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Before yesterdayAvast Threat Labs

Warez users fell for Certishell

21 April 2022 at 15:09

Research of this malware family began when I found a malicious task starting powershell code directly from a registry key within our user base.  I wasn’t expecting the surprise I’d arrived at when I began tracking its origins. Living in a smaller country, Czech Republic, it is a rare sight to see someone exclusively targeting the local Czech/Slovak audience. The threat actor seems to have been creating malware since 2015 and appears to be from Slovakia. The bad actor’s repertoire contains a few RATs, some packers for cryptominers and, almost obligatorily, ransomware, and I have named the malware family Certishell. This person’s malware is spread with illegal copies of songs and movies and with alleged cracks and keygens of games and common tools (GTA SA, Mafia, Avast, Microsoft Office) that were hosted on one of the most popular Czech and Slovak file-sharing services uloz.to.

The Ceritshell family can be split into three different parts. 

  1. RAT with a C&C server sivpici.php5[.]sk (Czech/Slovak slang for “you are fucked up”), which has AutoIT, C++ and Go versions.
  2. Miner downloaded from hacked websites and started with the script que.vbs from the task. 
  3. Miner or ransomware downloaded from hacked websites and launched from a powershell command hidden in registry keys. The command from the registry key is started with the task from the picture above.

The map above shows the risk ratio of users around who were at risk of encountering one of the malware families

Sivpici.php5.sk (2015-2018)

The oldest part of the family is a simple RAT with sivpici.php5[.]sk as the C&C server. It places all the needed files in the folder .win inside of the user folder. 

The malware installer comes disguised as one of the following:

  • Cracked software, such as FixmyPC,
  • Fraud apps, like SteamCDKeys that share Steam keys,
  • Music CD unpackers with names like Extractor.exe or Heslo.exe (Heslo means password in Czech/Slovak) that come with a password protected archive with music files.

The malicious executable downloads an executable named UnRAR.exe and a malicious archive that contains a simple RAT written in C++, AutoIT or Go.


Every executable installing this malware family contains a script similar to the one in the following picture optionally with curl.exe. This script usually shows the password to archive or start another application. The malicious part downloads a legitimate RAR extractor UnRAR.exe and a malicious archive that can be password protected and unpacks it into the %UserProfile%\.win\ folder. In the end it registers one of the unpacked files as a service, starts it and allows one of the binaries in the firewall.

I found six different methods used to pack the script into executable binary:

  1. Bat2exe
  2. Quick Batch File Compiler
  3. Compiled AutoIT version
  4. Compiled AutoIT version with obfuscated script
  5. Compiled AutoIT version with obfuscated script and packed with PELock
  6. Compiled AutoIT version with obfuscated script packed with VMProtect


There are three main variants of this RAT.  All of them use the same C&C sivpici.php5[.]sk and similar communication protocol. The most advanced is a compiled AutoIT script. This script comes in 10 different main versions. The second one is written in C++ and we found only one main version and the last one is written in Go also with one main version. 

The first time it is run, it generates a random alphanumeric string that works as an identificator for the C&C. This identificator is saved into file gen.gen for next start. The communication uses the HTTP protocol. Infected machines send the following back the C&C: 

  • pc = ComputerName,
  • os = content of SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\ProductName,
  • uniq = generated identifier, saved in \.win\gen.gen

with the GET method to start.php.

After a random period of time, the malware starts asking for commands using the GET method with the parameter uniq. The response is a number that has fixed meanings throughout all the versions. Commands “1” – “7” are implemented as follows:

  1. The RAT downloads a URL from /urlg.php using uniq, from this URL it downloads a file, packed.rar, then the RAT starts run.bat from the installation phase to UnRaR the package to the \.win\Lambda folder and restart the RAT. This allows the RAT to update itself and also download any other file necessary.
  2. Create a screenshot and send it with the POST method to the up.php.
  3. Send all file names from all drives to up.php.
  4. DDoS attack to a chosen IP through UDP/HTTP/PING.
  5. Get a list of all installed apps from
    saves it to /.win/installed.txt and send them to up.php.
  6. Get a list of all running processes, save it to /.win/processes.txt and send them to up.php.
  7. Collect log from keylogger, save it to \.win\log.txt and send it to up.php.

The RAT in the form of compiled AutoIT script has the name Winhost.exe

There is a comparison of different versions (versioning by the author of the RAT) in the following table.

