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Operation DiΓ nxΓΉn: Cyberespionage Campaign Targeting Telecommunication Companies

16 March 2021 at 13:00
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In this report the McAfee Advanced Threat Research (ATR) Strategic Intelligence team details an espionage campaign, targeting telecommunication companies, dubbed Operation DiΓ nxΓΉn.

In this attack, we discovered malware using similar tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to those observed in earlier campaigns publicly attributed to the threat actors RedDelta and Mustang Panda. While the initial vector for the infection is not entirely clear, we believe with a medium level of confidence that victims were lured to a domain under control of the threat actor, from which they were infected with malware which the threat actor leveraged to perform additional discovery and data collection. We believe with a medium level of confidence that the attackers used a phishing website masquerading as the Huawei company career page to target people working in the telecommunications industry.

We discovered malware that masqueraded as Flash applications, often connecting to the domain β€œhxxp://update.careerhuawei.net” that was under control of the threat actor. The malicious domain was crafted to look like the legitimate career site for Huawei, which has the domain: hxxp://career.huawei.com. In December, we also observed a new domain name used in this campaign: hxxp://update.huaweiyuncdn.com.

Moreover, the sample masquerading as the Flash application used the malicious domain name β€œflach.cn” which was made to look like the official web page for China to download the Flash application, flash.cn. One of the main differences from past attacks is the lack of use of the PlugX backdoor. However, we did identify the use of a Cobalt Strike backdoor.

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By using McAfee’s telemetry, possible targets based in Southeast Asia, Europe, and the US were discovered in the telecommunication sector. We also identified a strong interest in German,Β VietnameseΒ and IndiaΒ telecommunication companies.Β Combined with the use of the fake Huawei site, we believe with a high level of confidence that this campaign was targeting the telecommunication sector. We believe with a moderate level of confidence that the motivation behind this specific campaign has to do with the ban of Chinese technology in the global 5G roll-out.

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Activity linked to the Chinese group RedDelta, by peers in our industry, has been spotted in the wild since early May 2020. Previous attacks have been described targeting the Vatican and religious organizations.

In September 2020, the group continued its activity using decoy documents related to Catholicism, Tibet-Ladakh relations and the United Nations General Assembly Security Council, as well as other network intrusion activities targeting the Myanmar government and two Hong Kong universities. These attacks mainly used the PlugX backdoor using DLL side loading with legitimate software, such as Word or Acrobat, to compromise targets.

While external reports have given a new name to the group which attacked the religious institutions, we believe with a moderate level of confidence, based on the similarity of TTPs, that both attacks can be attributed to one known threat actor: Mustang Panda.

Coverage and Protection

We believe the best way to protect yourself from this type of attack is to adopt a multi-layer approach including MVISION Insights, McAfee Web Gateway, MVISION UCE and MVISION EDR.

MVISION Insights can play a key role in risk mitigation by proactively collecting intelligence on the threat and your exposure.

McAfee Web Gateway and MVISION UCE provide multi-layer web vector protection with URL Reputation check, SSL decryption, and malware emulation capabilities for analyzing dangerous active Web content such as Flash and DotNet. MVISION UCE also includes the capabilities of Remote Browser Isolation, the only solution that can provide 100% protection during web browsing.

McAfee Endpoint Security running on the target endpoint protects against Operation Dianxun with an array of prevention and detection techniques. ENS Threat Prevention and ATP provides both signature and behavioral analysis capability which proactively detects the threat. ENS also leverages Global Threat Intelligence which is updated with known IoCs. For DAT based detections, the family will be reported as Trojan-Cobalt, Trojan-FSYW, Trojan-FSYX, Trojan-FSZC and CobaltStr-FDWE.

As the last phase of the attack involves creating a backdoor for remote control of the victim via a Command and Control Server and Cobalt Strike Beacon, the blocking features that can be activated on a Next Generation Intrusion Prevention System solution such as McAfee NSP are important, NSP includes a Callback Detection engine and is able to detect and block anomalies in communication signals with C2 Servers.

MVISION EDR can proactively identify persistence and defense evasion techniques. You can also use MVISION EDR to search the indicators of compromise in Real-Time or Historically (up to 90 days) across enterprise systems.

Learn more aboutΒ OperationΒ DiΓ nxΓΉn, including Yara & Mitre ATT&CK techniques, by readingΒ ourΒ technical analysisΒ andΒ Defender blog.Β 

Summary of the Threat

We assess with a high level of confidence that:

  • Recent attacks using TTPs similar to those of the Chinese groups RedDelta and Mustang Panda have been discovered.
  • Multiple overlaps including tooling, network and operating methods suggest strong similarities between Chinese groups RedDelta and Mustang Panda.
  • The targets are mainly telecommunication companies based in Southeast Asia, Europe, and the US. We also identified a strong interest in German and Vietnamese telecommunication companies.

We assess with a moderate level of confidence that:

  • We believe that this espionage campaign is aimed at stealing sensitive or secret information in relation to 5G technology.

PLEASE NOTE:Β  We have no evidence that the technology company Huawei was knowingly involved in this Campaign.

McAfee Advanced Threat Research (ATR) is actively monitoring this threat and will update as its visibility into the threat increases.

The post Operation DiΓ nxΓΉn: Cyberespionage Campaign Targeting Telecommunication Companies appeared first on McAfee Blog.

