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Yesterday — 12 August 2022Cisco Talos

Threat Roundup for August 5 to August 12

12 August 2022 at 20:12

Today, Talos is publishing a glimpse into the most prevalent threats we've observed between Aug. 5 and Aug. 12. As with previous roundups, this post isn't meant to be an in-depth analysis. Instead, this post will summarize the threats we've observed by highlighting key behavioral characteristics, indicators of compromise, and discussing how our customers are automatically protected from these threats.

As a reminder, the information provided for the following threats in this post is non-exhaustive and current as of the date of publication. Additionally, please keep in mind that IOC searching is only one part of threat hunting. Spotting a single IOC does not necessarily indicate maliciousness. Detection and coverage for the following threats is subject to updates, pending additional threat or vulnerability analysis. For the most current information, please refer to your Firepower Management Center, Snort.org, or ClamAV.net.

For each threat described below, this blog post only lists 25 of the associated file hashes and up to 25 IOCs for each category. An accompanying JSON file can be found herethat includes the complete list of file hashes, as well as all other IOCs from this post. A visual depiction of the MITRE ATT&CK techniques associated with each threat is also shown. In these images, the brightness of the technique indicates how prevalent it is across all threat files where dynamic analysis was conducted. There are five distinct shades that are used, with the darkest indicating that no files exhibited technique behavior and the brightest indicating that technique behavior was observed from 75 percent or more of the files.

The most prevalent threats highlighted in this roundup are:

Threat Name Type Description
Win.Dropper.Tofsee-9960568-0 Dropper Tofsee is multi-purpose malware that features a number of modules used to carry out various activities such as sending spam messages, conducting click fraud, mining cryptocurrency and more. Infected systems become part of the Tofsee spam botnet and are used to send large volumes of spam messages to infect additional systems and increase the size of the botnet under the operator's control.
Win.Dropper.TrickBot-9960840-0 Dropper Trickbot is a banking trojan targeting sensitive information for certain financial institutions. This malware is frequently distributed through malicious spam campaigns. Many of these campaigns rely on downloaders for distribution, such as VB scripts.
Win.Trojan.Zusy-9960880-0 Trojan Zusy, also known as TinyBanker or Tinba, is a trojan that uses man-in-the-middle attacks to steal banking information. When executed, it injects itself into legitimate Windows processes such as "explorer.exe" and "winver.exe." When the user accesses a banking website, it displays a form to trick the user into submitting personal information.
Win.Dropper.DarkComet-9961766-1 Dropper DarkComet and related variants are a family of remote access trojans designed to provide an attacker with control over an infected system. This malware can download files from a user's machine, mechanisms for persistence and hiding. It also has the ability to send back usernames and passwords from the infected system.
Win.Ransomware.TeslaCrypt-9960924-0 Ransomware TeslaCrypt is a well-known ransomware family that encrypts a user's files with strong encryption and demands Bitcoin in exchange for a file decryption service. A flaw in the encryption algorithm was discovered that allowed files to be decrypted without paying the ransomware, and eventually, the malware developers released the master key allowing all encrypted files to be recovered easily.
Win.Virus.Xpiro-9960895-1 Virus Expiro is a known file infector and information-stealer that hinders analysis with anti-debugging and anti-analysis tricks.
Win.Dropper.Emotet-9961142-0 Dropper Emotet is one of the most widely distributed and active malware families today. It is a highly modular threat that can deliver a wide variety of payloads. Emotet is commonly delivered via Microsoft Office documents with macros, sent as attachments on malicious emails.
Win.Dropper.Remcos-9961392-0 Dropper Remcos is a remote access trojan (RAT) that allows attackers to execute commands on the infected host, log keystrokes, interact with a webcam, and capture screenshots. This malware is commonly delivered through Microsoft Office documents with macros, sent as attachments on malicious emails.
Win.Dropper.Ramnit-9961396-0 Dropper Ramnit is a banking trojan that monitors web browser activity on an infected machine and collects login information from financial websites. It also has the ability to steal browser cookies and attempts to hide from popular antivirus software.