Version Commands Notes
debugging 1 Command 2 opens a message box with text 222222
4 1 – 3 Registration of PC happens only once on reg.php and on connection it sends only the uniq and the version of the RAT to updaver.php
6 1 – 4 Opens /ad.php in a hidden Internet Explorer window once when the user is not interacting with the PC for at least 5 seconds and closes it after 30 seconds.
7 1 – 5
8 1 – 7 Keylogger starts with the start of the RAT.
9 1 – 7 Keylogger has colored output.
10 1 – 7 Keylogger is separate executable ( ~\.win\1.exe)
Comparission of different version of AutoIT RAT

The keylogger in versions eight and nine is copied from the official AutoIT documentation (with a few small changes) https://www.autoitscript.com/autoit3/docs/libfunctions/_WinAPI_SetWindowsHookEx.htm

Version 9 adds coloring of keys, mouse movements and clipboard in the keylogger.

The C++ RAT is named dwms.exe. It uses LibCURL to communicate with the C&C. The communication protocol is the same. The uniq identifier is saved in the fr.fr file instead of gen.gen for the AutoIT version, it also starts communication by accessing connect.php instead of start.php.

I’ve managed to find a debugging version that only has the first command implemented and returns only “Command 2” and “Command 3” to the standard output for the second and third command. After every command it answers the C&C by sending uniq and verzia (“version” in English) with GET method to online.php.

The “production” version is labeled as version A. The code is divided into two functions: 

  • LLLoad downloads the URL address of the C&C server from the pastebin and tests it by downloading /exists.txt.
  • RRRun that contains the first two commands as described above. It also uses /connect/ path for register.php, load.php, online.php and verzia.php.

To download newer versions it uses curl called from the command line.

Another difference is that screenshots taken are sent via FTP to a different domain:
with the username sivpici and password A1B2C3D4

The RAT written in Go only has the first command implemented, but it downloads /cnct/ad.txt and it opens URLs contained on victims computer, thus we speculate it could also work as adware. 

IECache, bitly, pastebin (2016-2018)

The installation of this coinminer is similar to the RAT in the previous section. Installations use the same folder and the scripts have the same name. It usually comes as an unpacker of illegal copies of music and movies downloaded from uloz.to. It uses powershell to download and execute scripts from a bit.ly shortened address. The final stage is coinminer IECache.exe, which is usually XMRig.

Heslo.txt.exe, Crack.exe…

There is a huge variety of programs that download bit.ly-shortened Czech and Slovak sites and execute them. These programs include: GTA SA crack, Mafia, Microsoft Office, Sims, Lego Star Wars, and unpackers for music and movies. These programs usually print a message to the victim and run a malicious script in a hidden window.

The unpackers use UnRAR to unpack the archive and show the victim the password of that archive. 

Unpacker of a music album written in Python and packed with Pyinstaller. It tries to use UnRAR.exe to unpack the music, if unsuccessful, it shows password “1234”.

The cracks on the other hand just show an error message.

Result of Patcher for Counter-Strike Global Offensive. After downloading and installing the malware from Sourceforge it shows an error from the picture above.

All the installation files execute the following command with some bitly shortened site:

There are VBA scripts calling it, basic programs possibly written in C, .Net, AutoIT scripts, Golang programs, Rust programs, Redlang programs, different packers of python and batches, some of them use UPX, MPRESS, VMprotect and PELock

Red language
Bat obfuscator

Downloaded script

There are at least two new scripts created by the script from the site hidden behind the bit.ly shortened URL, que.vbs and run.bat.

The script also creates one of two services named Winmgr and Winservice that start que.vbs. Que.vbs only starts run.bat which downloads whats.txt contains a script downloading and starting coinminer IECache.exe.

que.vbs hash: 6f2efc19263a3f4b4f8ea8d9fd643260dce5bef599940dae02b4689862bbb362
run.bat hash: 1ad309c8ee17718fb5aacf2587bd51bddb393c0240ee63faf7f890b7093db222

Content of run.bat

In this case the pastebin contains two lines (the second line is splitted for better readability)

content of pastebin

The miner

The miner is saved as IECache.exe or ctfmon.exe.

The first miner (from June, 2018) is just XMRig that includes all command line options inside the binary. 

Most of the miners of this type I found are packed with VMProtect or Themida/Winlicense.

The more interesting one (from Jun-Jul 2018) is a compiled AutoIT script packed with VMProtect. Here again, we see that author speaks Slovak:

This script contains the XMRig as (in some cases LZMA compressed) Base64 encoded string inside a variable. The miner is decoded and started in memory.

ODBASUJ64A is “decode base64” and ODLZMUJA is “LZMA decompress”. 

In some versions, the script checks user activity and it starts different miners with different options to maximize profit with lower risk of being caught.

_PUSTITAM is executes an binary in memory

Newer samples (Since August, 2018) use sRDI or XOR encryption in memory and injection to a suspended process to hide from antivirus software.

Interesting files

Sourceforge and Github

Some of the samples used Sourceforge and Github to download malicious content, instead of small, possibly hacked websites.

It downloaded content from a repository WEB of user W33v3ly on Github and from user Dieworld on Sourceforge. On Github, the attacker once made a mistake and pushed Systemcall.exe and TestDLL.bin to the wrong repository.