Cybercriminals Actively Exploiting RDP to Target Remote Organizations

7 May 2020 at 04:01

The COVID-19 pandemic has prompted many companies to enable their employees to work remotely and, in a large number of cases, on a global scale. A key component of enabling remote work and allowing employees to access internal corporate resources remotely is Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), which allows communication with a remote system. In order to maintain business continuity, it is very likely that many organizations brought systems online quickly with minimal security checks in place, giving attackers the opportunity to enter them with ease.

RDP is a Microsoft protocol running on port 3389 that can be utilized by users requiring remote access to internal systems. Most of the time, RDP runs on Windows servers and hosts services such as web servers or file servers, for example. In some cases, it is also connected to industrial control systems.

RDP ports are often exposed to the Internet, which makes them particularly interesting for attackers. In fact, accessing an RDP box can allow an attacker access to an entire network, which can generally be used as an entry point for spreading malware, or other criminal activities.

As it can be such a powerful entry vector, McAfee Advanced Threat Research (ATR) has observed many underground markets emerge, offering RPD credentials at relatively low cost. For example, McAfee ATR uncovered access linked to a major international airport that could be bought for only US$10. Since March 2020, the number of exposed RDP ports have increased considerably.

McAfee Advanced Threat Research and the security industry have been aware of the risk of exposed RDP for many years and will continue to raise awareness as part of our global threat monitoring.

In this blog, we will discuss the risks of exposing the RDP protocol and the associated misconfigurations.

RDP Statistics

The number of RDP ports exposed to the Internet has grown quickly, from roughly three million in January 2020 to more than four and a half million in March. A simple search on Shodan reveals the number of RDP ports exposed to the Internet by country.

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It is interesting to note that the number of RDP systems exposed is much higher for China and the United States.

Most of the compromised systems using RDP are running Windows Server but we also notice other operating systems, such as Windows 7.

For attackers, access to a remote system can allow them to perform several criminal actions such as:

  • Spreading spam: Using a legitimate system for sending spam is very convenient. Some systems are sold especially for this purpose.
  • Spreading malware: A compromised system provides a ready-to-use machine for easily distributing malware, or even pivoting to the internal network. Many ransomware authors use this vector to target organizations around the world. Another criminal option would be to implant a cryptominer.
  • Using the compromised box as their own: Cybercriminals also use remotely compromised systems to hide their tracks by, for example, compiling their tools on the machine.
  • Abuse: The remote system can also be used to carry out additional fraud such as identity theft or the collection of personal information.

This recent increase in the number of systems using RDP over the Internet has also influenced the underground. McAfee ATR has noticed an increase in both the number of attacks against RDP ports and in the volume of RDP credentials sold on underground markets.

As observed on Shodan, the number of exposed systems is higher for China (37% of total) and the United States (37% of total), so it is interesting to note that the number of stolen RDP credentials from the US (4% of the total) for sale is comparatively much lower than other nations. We believe this may be because the actors behind the market sometimes hold back RDP credentials without publishing their whole list.

How are Attackers Breaching Remote Systems?

Weak passwords remain one of the common points of entry. Attackers can easily use brute force attacks to gain access. In the below image we see the 20 most used passwords in RDP. We built this list based on information on weak passwords shared by a friendly Law Enforcement Agency from taken downΒ RDPΒ shops.

The diagram below demonstrates the number of compromised systems using the top 10 passwords. What is most shocking is the large number of vulnerableΒ RDPΒ systems that did not even have a password.

The RDP protocol also suffers from vulnerabilities and needs patching. Last year, we explained in detail the workings of the BlueKeep vulnerability that affects reserved channel 31, which is part of the protocol functionality, to allow remote code execution.

https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/rdp-stands-for-really-do-patch-understanding-the-wormable-rdp-vulnerability-cve-2019-0708/

In early January, additional flaws related to Remote Desktop Gateway were also patched:

These two vulnerabilities are similar to the BlueKeep vulnerability and allow remote code execution by sending a specially crafted request. We have not yet observed this vulnerability exploited in the wild.

To secure the RDP protocol, the following checklist can be a good starting point:

  • Do not allow RDP connections over the open Internet
  • Use complex passwords as well as multi-factor authentication
  • Lock out users and block or timeout IPs that have too many failed logon attempts
  • Use an RDP gateway
  • Limit Domain Admin account access
  • Minimize the number of local admins
  • Use a firewall to restrict access
  • Enable restricted Admin mode
  • Enable Network Level Authentication (NLA)
  • Ensure that local administrator accounts are unique and restrict the users who can logon using RDP
  • Consider placement within the network
  • Consider using an account-naming convention that does not reveal organizational information

For more details about how to secure RDP access, you can refer to our previous blog (https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/rdp-security-explained/)

Conclusion

As we discussed, RDP remains one of the most used vectors to breach into organizations. For attackers, this is a simple solution to quickly perform malicious activities such as malware, spam spreading or other types of crime.

There is currently a whole business around RDP on the underground market and the current situation has amplified this behavior. To stay protected, it is essential to follow best security practices, starting with the basics, such as using strong passwords and patching vulnerabilities.

McAfee ATR is actively monitoring threats and will continue to update you on this blog and its social networking channels.

The post Cybercriminals Actively Exploiting RDP to Target Remote Organizations appeared first on McAfee Blog.

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