Threat Breakdown

Win.Dropper.Tofsee-9960568-0

Indicators of Compromise

  • IOCs collected from dynamic analysis of 10 samples
Registry Keys Occurrences
<HKU>\.DEFAULT\CONTROL PANEL\BUSES
Value Name: Config4
3
<HKU>\.DEFAULT\CONTROL PANEL\BUSES 3
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: LanguageList
3
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%SystemRoot%\system32\dhcpqec.dll,-100
3
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%SystemRoot%\system32\dhcpqec.dll,-101
3
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%SystemRoot%\system32\dhcpqec.dll,-103
3
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%SystemRoot%\system32\dhcpqec.dll,-102
3
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%SystemRoot%\system32\napipsec.dll,-1
3
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%SystemRoot%\system32\napipsec.dll,-2
3
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%SystemRoot%\system32\napipsec.dll,-4
3
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%SystemRoot%\system32\napipsec.dll,-3
3
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%SystemRoot%\system32\tsgqec.dll,-100
3
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%SystemRoot%\system32\tsgqec.dll,-101
3
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%SystemRoot%\system32\tsgqec.dll,-102
3
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%SystemRoot%\system32\tsgqec.dll,-103
3
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%SystemRoot%\system32\eapqec.dll,-100
3
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%SystemRoot%\system32\eapqec.dll,-101
3
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%SystemRoot%\system32\eapqec.dll,-102
3
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%SystemRoot%\system32\eapqec.dll,-103
3
<HKU>\.DEFAULT\CONTROL PANEL\BUSES
Value Name: Config0
3
<HKU>\.DEFAULT\CONTROL PANEL\BUSES
Value Name: Config1
3
<HKU>\.DEFAULT\CONTROL PANEL\BUSES
Value Name: Config2
3
<HKU>\.DEFAULT\CONTROL PANEL\BUSES
Value Name: Config3
3
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\FNWISXTV
Value Name: ErrorControl
1
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\FNWISXTV
Value Name: DisplayName
1
Mutexes Occurrences
Global\27a1e0c1-13fc-11ed-9660-001517101edf 1
Global\30977501-13fc-11ed-9660-001517215b93 1
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness Occurrences
216[.]146[.]35[.]35 3
31[.]13[.]65[.]174 3
142[.]251[.]40[.]196 3
96[.]103[.]145[.]165 3
31[.]41[.]244[.]82 3
31[.]41[.]244[.]85 3
80[.]66[.]75[.]254 3
80[.]66[.]75[.]4 3
31[.]41[.]244[.]128 3
31[.]41[.]244[.]126/31 3
208[.]76[.]51[.]51 2
74[.]208[.]5[.]20 2
208[.]76[.]50[.]50 2
202[.]137[.]234[.]30 2
212[.]77[.]101[.]4 2
193[.]222[.]135[.]150 2
203[.]205[.]219[.]57 2
47[.]43[.]18[.]9 2
67[.]231[.]144[.]94 2
188[.]125[.]72[.]74 2
40[.]93[.]207[.]0/31 2
205[.]220[.]176[.]72 2
135[.]148[.]130[.]75 2
121[.]53[.]85[.]11 2
67[.]195[.]204[.]72/30 1
*See JSON for more IOCs
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness Occurrences
249[.]5[.]55[.]69[.]bl[.]spamcop[.]net 3
249[.]5[.]55[.]69[.]cbl[.]abuseat[.]org 3
249[.]5[.]55[.]69[.]dnsbl[.]sorbs[.]net 3
249[.]5[.]55[.]69[.]in-addr[.]arpa 3
249[.]5[.]55[.]69[.]sbl-xbl[.]spamhaus[.]org 3
249[.]5[.]55[.]69[.]zen[.]spamhaus[.]org 3
microsoft-com[.]mail[.]protection[.]outlook[.]com 3
microsoft[.]com 3
www[.]google[.]com 3
www[.]instagram[.]com 3
comcast[.]net 3
mx1a1[.]comcast[.]net 3
jotunheim[.]name 3
niflheimr[.]cn 3
whois[.]arin[.]net 2
whois[.]iana[.]org 2
mx-eu[.]mail[.]am0[.]yahoodns[.]net 2
aspmx[.]l[.]google[.]com 2
mta5[.]am0[.]yahoodns[.]net 2
icloud[.]com 2
cox[.]net 2
walla[.]com 2
hanmail[.]net 2
allstate[.]com 2
wp[.]pl 2
*See JSON for more IOCs
Files and or directories created Occurrences
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\config\systemprofile 3
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\config\systemprofile:.repos 3
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\fnwisxtv 1
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\airdnsoq 1
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\uclxhmik 1
%TEMP%\dnyabinr.exe 1
%TEMP%\lcxykqya.exe 1
%TEMP%\qzguacfj.exe 1

File Hashes

098ad43e2067c5c814cebe1fc52bdc528289c6a2cc96daf4e8bac90d1c95a0b3 2240525bf4ee830766ec33e2e3c0dfcdf871748088fcf068770fd306940c5957 693cd93fbc6bfb587ad011477ae870805725c5403260621a290f61bb0d243f47 a6b68aa5d00739401b413ed936526ea5e767824fddb4e768e03fb05dc369a6fd b9820bc7b09bfa88556efac463b7459d2f4a47f06cc953529a9782fdbefd4959 c2cb05d50c06d9ed65a7c53fb2f6b7977f2988f5fbbd928266bb8ea27723b243 d6df88c6f61812a4bb662abb8d90fb4ba7e17ae5b9351251d001b7945d7aae98 ec745df5a9e65776f76b97e9685ad86fbb130bb6a3146a7823bd94c7c6502f1d f3e93f62b4f4699a3d20e85fa3c9e8b7eb9129a15ca66720d4f677cae0c5a469 f8a2e41ea8ca0e998bcd54d8256cb538b1e32cec4e80eb810e8df003427b886b

Coverage

Product Protection
Secure Endpoint This has coverage
Cloudlock N/A
CWS This has coverage
Email Security This has coverage
Network Security This has coverage
Stealthwatch N/A
Stealthwatch Cloud N/A
Secure Malware Analytics This has coverage
Umbrella This has coverage
WSA This has coverage