Systemcall.exe hash: e9d96c6de650ada54b3788187132f525094ff7266b87c98d3dd1398c2d5c41a
TestDLL.bin hash: 1d2eda5525725f919cb4ef4412272f059abf4b6f25de5dc3b0fca4ce6ef5dd8e

The Systemcall.exe is a PE file without “MZ” in the beginning and Test.dll contains some random bytes before the PE file. The dll contains XMRig encrypted with TEA and the Systemcall.exe uses sRDI to load and run the Test.dll. 

Steam Giver

This small application written in .Net shows some hacked Steam accounts.

The malicious part downloads and installs the following scripts and downloads UnRAR and begin.rar

Install.vbs creates a task named WinD2 that starts inv.vbs upon every PC startup. Inv.vbs starts runner.bat, which starts %temp%/Microsoft/NisSrve.exe that is unpacked from begin.rar with UnRAR.exe.

Free bet tips

Betters are also targeted. We found a malicious file with the following readme file: 

The binary included only starts a cmd with the script as an argument.

All from registry keys since 2018

After 2018, I observed an updated version of the malware family. There is no need for any script file if you can have a command as a scheduled task and save enough data into registry keys. 

The infection vector is the same as in the previous case. The victim downloads and runs an executable that downloads a powershell script from a hacked website whose URL is shortened with bit.ly. This time the script is different, it creates the following task:

This task reads the value of the registry key Shell placed in HKLM\Software\a and executes its content. The script also creates the Registry key. 

Let’s focus on the value of the registry key Shell. In the following picture you will find the value I found on an infected machine.

After decoding and decompression we get an obfuscated script:

Under two layers of string formatting and replacing we get another compressed base64 encoded script:

Inside the base64 string is malicious code that tests the connection and executes code directly from the internet.

In total, I found about 40 different values of the Shell key in the wild that contain similar code with different URLs and they are obfuscated in the same way or less.

Some of the pastebins were alive. For example, one of them contains the following scripts that sends information about graphic cards to the C&C server, which can decide what to install on an infected computer. I have not found any C&C server alive.


Another final stage that runs from the registry keys is ransomware Athos.exe. At first it checks some tactics from https://blog.sevagas.com/IMG/pdf/BypassAVDynamics.pdf to check if it runs in the sandbox. On the sixth start it injects ransomware into another process that gets the id and encryption key from the web page googleprovider[.]ru. Then it encrypts all the files with AES-CFB and shows the following message saved on imgur (https://i.imgur[.]com/cKkSBSI.jpg). 

Translation: Your files are encrypted. If you want them back, you need your ID that you can find in Athos_ID.txt on the desktop. Keep your ID secure, if you lose it, your files can’t be recovered!!! You can recover your files with the help of the website www.g…

We also found AutoIT ransomware King Ouroboros translated to Slovak. The malware was edited to use Windows users’ GUID as encryption key and to download additional content from a different server than the original King Ouroboros.

ransomware hash: 90d99c4fe7f81533fb02cf0f1ff296cc1b2d88ea5c4c8567142bb455f435ee5b


Most of the methods described in this article are not new, in some cases I was able to find their source. The most interesting method is hiding the powershell script to the registry keys. 

As I found out, the author is a Slovak speaker, this corresponds with the fact that the infected files were published only on Uloz.to, therefore the victims are only from the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 

The variation of the final payload is huge. I found three different RATs, a few different packers of coinminers and ransomware that were created by the author and many more that were “available” on the internet. The initial installer, which function was to call only one command, was also created with a huge variety of tools, some of them quite obscure.

To protect against this type of threat, it is enough to download software only from trustworthy sources and use security software, like Avast Antivirus, which will act as a safety net in case you should come across a threat.

Indicators of Compromise (IoC)

The post Warez users fell for Certishell appeared first on Avast Threat Labs.

Crackonosh: A New Malware Distributed in Cracked Software

24 June 2021 at 09:39

We recently became aware of customer reports advising that Avast antivirus was missing from their systems – like the following example from Reddit.

From Reddit

We looked into this report and others like it and have found a new malware we’re calling “Crackonosh” in part because of some possible indications that the malware author may be Czech. Crackonosh is distributed along with illegal, cracked copies of popular software and searches for and disables many popular antivirus programs as part of its anti-detection and anti-forensics tactics.

In this posting we analyze Crackonosh. We look first at how Crackonosh is installed. In our analysis we found that it drops three key files winrmsrv.exe, winscomrssrv.dll and winlogui.exe which we analyze below. We also include information on the steps it takes to disable Windows Defender and Windows Update as well as anti-detection and anti-forensics actions. We include information on how to remove Crackonosh. Finally, we include indicators of compromise for Crackonosh.

Number of hits since December 2020. In total over 222,000 unique devices.
Number of users infected by Crackonosh since December 2020. In May it is still about a thousand hits every day.

