a0a5ee9 2019:12:24 05:03:25+00:00
735ef043f3f64a9c57ba938dddc6fdac60ed30fa746a728635835c7162729710 2019:12:25 20:14:11+01:00
92cf38b5bee56490871c19e1ee31239c550a0eb6d177a37d02079465be9e4f7d 2019:12:27 18:55:35+01:00
4b4feffb0783aca42f0e9c38961340a76b4a2b3fd324f71e764a88ab500f1372 2019:12:27 18:55:35+01:00
5a022aba75d4986adedb1a5fb62fce8946d43f06846f663a851ba93e9e317f8c 2019:12:27 18:55:35+01:00
3ae7d44569b2885de360c0e6c3448772f74c1c3ff4ee3f594053a95bfc73850f 2019:12:27 18:55:35+01:00
42e9356feb10e5814fb73c6c8d702f010d4bd742e25550ae91413fa2a7e7c888 2019:12:27 18:55:35+01:00
bf6b8563773f7a05de33edcb1333d9e39e5bc60c91d111d3fb4ec7f5cfbb6c43 2019:12:28 03:06:43+01:00
842b92ed20115ff28fd5b8b204e80e88168594aa5ce44c288a560ec6f907516a 2019:12:28 03:06:43+01:00
eedefda5ff588f0b194b97a0244d6d3e4892b9a5f1539b33aa0fa86a47be7ea1 2019:12:28 03:06:43+01:00
d398280940af9fcb5aad2f0eb38d7b00b9d241ad1c4abfe3ca726accded70e2a 2019:12:29 09:38:39+01:00
6e18acc14f36010c4c07f022e853d25692687186169e50929e402c2adf2cb897 2020:01:07 10:57:37+00:00
8e056ccffad1f5315a38abf14bcd3a7b662b440bda6a0291a648edcc1819eca6 2020:01:18 12:03:36+01:00

The post Nemty Ransomware – Learning by Doing appeared first on McAfee Blog.

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