Screenshots of Detection

Secure Endpoint



Secure Malware Analytics



MITRE ATT&CK





Win.Dropper.TrickBot-9960840-0

Indicators of Compromise

  • IOCs collected from dynamic analysis of 36 samples
Registry Keys Occurrences
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\SYSTEMCERTIFICATES\USERDS 36
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS
Value Name: 4334c972
36
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS
Value Name: 2d17e659
36
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: IntelPowerAgent3
7
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: IntelPowerAgent5
5
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: IntelPowerAgent9
4
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: IntelPowerAgent6
4
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: IntelPowerAgent7
3
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: IntelPowerAgent2
3
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: IntelPowerAgent1
3
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: IntelPowerAgent8
3
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: IntelPowerAgent0
2
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: IntelPowerAgent4
2
Mutexes Occurrences
98b59d0b000000cc 36
98b59d0b00000120 36
Global\{2d17e659d34601689591} 36
98b59d0b00000174 36
98b59d0b00000150 36
98b59d0b00000158 36
98b59d0b000001ac 35
98b59d0b00000308 35
98b59d0b0000043c 35
98b59d0b000004b4 35
98b59d0b000001bc 35
98b59d0b000002ec 35
98b59d0b000001f0 35
98b59d0b000001c4 35
98b59d0b0000021c 35
98b59d0b0000025c 35
98b59d0b00000294 35
98b59d0b00000320 35
98b59d0b000003d4 35
98b59d0b000003f8 35
98b59d0b000004dc 35
98b59d0b0000060c 8
98b59d0b000005cc 8
98b59d0b000004f8 8
98b59d0b00000614 7
*See JSON for more IOCs
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness Occurrences
209[.]197[.]3[.]8 11
72[.]21[.]81[.]240 7
69[.]164[.]46[.]0 6
8[.]253[.]154[.]236/31 3
23[.]46[.]150[.]81 2
23[.]46[.]150[.]58 2
8[.]253[.]141[.]249 1
8[.]253[.]38[.]248 1
8[.]253[.]140[.]118 1
23[.]46[.]150[.]43 1
8[.]247[.]119[.]126 1
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness Occurrences
download[.]windowsupdate[.]com 36
adtejoyo1377[.]tk 36
Files and or directories created Occurrences
%ProgramData%\c7150968.exe 1
%LOCALAPPDATA%\gusEBBF.tmp.bat 1
%ProgramData%\ba886437.exe 1
%HOMEPATH%\jfpDCC6.tmp.bat 1
%ProgramData%\63b007ed.exe 1
%HOMEPATH%\dtaE10F.tmp.bat 1
%ProgramData%\545ba94b.exe 1
%HOMEPATH%\hcv6907.tmp.bat 1
%ProgramData%\7afae1e8.exe 1
%HOMEPATH%\greA7E2.tmp.bat 1
%ProgramData%\9421c9aa.exe 1
%APPDATA%\vqpA923.tmp.bat 1
%ProgramData%\f779fb59.exe 1
%ProgramData%\xywA29.tmp.bat 1
%ProgramData%\940d0a1e.exe 1
%HOMEPATH%\jawD8CB.tmp.bat 1
%ProgramData%\a37667ce.exe 1
%HOMEPATH%\lkyB72F.tmp.bat 1
%ProgramData%\edcfad58.exe 1
%HOMEPATH%\pvf22C5.tmp.bat 1
%ProgramData%\182b8517.exe 1
%LOCALAPPDATA%\qsw15A4.tmp.bat 1
%ProgramData%\a3a20124.exe 1
%HOMEPATH%\xqh15A4.tmp.bat 1
%ProgramData%\a116e074.exe 1
*See JSON for more IOCs

File Hashes

007a16c9f6908085a2d65e991ae691f41e7ceab17653200669b4286af82e8c12 017306c686a5a81630e746b9518106fd5e54b410b50a61f43cba7a3850b1fec8 024d73837dea32792852294b951dcb246c56442ebde4643cef6733f411f581b6 0284c0aff10ff3ca7e6078f3d8191fc9c4db42fbfb912a8cefabc937c1eca87d 02df9ec5bfb9e1bb613b5ee7d4a518bccc9f87580182f26d6e5d5a643036e3a1 03226228480f9e9d87a0370428d337023226314bd9447efccdbc03bb672ec81b 0337b9f06cda7d7a6e96ce2a29e0f004fb6df49d3b82d294a17a13604e754f86 03a89b1af244c7d20db8498d9284c20deea9462fb15db2f89b4c59a9be47c2f0 04432d06396fac85167c0a9dadf206dc50ea8527c29b943b77f192e45dbce22d 04679de514d8e3902341b314e324e6f75ba536d09da05e99958dc5b4a689de42 049f0322736b0abeec70630b9efbbd40d9a0916ce359a5a8168165d25a76e48f 04e819e635fc974afd4ee533b478841ba581ddcff254034fdbfea6522939ef5f 05b51b8179992a7e21259d9eacdaf8b1115e51056ec0104daddda5a0810f7126 0734ea55ac016a1e6b6ac40837883a684656eec9ce857351c9f99d3c965d6501 07e4ebd0b135dbfcf1e7d2b60386c9b52fa5d154d072a5689eb3a7a2b15112d6 08da477f7c363ddbc11224260717cf6f7f48e849cff403e25559529029b8fdf4 08e9ccb010aceac1ea0c0fbb41e58c8e2552b30de500bf43e298a645f5acedf7 097f9d7400b8a8c8bf5aa5339bf18359148a533f9136cd9b6279623e4db293d7 0bde820541632a300070601291eb1c478b9d09da2b405f740d6fe92b290a45de 0be2e49c02aa297d158bd5fe213a96584455fb4cea7c24dd100b9922df2a45c5 0bf64ebc68956ea9d73858f32530c20fab4243fb09320adfd500fb94842a9888 0c29c2763f311604136a06a99fa76ed09411572cd796021b60c66806e6c8e5a9 0c6b997f98a1e58caf5a16a90317d2cb1d2474ac5c5926f26fa2b14a9299638a 0d30d3c9cf63898bb2e970ec5a54dfe868fc5f519fd6b283bd00a2d22a01a653 0da6c492cc755852c07bf7511b774e2527dce42be420f602e9445f1bb760ad33
*See JSON for more IOCs

Coverage

Product Protection
Secure Endpoint This has coverage
Cloudlock N/A
CWS This has coverage
Email Security This has coverage
Network Security This has coverage
Stealthwatch N/A
Stealthwatch Cloud N/A
Secure Malware Analytics This has coverage
Umbrella N/A
WSA N/A