The main target of Crackonosh was the installation of the coinminer XMRig, from all the wallets we found, there was one where we were able to find statistics. The pool sites showed payments of 9000 XMR in total, that is with today prices over $2,000,000 USD.

Statistics from xmrpool.eu
Statistics from MoneroHash

Installation of Crackonosh

The diagram below depicts the entire Crackonosh installation process.

Diagram of installation
  1. First, the victim runs the installer for the cracked software.
  2. The installer runs maintenance.vbs
  3. Maintenance.vbs then starts the installation using serviceinstaller.msi
  4. Serviceinstaller.msi registers and runs serviceinstaller.exe, the main malware executable.
  5. Serviceintaller.exe drops StartupCheckLibrary.DLL.
  6. StartupCheckLibrary.DLL downloads and runs wksprtcli.dll.
  7. Wksprtcli.dll extracts newer winlogui.exe and drops winscomrssrv.dll and winrmsrv.exe which it contains, decrypts and places in the folder.

From the original compilation date of Crackonosh we identified 30 different versions of serviceinstaller.exe, the main malware executable, from 31.1.2018 up to 23.11.2020. It is easy to find out that serviceinstaller.exe is started from a registry key created by Maintenance.vbs

The only clue to what happened before the Maintenance.vbs creates this registry key and how the files appear on the computer of the victim is the removal of InstallWinSAT task in maintenance.vbs. Hunting led us to uncover uninstallation logs containing Crackonosh unpacking details when installed with cracked software.

The following strings were found in uninstallation logs:

  • {sys}\7z.exe
  • -ir!*.*? e -pflk45DFTBplsd -y "{app}\base_cfg3.scs" -o{sys}
  • -ir!*.*? e -pflk45DFTBplsd -y "{app}\base_cfg4.scs" -o{localappdata}\Programs\Common
  • /Create /SC ONLOGON /TN "Microsoft\Windows\Maintenance\InstallWinSAT" /TR Maintenance.vbs /RL HIGHEST /F
  • /Create /SC ONLOGON /TN "Microsoft\Windows\Application Experience\StartupCheckLibrary" /TR StartupCheck.vbs /RL HIGHEST /F

This shows us that Crackonosh was packed in a password protected archive and unpacked in the process of installation. Here are infected installers we found:

Name of infected installer SHA256
NBA 2K19 E497EE189E16CAEF7C881C1C311D994AE75695C5087D09051BE59B0F0051A6CF
Grand Theft Auto V 65F39206FE7B706DED5D7A2DB74E900D4FAE539421C3167233139B5B5E125B8A
Far Cry 5 4B01A9C1C7F0AF74AA1DA11F8BB3FC8ECC3719C2C6F4AD820B31108923AC7B71
The Sims 4 Seasons 7F836B445D979870172FA108A47BA953B0C02D2076CAC22A5953EB05A683EDD4
Euro Truck Simulator 2 93A3B50069C463B1158A9BB3A8E3EDF9767E8F412C1140903B9FE674D81E32F0
The Sims 4 9EC3DE9BB9462821B5D034D43A9A5DE0715FF741E0C171ADFD7697134B936FA3
Jurassic World Evolution D8C092DE1BF9B355E9799105B146BAAB8C77C4449EAD2BDC4A5875769BB3FB8A
Fallout 4 GOTY 6A3C8A3CA0376E295A2A9005DFBA0EB55D37D5B7BF8FCF108F4FFF7778F47584
Call of Cthulhu D7A9BF98ACA2913699B234219FF8FDAA0F635E5DD3754B23D03D5C3441D94BFB
Pro Evolution Soccer 2018 8C52E5CC07710BF7F8B51B075D9F25CD2ECE58FD11D2944C6AB9BF62B7FBFA05
We Happy Few C6817D6AFECDB89485887C0EE2B7AC84E4180323284E53994EF70B89C77768E1
Infected installers

The installer Inno Setup executes the following script. If it finds it’s “safe” to run malware, then installs the Crackonosh malware to %SystemRoot%\system32\ and one configuration file to %localappdata%\Programs\Common and creates in the Windows Task scheduler the tasks InstallWinSAT to start maintenance.vbs and StartupCheckLibrary to start StartupcheckLibrary.vbs. Otherwise it does nothing at all.

Reconstructed Crackonosh Inno Setup installer script

Installation script

Analysis of Maintenance.vbs

As noted before, the Crackonosh installer registerers the maintenance.vbs script with the Windows Task Manager and sets it to run on system startup. The Maintenance.vbs creates a counter, that counts system startups until it reaches the 7th or 10th system start, depending on the version. After that the Maintenance.vbs runs serviceinstaller.msi, disables hibernation mode on the infected system and sets the system to boot to safe mode on the next restart. To cover its tracks it also deletes serviceinstaller.msi and maintenance.vbs.