Screenshots of Detection

Secure Endpoint



Secure Malware Analytics



MITRE ATT&CK





Win.Trojan.Zusy-9960880-0

Indicators of Compromise

  • IOCs collected from dynamic analysis of 16 samples
Registry Keys Occurrences
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\CDEFGH 12
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\CDEFGH
Value Name: MarkTime
12
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\CDEFGH
Value Name: Description
2
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\CDEFGH
Value Name: Type
2
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\CDEFGH
Value Name: Start
2
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\CDEFGH
Value Name: ErrorControl
2
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\CDEFGH
Value Name: ImagePath
2
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\CDEFGH
Value Name: DisplayName
2
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\CDEFGH
Value Name: WOW64
2
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\CDEFGH
Value Name: ObjectName
2
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\CDEFGH
Value Name: FailureActions
2
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\PQRSTU 2
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\PQRSTU
Value Name: MarkTime
2
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\CDEFGH
Value Name: Group
2
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\CDEFGH
Value Name: InstallTime
2
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\ABCDEF
Value Name: Description
1
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\ABCDEF
Value Name: Type
1
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\ABCDEF
Value Name: Start
1
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\ABCDEF
Value Name: ErrorControl
1
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\ABCDEF
Value Name: DisplayName
1
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\ABCDEF
Value Name: WOW64
1
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\ABCDEF
Value Name: ObjectName
1
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\ABCDEF
Value Name: FailureActions
1
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\PQRSTU
Value Name: Description
1
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\PQRSTU
Value Name: Type
1
Mutexes Occurrences
127.0.0.1:8000:Cdefgh 3
112.74.89.58:44366:Cdefgh 3
112.74.89.58:42150:Cdefgh 1
47.100.137.128:8001:Pqrstu 1
22.23.24.56:8001:Pqrstu 1
hz122.f3322.org:8001:Cdefgh 1
112.74.89.58:35807:Cdefgh 1
112.74.89.58:46308:Cdefgh 1
101.33.196.136:3389:Cdefgh 1
127.0.0.1:8001:Cdefgh 1
183.28.28.43:8001:Abcdef 1
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness Occurrences
112[.]74[.]89[.]58 6
22[.]23[.]24[.]56 1
47[.]100[.]137[.]128 1
101[.]33[.]196[.]136 1
183[.]28[.]28[.]43 1
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness Occurrences
hz122[.]f3322[.]org 1
Files and or directories created Occurrences
%SystemRoot%\svchost.exe 4

File Hashes

04fa031e5d2d86f8dbe0d3b95d67ea774448df4613e8acce79f0c9a30ef041bc 2444b744b5c06e9410ee5c3baa807569fde44c5092192428de935e03d25b1edb 466ca0805173034a7b12a5ffce104bbe5ed312e7441abdb98849ae4103150d04 5a755f07d3b90ac5a2041fd04fd764c40882dd20b50f91fddbc10b8c6341591d 5b53262a14fe1dcd42d670b0488d0de11aeb7cfa84e36acb4eec0c13b5fd2d73 5ca6b22c6e7de5f0b9437970f1f9360ad4f3a74f964eb319080e347c27c6dff9 6ea5fdaa95dbe09ccbc474ba4fc9fbe796e79c02d2b4f65f223feda5643f5400 86bd70bc7bb74d3d4991b0f1c7e15ddef1d09695b3940c5fb015f2d00ce5f558 b9b344bd7005b233cbb85395f61c309938fe70e2f8a8d0b2c24441ba074f9ca5 bea6c7b4117eb1f894d830c77ddf6d4424bccb6043d0f43c257522d253321c3e c0a8a6e606e46a970cefe81f269ec6aec2a538830c2f7e03cf0eac55b135a59a c968ae3cfbbd89673b49f6bfd474eea846bdb1e2e3a7c5376dbcda5290d445ed dfc315d962da82d84b54683a849edf4e7b16bb136dbc2eb1198d35e528920103 ec6cb8ff27e33d7e69ce02885baa9c08fd5a03349a16a52590353a4ec364c464 f240b80b34fa480dc7236ddecb5c326e719a094e49df5a6f2070712650553066 fd0e616e5ebb9075c44bb6772cf8b2c46801fafdb0716636850dc2ec0fe06f8c

Coverage

Product Protection
Secure Endpoint This has coverage
Cloudlock N/A
CWS This has coverage
Email Security This has coverage
Network Security This has coverage
Stealthwatch N/A
Stealthwatch Cloud N/A
Secure Malware Analytics This has coverage
Umbrella N/A
WSA This has coverage