Below is the maintenance.vbs script:


Serviceinstaller.msi does not manipulate any files on the system, it only modifies the registry to register serviceinstaller.exe, the main malware executable, as a service and allows it to run in safe mode. Below you can see the registry entries serviceinstaller.msi makes.

MSI Viewer screenshot of serviceinstaller.msi

Using Safe Mode to Disable Windows Defender and Antivirus

While the Windows system is in safe mode antivirus software doesn’t work. This can enable the malicious Serviceinstaller.exe to easily disable and delete Windows Defender. It also uses WQL to query all antivirus software installed SELECT * FROM AntiVirusProduct. If it finds any of the following antivirus products it deletes them with rd <AV directory> /s /q command where <AV directory> is the default directory name the specific antivirus product uses. 

  • Adaware
  • Bitdefender
  • Escan
  • F-secure
  • Kaspersky
  • Mcafee (scanner only)
  • Norton
  • Panda

It has names of folders, where they are installed and finally it deletes %PUBLIC%\Desktop\.

Older versions of serviceinstaller.exe used pathToSignedProductExe to obtain the containing folder. This folder was then deleted. This way Crackonosh could delete older versions of Avast or current versions with Self-Defense turned off.

It also drops StartupCheckLibrary.dll and winlogui.exe to %SystemRoot%\system32\ folder.

In older versions of serviceinstaller.exe it drops windfn.exe which is responsible for dropping and executing winlogui.exe. Winlogui.exe contains coinminer XMRig and in newer versions the serviceinstaller drops winlogui and creates the following registry entry:

This connects the infected PC to the mining pool on every start.

Disabling Windows Defender and Windows Update

It deletes following registry entries to stop Windows Defender and turn off automatic updates.

commands executed by serviceinstaller.exe

In the place of Windows Defender it installs its own MSASCuiL.exe which puts the icon of Windows Security to the system tray. 

It has the right icon
Deleted Defender

Searching for Configuration Files 

Looking at winrmsrv.exe (aaf2770f78a3d3ec237ca14e0cb20f4a05273ead04169342ddb989431c537e83) behavior showed something interesting in its API calls. There were over a thousand calls of FindFirstFileExW and FindNextFileExW. We looked at what file it was looking for, unfortunately the author of malware hid the name of the file behind an SHA256 hash as shown below.

In this image, you see the function searching for a file by hash of file name from winrmsrv.exe. Some nodes are grouped for better readability.

This technique was used in other parts of Crackonosh, sometimes with SHA1. 

Here is a list of searched hashes and corresponding names and paths. In the case of UserAccountControlSettingsDevice.dat the search is also done recursively in all subfolders. 

    • File 7B296FC0-376B-497d-B013-58F4D9633A22-5P-1.B5841A4C-A289-439d-8115-50AB69CD450
      • SHA1: F3764EC8078B4524428A8FC8119946F8E8D99A27
      • SHA256: 86CC68FBF440D4C61EEC18B08E817BB2C0C52B307E673AE3FFB91ED6E129B273
    • File 7B296FC0-376B-497d-B013-58F4D9633A22-5P-1.B5841A4C-A289-439d-8115-50AB69CD450B
      • SHA1: 1063489F4BDD043F72F1BED6FA03086AD1D1DE20
      • SHA256: 1A57A37EB4CD23813A25C131F3C6872ED175ABB6F1525F2FE15CFF4C077D5DF7
  • Searched in CSIDL_Profile and actual location is %localappdata%\Programs\Common
    • File UserAccountControlSettingsDevice.dat
      • SHA1: B53B0887B5FD97E3247D7D88D4369BFC449585C5
      • SHA256: 7BB5328FB53B5CD59046580C3756F736688CD298FE8846169F3C75F3526D3DA5

These files contain configuration information encrypted with xor cipher with the keys in executables. 

After decryption we found names of other parts of malware, some URLs, RSA public keys, communication keys for winrmsrv.exe and commands for XMRig. RSA keys are 8192 and 8912 bits long. These keys are used to verify every file downloaded by Crackonosh (via StartupCheckLibrary.dll, winrmsrv.exe, winscomrssrv.dll).

Here we found the first remark of wksprtcli.dll.

StartupCheckLibrary.dll and Download of wksprtcli.dll

StartupCheckLibrary.dll is the way how the author of Crackonosh can download updates of Crackonosh on infected machines. Startupchecklibrary.dll queries TXT DNS records for domains first[.]universalwebsolutions[.]info and second[.]universalwebsolutions[.]info (or other TLDs like getnewupdatesdownload[.]net and webpublicservices[.]org). There are TXT DNS records like [email protected]@@FEpHw7Hn33. From the first twelve letters it computes the IP address as shown on image. Next five characters are the digits of the port encrypted by adding 16. This gives us a socket, where to download wksprtcli.dll. The last eight characters are the version. Downloaded data is validated against one of the Public keys stored in the config file.