Screenshots of Detection

Secure Endpoint



Secure Malware Analytics



MITRE ATT&CK





Win.Dropper.DarkComet-9961766-1

Indicators of Compromise

  • IOCs collected from dynamic analysis of 33 samples
Registry Keys Occurrences
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\DC3_FEXEC 29
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: Windows Debugger
24
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS NT\CURRENTVERSION\WINLOGON
Value Name: UserInit
23
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: LanguageList
19
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: MicroUpdate
11
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: svchost.exe
7
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\POLICIES\SYSTEM
Value Name: EnableLUA
5
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\POLICIES\SYSTEM 5
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\SHAREDACCESS\PARAMETERS\FIREWALLPOLICY\STANDARDPROFILE
Value Name: EnableFirewall
4
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\SHAREDACCESS\PARAMETERS\FIREWALLPOLICY\STANDARDPROFILE
Value Name: DisableNotifications
4
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\WOW6432NODE\MICROSOFT\SECURITY CENTER
Value Name: AntiVirusDisableNotify
4
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\POLICIES\SYSTEM
Value Name: DisableTaskMgr
3
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\WOW6432NODE\MICROSOFT\SECURITY CENTER
Value Name: UpdatesDisableNotify
3
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\WSCSVC
Value Name: Start
3
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\POLICIES\SYSTEM
Value Name: DisableRegistryTools
3
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: rundll32
3
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\POLICIES\CURRENTVERSION\EXPLORERN
Value Name: NoControlPanel
1
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\POLICIES\CURRENTVERSION 1
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\POLICIES\CURRENTVERSION\EXPLORERN 1
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: Microsoft
1
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: Windows Updater
1
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: Update
1
Mutexes Occurrences
DC_MUTEX-<random, matching [A-Z0-9]{7}> 22
DCPERSFWBP 18
DC_MUTEX-5DND8AT 7
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness Occurrences
99[.]229[.]175[.]244 1
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness Occurrences
pervert[.]no-ip[.]info 7
pervert2[.]no-ip[.]info 7
delvega[.]no-ip[.]org 2
wp-enhanced[.]no-ip[.]org 2
funstuff712[.]zapto[.]org 2
fflazhhf1[.]no-ip[.]org 1
darkcometss[.]no-ip[.]org 1
not4umac[.]no-ip[.]biz 1
sanderkidah[.]no-ip[.]org 1
bobolobob[.]no-ip[.]biz 1
hg-ma[.]zapto5[.]org 1
corrosivegas2010[.]zapto[.]org 1
profi555[.]no-ip[.]org 1
hg-ma[.]zapto[.]org 1
jugoboy1[.]zapto[.]org 1
hg-ma[.]zapto1[.]org 1
hg-ma[.]zapto2[.]org 1
hg-ma[.]zapto3[.]org 1
hg-ma[.]zapto4[.]org 1
jackreapez[.]zapto[.]org 1
magicmq[.]no-ip[.]org 1
kenrickm[.]no-ip[.]org 1
mrganja[.]no-ip[.]org 1
cherubi[.]no-ip[.]org 1
Files and or directories created Occurrences
%APPDATA%\WinDbg 30
%APPDATA%\WinDbg\windbg.exe 29
%APPDATA%\dclogs 28
\svchost.exe 7
%TEMP%\uxcv9v 7
%TEMP%\uxcv9v.vbs 7
%HOMEPATH%\Documents\MSDCSC 6
%HOMEPATH%\Documents\MSDCSC\msdcsc.exe 6
%TEMP%\MSDCSC 5
%TEMP%\MSDCSC\msdcsc.exe 5
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\MSDCSC 3
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\MSDCSC\msdcsc.exe 3
%TEMP%\tMMjnM 1
%TEMP%\xMWbLz.vbs 1
%TEMP%\tMMjnM.vbs 1
%APPDATA%\WinDbg\msdnaa.exe 1
%TEMP%\Mi0z67 1
%HOMEPATH%\Documents\Explorer\Iexplorer.exe 1
%TEMP%\q7EVTk 1
%TEMP%\mmsHyU 1
%TEMP%\q7EVTk.vbs 1
%TEMP%\mmsHyU.vbs 1
%APPDATA%\WinUpd\WinUpdater.exe 1
%TEMP%\alRnXV 1
%TEMP%\alRnXV.vbs 1
*See JSON for more IOCs

File Hashes

0153ea1e28f729d6604f422075202e48a599969c04c30e4a3056e3a308148eb3 050332edd1c7356a6e8a86471699135d90ba402d1f7ac0a27da39ccdb94ba0e8 07525015abc52c0820727bbfe3a29f62e1e5e0ca8af36ca8716ae5ea12e71a75 09fce07fb07b90dc54f5e72dd08d8677f62e948e6a0450e63f25cc6e22f99ff5 0a5710ed174fbee931562112147c3bf6cf8609a5f1674d0c878a6888548cb0c9 0db09a5cc0ff770b4024f14bf6b56b03c4ec599fe0499fc3a8d5da2625d93954 0f67c4df374d4e01f9838a7dc6ab174c0d8f4b5f2485b670f24c7fcdf65f3269 10f39ff02541b02857c11ca18a1cc745e075224ad510af7ad18b21dcb0d3cfa0 12449565aed227128301078ece7695cd6fbd8fb735e8f8b4238e08a1b181a651 13d377317be765d9d333e6a6d41bb83cffb606547dc308fefe0dcea87133b172 157be56d2b1cee72ad290957752e089cd39f39c51807c6791b25b875113758ab 15c65c639231d17726fa4a2c0cef2a7975a52f5d71ba8d7e4e3e1f053c066528 16cc7eabf5a54d8b376b6de32e2591902044a558ded0a527fcc0143e1686c4af 16e972675f3d1bd26aff1accdde7925e4cd5ba6d5f2a33826d3d75606a1bc955 173cae8d47a5d796b06fdd18c951003342ad08d0aee4be2823332df003b5673a 17dbbd57df81e29f2d19aba93c1626efe92bff713ad8b8e65b449e843aff54e8 19370c555e8e7ed5133ca6efa7acc98fc360983cc04193cc195ea0c8a0bf2931 1984c2439c1acacb9ec7c6468db48017d8c2aa4e2da5829d572bb6f5050e80cd 1b7a03db77e43e04badd95d28554df1f9e3d97197605af709df0387d3bd0c1e8 1b9f9491a6d98e3de499641caa8ac736f2c6f76e4ac8960170d89fea7026c69e 1bd9838e181acb88813cdea1d228b445e06b921bff3cece199f9551522eff27d 1cd35eff6c0963356162d68f5434b19728f2805db71b5c616ff534d2c961d093 1d25e1479054eea2355385f60a9ce320af2e5ff5ff1333bfabc72518f7337056 1f3c3ebac21a63328b72317246fb5731720e1d311cdb7928543e1c13e87994d3 2066531192b69556304df9a65266a2d2e5978ae8cec323b6860eb230fd2faa79
*See JSON for more IOCs

Coverage

Product Protection
Secure Endpoint This has coverage
Cloudlock N/A
CWS This has coverage
Email Security This has coverage
Network Security N/A
Stealthwatch N/A
Stealthwatch Cloud N/A
Secure Malware Analytics This has coverage
Umbrella N/A
WSA N/A