Decryption of IP address, screenshot from Ida

Wksprtcli.dll (exports DllGetClassObjectMain) is updating older versions of Crackonosh. The oldest version of wksprtcli.dll that we found checks only the nonexistence of winlogui.exe. Then it deletes diskdriver.exe (previous coinminer) and autostart registry entry. The newest version has a time frame when it runs. It deletes older versions of winlogui.exe or diskdriver.exe and drops new version of winlogui.exe. It drops new config files and installs winrmsrv.exe and winscomrssrv.dll. It also changed the way of starting winlogui.exe from registry HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to a task scheduled on user login.

Tasks created in Windows task scheduler by wksprtcli.dll

In the end it disallows hibernation and Windows Defender. 

Wksprtcli.dll also checks computer time. The reason may be not to overwrite newer versions and to make dynamic analysis harder. It also has written date after which it to stop winlogui task to be able to replace files.

(time of compilation)
Timestamp 1
(after this it kills winlogui task, so it can update it)
Timestamp 2
(before this it runs)
5C8B… (2020-11-20) 2019-12-01 2023-12-30
D9EE… (2019-11-24) 2019-12-01 2020-12-06
194A… (2019-11-24) 2019-03-09
FA87… (2019-03-22) Uses winlogui size instead 2019-11-02
C234… (2019-02-24) 2019-03-09 2019-11-02
A2D0… (2018-12-27)
D3DD… (2018-10-13)
Hardcoded timestamps, full file hashes are in IoCs

Analysis of Winrmsrv.exe

Winrmsrv.exe is responsible for P2P connection of infected machines. It exchanges version info and it is able to download newer versions of Crackonosh. We didn’t find any evidence of versions higher than 0 and therefore we don’t know what files are transferred.

Winrmsrv.exe searches for internet connection. If it succeeds it derives three different ports in the following ways.

First, in the config file, there is offset (49863) and range (33575) defined. For every port there is computed SHA-256 from date (days from Unix Epoch time) and 10 B from config file. Every port is then set as offset plus the first word of SHA moduled by range (offset + (2 B of SHA % range)).

First two ports are used for incoming TCP connections. The last one is used to listen to an incoming UDP. 

Obtain ports, screenshot from IDA

Next, winrmsrv.exe starts sending UDP packets containing version and timestamp to random IP addresses to the third port (approximately 10 IP’s per second). Packet is prolonged with random bytes (to random length) and encrypted with a Vigenère cipher. 

UDP packet

Finally, if winrmsrv.exe finds an IP address infected with Crackonosh, it stores the IP, control version and starts updating the older one with the newer one. The update data is signed with the private key. On the next start winrmsrv.exe connects all stored IP’s to check the version before trying new ones. It blocks all IP addresses after the communication. It blocks them for 4 hours unless they didn’t follow the protocol, then the block is permanent (until restart).

We have modified masscan to check this protocol. It showed about 370 infected IP addresses over the internet (IPv4).

A UDP Hello B
Sends UDP Packet from random port to port 3 -> decrypt, check timestamp (in last 15 s) and if the version match ban IP address for next 4 hr
decrypt, check timestampsame version: do nothingB has lower version: TCP send B has higher version: TCP receive <- Sends UDP Crackonosh Hello Packet to port of A
A TCP Send B
Connect to port 2 -> Search if the communication from A is expected (Successful UDP Hello in last 5 seconds with different versions)
send encrypted packet -> decode data, validate, save
A TCP Receive B
Connect to port 1 -> Search if the communication from A is expected (Successful UDP Hello in last 5 seconds with different versions)
decode data, validate, save <- send encrypted packet
Communication diagram
Encryption scheme of the UDP Packet
Encryption scheme of the TCP Packet

It’s notable that here is a mistake in TCP encryption/decryption implementation shown above. Instead of the red arrow there is computed one more SHA256, that should be used in the xor with the initialization vector. But then there is the source of the SHA used instead of the result.

Analysis of winscomrssrv.dll

It is preparation for the next phase. It uses the TXT DNS records the same way as StratupCheckLibrary.dll. It tries to decode txt records on URL’s:

  • fgh[.]roboticseldomfutures[.]info
  • anter[.]roboticseldomfutures[.]info
  • any[.]tshirtcheapbusiness[.]net
  • lef[.]loadtubevideos[.]com
  • levi[.]loadtubevideos[.]com
  • gof[.]planetgoodimages[.]info
  • dus[.]bridgetowncityphotos[.]org
  • ofl[.]bridgetowncityphotos[.]org
  • duo[.]motortestingpublic[.]com
  • asw[.]animegogofilms[.]info
  • wc[.]animegogofilms[.]info
  • enu[.]andromediacenter[.]net
  • dnn[.]duckduckanimesdownload[.]net
  • vfog[.]duckduckanimesdownload[.]net
  • sto[.]genomdevelsites[.]org
  • sc[.]stocktradingservices[.]org
  • ali[.]stocktradingservices[.]org
  • fgo[.]darestopedunno[.]com
  • dvd[.]computerpartservices[.]info
  • efco[.]computerpartservices[.]info
  • plo[.]antropoledia[.]info
  • lp[.]junglewearshirts[.]net
  • um[.]junglewearshirts[.]net
  • fri[.]rainbowobservehome[.]net
  • internal[.]videoservicesxvid[.]com
  • daci[.]videoservicesxvid[.]com
  • dow[.]moonexploringfromhome[.]info
  • net[.]todayaniversarygifts[.]info
  • sego[.]todayaniversarygifts[.]info
  • pol[.]motorcyclesonthehighway[.]com
  • any[.]andycopyprinter[.]net
  • onl[.]andycopyprinter[.]net
  • cvh[.]cheapjewelleryathome[.]info
  • df[.]dvdstoreshopper[.]org
  • efr[.]dvdstoreshopper[.]org
  • Sdf[.]expensivecarshomerepair[.]com

It seems, that these files are not yet in the wild, but we know what the names of files should be 

C:\WINDOWS\System32\wrsrvrcomd0.dll, C:\WINDOWS\System32\winupdtemp_0.dat and C:\WINDOWS\System32\winuptddm0.

Anti-Detection and Anti-Forensics

As noted before, Crackonosh takes specific actions to evade security software and analysis.

Specific actions it takes to evade and disable security software includes:

  • Deleting antivirus software in safe mode
  • Stopping Windows Update
  • Replacing Windows Security with green tick system tray icon
  • Using libraries that don’t use the usual DllMain that is used when running library as the main executable (by rundll32.exe) but instead are started with some other exported functions.
  • Serviceinstaller tests if it is running in Safe mode

To protect against analysis, it takes the following actions to test to determine if it’s running in a VM:

  • Checks registry keys:
    • SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc
    • SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Virtual Machine\Guest\Parameters
    • SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions
  • Test if computer time is in some reasonable interval e.g. after creation of malware and before 2023 (wksprtcli.dll)

Also, as noted it delays running to better hide itself. We found the specific installers used hard coded dates and times for its delay as shown below.

SHA of installer Installer doesn’t run before
9EC3DE9BB9462821B5D034D43A9A5DE0715FF741E0C171ADFD7697134B936FA3 2018-06-10 13:08:20
8C52E5CC07710BF7F8B51B075D9F25CD2ECE58FD11D2944C6AB9BF62B7FBFA05 2018-06-19 14:06:37
93A3B50069C463B1158A9BB3A8E3EDF9767E8F412C1140903B9FE674D81E32F0 2018-07-04 17:33:20
6A3C8A3CA0376E295A2A9005DFBA0EB55D37D5B7BF8FCF108F4FFF7778F47584 2018-07-10 15:35:57
4B01A9C1C7F0AF74AA1DA11F8BB3FC8ECC3719C2C6F4AD820B31108923AC7B71 2018-07-25 13:56:35
65F39206FE7B706DED5D7A2DB74E900D4FAE539421C3167233139B5B5E125B8A 2018-08-03 15:50:40
C6817D6AFECDB89485887C0EE2B7AC84E4180323284E53994EF70B89C77768E1 2018-08-14 12:36:30
7F836B445D979870172FA108A47BA953B0C02D2076CAC22A5953EB05A683EDD4 2018-09-13 12:29:50
D8C092DE1BF9B355E9799105B146BAAB8C77C4449EAD2BDC4A5875769BB3FB8A 2018-10-01 13:52:22
E497EE189E16CAEF7C881C1C311D994AE75695C5087D09051BE59B0F0051A6CF 2018-10-19 14:15:35
D7A9BF98ACA2913699B234219FF8FDAA0F635E5DD3754B23D03D5C3441D94BFB 2018-11-07 12:47:30
Hardcoded timestamps in installers

We also found a version, Winrmsrv.exe (5B85CEB558BAADED794E4DB8B8279E2AC42405896B143A63F8A334E6C6BBA3FB), that instead decrypts time that is hard-coded in config file (for example in 5AB27EAB926755620C948E7F7A1FDC957C657AEB285F449A4A32EF8B1ADD92AC ) is 2020-02-03. If current system time is lower than the extracted value, winrmsrv.exe doesn’t run.

It also takes specific actions to hide itself from possible power users who use tools that could disclose its presence.

It uses Windows-like names and descriptions such as winlogui.exe which is the Windows Logon GUI Application.

It also checks running processes and compares it to the blocklist below. If it finds process with specified name winrmsrv.exe and winlogui.exe terminate itself and wait until the next start of PC.