Screenshots of Detection

Secure Endpoint



Secure Malware Analytics



MITRE ATT&CK





Win.Ransomware.TeslaCrypt-9960924-0

Indicators of Compromise

  • IOCs collected from dynamic analysis of 16 samples
Registry Keys Occurrences
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\POLICIES\SYSTEM
Value Name: EnableLinkedConnections
16
<HKU>\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\TRUEIMG 16
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\TRUEIMG 16
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\ACTION CENTER\CHECKS\{C8E6F269-B90A-4053-A3BE-499AFCEC98C4}.CHECK.0
Value Name: CheckSetting
16
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\TRUEIMG
Value Name: ID
16
<HKCU>\Software\<random, matching '[A-Z0-9]{14,16}'> 16
<HKCU>\Software\<random, matching '[A-Z0-9]{14,16}'>
Value Name: data
16
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: _lfia
1
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: _hfnk
1
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: _kcgt
1
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: _ppqk
1
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: _kaol
1
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: _abtg
1
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: _rpua
1
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: _raet
1
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: _kwxa
1
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: _ojsf
1
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: _kiyk
1
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: _iykv
1
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: _hpdk
1
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: _htkc
1
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: _fshu
1
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: _fanp
1
Mutexes Occurrences
__xfghx__ 16
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness Occurrences
74[.]220[.]199[.]6 16
64[.]190[.]63[.]111 16
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness Occurrences
prodocument[.]co[.]uk 16
marketathart[.]com 16
joshsawyerdesign[.]com 16
emmy2015[.]com 16
nlhomegarden[.]com 16
esbook[.]com 16
Files and or directories created Occurrences
%ProgramFiles%\7-Zip\Lang\lv.txt 16
%ProgramFiles%\7-Zip\Lang\mk.txt 16
%ProgramFiles%\7-Zip\Lang\mn.txt 16
%ProgramFiles%\7-Zip\Lang\mng.txt 16
%ProgramFiles%\7-Zip\Lang\mng2.txt 16
%ProgramFiles%\7-Zip\Lang\mr.txt 16
%ProgramFiles%\7-Zip\Lang\ms.txt 16
%ProgramFiles%\7-Zip\Lang\nb.txt 16
%ProgramFiles%\7-Zip\Lang\ne.txt 16
%ProgramFiles%\7-Zip\Lang\nl.txt 16
%ProgramFiles%\7-Zip\Lang\nn.txt 16
%ProgramFiles%\7-Zip\Lang\pa-in.txt 16
%ProgramFiles%\7-Zip\Lang\pl.txt 16
%ProgramFiles%\7-Zip\Lang\ps.txt 16
%ProgramFiles%\7-Zip\Lang\pt-br.txt 16
%ProgramFiles%\7-Zip\Lang\pt.txt 16
%ProgramFiles%\7-Zip\Lang\ro.txt 16
%ProgramFiles%\7-Zip\Lang\ru.txt 16
%ProgramFiles%\7-Zip\Lang\sa.txt 16
%ProgramFiles%\7-Zip\Lang\si.txt 16
%ProgramFiles%\7-Zip\Lang\sk.txt 16
%ProgramFiles%\7-Zip\Lang\sl.txt 16
%ProgramFiles%\7-Zip\Lang\sq.txt 16
%ProgramFiles%\7-Zip\Lang\sr-spc.txt 16
%ProgramFiles%\7-Zip\Lang\sr-spl.txt 16
*See JSON for more IOCs

File Hashes

00e862ecba1e2a71769a67fc5c27499e00c5594f6b7ed4e4114c2fe1fb43492f 144c480ed69ac652c4eb4efa5b6038d7a68ed3bca67089997b4228e1c814f7c4 1b02123c913912f44a6ef1c3c4a5a008270d9d8e802e92b4baa259135f25dc21 22f322c8241b4860c066f5ae57115c58f373753e3d8c9bede4521e5a5ed85e65 35aeb94c99b948b122f3e4bd4298107ab15cb8bbdb11b533d32666dbb1455ae3 3ba05e043bf3148202f498dcddb6bd67680f76640aef2d08f9ae1272ff85e719 41cba3025ecc75863b7a836ee00fdf2bbc2df90dffb17541b5bb1c9fcb269bd1 9223631593b46b54450b76028a69ddd837d06cd7e9b3d8e3f7bd584a46af22bf b2713458d2c3ebd4b558f8c2ce19a90bd97095ca868fd499755bf1c9cbd0c388 bdf2c5fcf72e7d7870e81ffacdd01206ed98d2446a85c28e7eaf73e26d7a6eda be9fac828e64c19e0a3fbf3c4a752d5332b7c0b849556f5388645515a29538ee c00039c0454935a5079dc801ce4420457eb9964cbed8372b5aff5c60a45fa26c d540b31f009a4138b5d35735fa9976522f4d5ee9e6b8dbdbde479796ebc6d4c0 dba60ef1804b4d90d74a2988fe53f044d7619f469d0ba9660e5646a1a67439cd f1ab2d7ace4656b5f3770186d088ac0644482fe43f38fe2bdb9217744d0f58c1 ff6f821dc0526f3615b1a3c37b2b14094f53d05cb0a6a753cb257cb0bcde6898

Coverage

Product Protection
Secure Endpoint This has coverage
Cloudlock N/A
CWS This has coverage
Email Security This has coverage
Network Security This has coverage
Stealthwatch N/A
Stealthwatch Cloud N/A
Secure Malware Analytics This has coverage
Umbrella This has coverage
WSA This has coverage

Screenshots of Detection

Secure Endpoint



Secure Malware Analytics



MITRE ATT&CK





Win.Virus.Xpiro-9960895-1

Indicators of Compromise

  • IOCs collected from dynamic analysis of 23 samples
Registry Keys Occurrences
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\CLR_OPTIMIZATION_V2.0.50727_32
Value Name: Type
23
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\CLR_OPTIMIZATION_V2.0.50727_64
Value Name: Type
23
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\CLR_OPTIMIZATION_V4.0.30319_32
Value Name: Type
23
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\CLR_OPTIMIZATION_V4.0.30319_32
Value Name: Start
23
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\COMSYSAPP
Value Name: Type
23
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\COMSYSAPP
Value Name: Start
23
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\MOZILLAMAINTENANCE
Value Name: Type
23
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\MOZILLAMAINTENANCE
Value Name: Start
23
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\OSE
Value Name: Type
23
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\OSE
Value Name: Start
23
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\WOW6432NODE\MICROSOFT\SECURITY CENTER\SVC\S-1-5-21-2580483871-590521980-3826313501-500 23
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\WOW6432NODE\MICROSOFT\SECURITY CENTER\SVC\S-1-5-21-2580483871-590521980-3826313501-500
Value Name: EnableNotifications
23
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\CLR_OPTIMIZATION_V2.0.50727_32
Value Name: Start
23
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\CLR_OPTIMIZATION_V2.0.50727_64
Value Name: Start
23
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\.NETFRAMEWORK\V2.0.50727\NGENSERVICE\STATE
Value Name: AccumulatedWaitIdleTime
23
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\.NETFRAMEWORK\V2.0.50727\NGENSERVICE\LISTENEDSTATE
Value Name: RootstoreDirty
23
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\WOW6432NODE\MICROSOFT\.NETFRAMEWORK\V2.0.50727\NGENSERVICE\STATE
Value Name: AccumulatedWaitIdleTime
23
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\WOW6432NODE\MICROSOFT\.NETFRAMEWORK\V2.0.50727\NGENSERVICE\LISTENEDSTATE
Value Name: RootstoreDirty
23
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\WSCSVC
Value Name: Start
22
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\CLR_OPTIMIZATION_V4.0.30319_64
Value Name: Type
22
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\CLR_OPTIMIZATION_V4.0.30319_64
Value Name: Start
22
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\IEETWCOLLECTORSERVICE
Value Name: Type
22
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\IEETWCOLLECTORSERVICE
Value Name: Start
22
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\WINDEFEND
Value Name: Start
21
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\EXT\STATS\{761497BB-D6F0-462C-B6EB-D4DAF1D92D43} 18
Mutexes Occurrences
kkq-vx_mtx63 23
kkq-vx_mtx64 23
kkq-vx_mtx65 23
kkq-vx_mtx66 23
kkq-vx_mtx67 23
kkq-vx_mtx68 23
kkq-vx_mtx69 23
kkq-vx_mtx70 23
kkq-vx_mtx71 23
kkq-vx_mtx72 23
kkq-vx_mtx73 23
kkq-vx_mtx74 23
kkq-vx_mtx75 23
kkq-vx_mtx76 23
kkq-vx_mtx77 23
kkq-vx_mtx78 23
kkq-vx_mtx79 23
kkq-vx_mtx80 23
kkq-vx_mtx81 23
kkq-vx_mtx82 23
kkq-vx_mtx83 23
kkq-vx_mtx84 23
kkq-vx_mtx85 23
kkq-vx_mtx86 23
kkq-vx_mtx87 23
*See JSON for more IOCs
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness Occurrences
107[.]22[.]125[.]105 7
3[.]217[.]206[.]46 4
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness Occurrences
ninite[.]com 21
www[.]bing[.]com 1
Files and or directories created Occurrences
%CommonProgramFiles%\Microsoft Shared\OfficeSoftwareProtectionPlatform\OSPPSVC.EXE 23
%CommonProgramFiles(x86)%\microsoft shared\Source Engine\OSE.EXE 23
%ProgramFiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\Office14\GROOVE.EXE 23
%ProgramFiles(x86)%\Mozilla Maintenance Service\maintenanceservice.exe 23
%SystemRoot%\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v2.0.50727\mscorsvw.exe 23
%SystemRoot%\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\mscorsvw.exe 23
%SystemRoot%\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\mscorsvw.exe 23
%SystemRoot%\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorsvw.exe 23
%System32%\FXSSVC.exe 23
%System32%\alg.exe 23
%System32%\dllhost.exe 23
%SystemRoot%\ehome\ehsched.exe 23
%SystemRoot%\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\ngen_service.log 23
%SystemRoot%\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v2.0.50727\ngen_service.log 23
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe 23
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\svchost.exe 23
%SystemRoot%\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\ngen_service.log 23
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\dllhost.vir 23
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\svchost.vir 23
%SystemRoot%\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\ngenservicelock.dat 23
%SystemRoot%\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\ngen_service.lock 23
%SystemRoot%\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\ngenservicelock.dat 23
%SystemRoot%\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v2.0.50727\ngen_service.lock 23
%SystemRoot%\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v2.0.50727\ngenservicelock.dat 23
%CommonProgramFiles(x86)%\microsoft shared\source engine\ose.vir 23
*See JSON for more IOCs