  • Blocklist:
    • dumpcap.exe
    • fiddler.exe 
    • frst.exe 
    • frst64.exe 
    • fse2.exe 
    • mbar.exe 
    • messageanalyzer.exe 
    • netmon.exe 
    • networkminer.exe 
    • ollydbg.exe 
    • procdump.exe 
    • procdump64.exe 
    • procexp.exe 
    • procexp64.exe 
    • procmon.exe 
    • procmon64.exe 
    • rawshark.exe 
    • rootkitremover.exe 
    • sdscan.exe 
    • sdwelcome.exe 
    • splunk.exe 
    • splunkd.exe 
    • spyhunter4.exe 
    • taskmgr.exe
    • tshark.exe 
    • windbg.exe 
    • wireshark-gtk.exe 
    • wireshark.exe 
    • x32dbg.exe 
    • x64dbg.exe 
    • X96dbg.exe

Additional files

As well as previously discussed, our research found additional files:

  • Startupcheck.vbs: a one time script to create a Windows Task Scheduler task for StartUpCheckLibrary.dll.
  • Winlogui.dat, wslogon???.dat: temporary files to be moved as new winlogui.exe.
  • Perfdish001.dat: a list of infected IP addresses winrmsrv.exe found.
  • Install.msi and Install.vbs: these are in some versions a step between maintenance.vbs and serviceinstaller.msi, containing commands that are otherwise in maintenance.vbs.

Removal of Crackonosh

Based on our analysis, the following steps are required to fully remove Crackonosh.

Delete the following Scheduled Tasks (Task Schedulers)

  • Microsoft\Windows\Maintenance\InstallWinSAT
  • Microsoft\Windows\Application Experience\StartupCheckLibrary
  • Microsoft\Windows\WDI\SrvHost\
  • Microsoft\Windows\Wininet\Winlogui\
  • Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\winrmsrv\

Delete the following files from c:\Windows\system32\

  • 7B296FC0-376B-497d-B013-58F4D9633A22-5P-1.B5841A4C-A289-439d-8115-50AB69CD450
  • 7B296FC0-376B-497d-B013-58F4D9633A22-5P-1.B5841A4C-A289-439d-8115-50AB69CD450B
  • diskdriver.exe
  • maintenance.vbs
  • serviceinstaller.exe
  • serviceinstaller.msi
  • startupcheck.vbs
  • startupchecklibrary.dll
  • windfn.exe
  • winlogui.exe
  • winrmsrv.exe
  • winscomrssrv.dll
  • wksprtcli.dll

Delete the following file from C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Local Settings\Application Data\Programs\Common (%localappdata%\Programs\Common)

  • UserAccountControlSettingsDevice.dat

Delete the following file from C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\

  • MSASCuiL.exe

Delete the following Windows registry keys (using regedit.exe)

  • HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender value DisableAntiSpyware
  • HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Real-Time Protection value DisableBehaviorMonitoring
  • HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Real-Time Protection value DisableOnAccessProtection
  • HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Real-Time Protection value DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable
  • HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Security Center value AntiVirusDisableNotify
  • HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Security Center value FirewallDisableNotify
  • HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Security Center value UpdatesDisableNotify
  • HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer value HideSCAHealth
  • HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Reporting value DisableEnhancedNotifications
  • HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run value winlogui

Restore the following default Windows services (Note: depends on your OS version – see https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/57567-restore-default-services-windows-10-a.html)

  • wuauserv
  • SecurityHealthService
  • WinDefend
  • Sense
  • MsMpSvc

Reinstall Windows Defender and any third-party security software, if any was installed.

Error messages

On infected machines, sometimes the following error messages about the file Maintenance.vbs can appear.

Type Mismatch: ‘CInt’, Code: 800A000D
Can not find script file

Both of these are bugs in the Crackonosh installation.

Although there are some guides on the internet on how to resolve these errors, instead we recommend following the steps in the previous chapter to be sure you fully remove all traces of Crackonosh.


Crackonosh installs itself by replacing critical Windows system files and abusing the Windows Safe mode to impair system defenses.

This malware further protects itself by disabling security software, operating system updates and employs other anti-analysis techniques to prevent discovery, making it very difficult to detect and remove.

In summary, Crackonosh shows the risks in downloading cracked software and demonstrates that it is highly profitable for attackers. Crackonosh has been circulating since at least June 2018 and has yielded over $2,000,000 USD for its authors in Monero from over 222,000 infected systems worldwide.

As long as people continue to download cracked software, attacks like these will continue to be profitable for attackers. The key take-away from this is that you really can’t get something for nothing and when you try to steal software, odds are someone is trying to steal from you.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Public keys


The post Crackonosh: A New Malware Distributed in Cracked Software appeared first on Avast Threat Labs.

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