File Hashes

137ad3b55addd7191c8c974beef6b65bae791bc4de1e86b7e2965b311d40e2d0 1cfd0fd601a0f5234ce72672ec9c6c866dca03836198d93a320ed5df0bddd7f8 1e831b6d0cabaa8b44de36c1b96dd6e54e295502eb171be4f87723212fe574ca 1f935627d9866da115f1aad78be290f60a639bec1a94d6b8397326eeb46c111b 30ffb87628211e78074a3a891b8bd173db6f2d74dc97e735ff386361cf29aee1 3f948d4350c566416101441adb1c00121bd835db40cc08c73a556b764458673d 47934d4f40e9a5af0ee572a7e1e088d29d3bfd655d4aff26018a64118ad68a24 563c16cb752614726d350000fbf514a8b8d32a8074cd12c7545d6ff93f790ed9 591ae4985fd6993f580eae6f93f3e96f7c73c14dc3927e96223e8003f9ab3588 5cbd454095120231e23ca372fee8e9e76f34e3f5491f8ab10e8e5203e4c52570 6f0f5fda67646bc8def9c66497041528cd8ed7158a169c1b0787f59360c28ea8 7ec4a0246b5d33dfe811f4f34ab94a6b82d822196776afbe28a0f543ade8ad63 97d0aeeca4859c38984086ff1bef13c9bd11466131058fabda20dd1b21342f7a a2839faa3c7ecbff8afa71ca5787690e0e3eaeb36b899bab1926b19ce32b8c6d bcf2ae9a67fe974c02e95fbdd4edcce7df377a288c7586dae9d0b625aeedc93b c51d235b290424ad6baf08d67ab600a260200846a3f4b218e916933594b40537 d3d7dd910bd5e79fdb39d51aa83afaccdfd10538d30dd69bc7219a146e897361 d445c1ac4afae6cb028a2508c655271e3d69e07d9e016887d89d790c80fc0409 e23566aabaa7743da973840338829cc25d6936e8fcb5fb8d9b78b0ccac46c1ea e37b0661d4e4483048abcf0abba65060c78716672790e12bb0a768f04b18134b e48a371f7f5f3ad1cda0d16312f30846b6a12494967c8fba8de7f65a5673b1ff eb1ecc1ef099105b4882ccace3caf843ed1508b1463f8af6cc94adaa0181b721 ec1bc44db50911234444c575d91335113232ab5b1f6cad6acf5e52ff16ccd8fb

Coverage

Product Protection
Secure Endpoint This has coverage
Cloudlock N/A
CWS This has coverage
Email Security This has coverage
Network Security This has coverage
Stealthwatch N/A
Stealthwatch Cloud N/A
Secure Malware Analytics This has coverage
Umbrella N/A
WSA N/A

Screenshots of Detection

Secure Endpoint



Secure Malware Analytics



MITRE ATT&CK





Win.Dropper.Emotet-9961142-0

Indicators of Compromise

  • IOCs collected from dynamic analysis of 218 samples
Registry Keys Occurrences
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: LanguageList
190
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\<random, matching '[A-Z0-9]{8}'>
Value Name: Type
64
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\<random, matching '[A-Z0-9]{8}'>
Value Name: Start
64
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\<random, matching '[A-Z0-9]{8}'>
Value Name: ErrorControl
64
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\<random, matching '[A-Z0-9]{8}'>
Value Name: DisplayName
64
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\<random, matching '[A-Z0-9]{8}'>
Value Name: WOW64
64
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\<random, matching '[A-Z0-9]{8}'>
Value Name: ObjectName
64
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\<random, matching '[A-Z0-9]{8}'> 63
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\<random, matching '[A-Z0-9]{8}'>
Value Name: ImagePath
61
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\<random, matching '[A-Z0-9]{8}'>
Value Name: Description
60
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%systemroot%\system32\dot3svc.dll,-1103
14
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @oleres.dll,-5013
10
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%systemroot%\system32\browser.dll,-101
9
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%SystemRoot%\system32\AxInstSV.dll,-104
9
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%systemroot%\system32\dps.dll,-501
9
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%SystemRoot%\ehome\ehrecvr.exe,-102
8
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @appmgmts.dll,-3251
8
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%SystemRoot%\system32\dhcpcore.dll,-101
8
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%systemroot%\system32\appinfo.dll,-101
8
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%SystemRoot%\System32\audiosrv.dll,-205
7
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%systemroot%\system32\appidsvc.dll,-101
7
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @comres.dll,-948
7
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%SystemRoot%\System32\dnsapi.dll,-102
7
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%systemroot%\system32\cscsvc.dll,-201
7
<HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\82\52C64B7E
Value Name: @%SystemRoot%\System32\bthserv.dll,-102
7
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness Occurrences
5[.]196[.]74[.]210 82
74[.]208[.]45[.]104 82
45[.]55[.]219[.]163 82
45[.]55[.]36[.]51 82
174[.]45[.]13[.]118 82
180[.]92[.]239[.]110 82
91[.]83[.]93[.]99 82
217[.]199[.]160[.]224 78
89[.]32[.]150[.]160 78
68[.]183[.]190[.]199 78
45[.]161[.]242[.]102 78
209[.]236[.]123[.]42 78
71[.]197[.]211[.]156 78
91[.]121[.]54[.]71 78
85[.]25[.]207[.]108 58
88[.]249[.]181[.]198 58
65[.]156[.]53[.]186 58
68[.]183[.]233[.]80 58
177[.]32[.]8[.]85 58
81[.]17[.]93[.]134 58
197[.]232[.]36[.]108 58
23[.]46[.]150[.]72 30
23[.]46[.]150[.]48 27
23[.]221[.]72[.]27 13
23[.]221[.]72[.]10 6
*See JSON for more IOCs
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness Occurrences
apps[.]identrust[.]com 82
Files and or directories created Occurrences
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\<random, matching '[a-z]{8}'> 35
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\printui 2
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\NlsLexicons0414 2
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\utildll 2
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\NlsData000a 2
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\fthsvc 2
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\shlwapi 2
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\WcsPlugInService 2
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\NlsLexicons0002 2
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\d3d8thk 1
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\instnm 1
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\cttune 1
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\tsbyuv 1
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\KBDSW 1
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\fc 1
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\rshx32 1
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\KBDHE220 1
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\WMADMOE 1
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\NlsData0002 1
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\iprop 1
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\rastls 1
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\aecache 1
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\SMBHelperClass 1
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\KBDNO 1
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\mfc100 1
*See JSON for more IOCs

File Hashes

0154a4e3faa4dafca324954364d049324d6fcc6b8a1c90cbae92cd41f8927c4e 01ea88880d59cd617d53bfd1849ad0c2023c9febc43b48579d06802c9b324d77 0222be0813e32c7a2c87a31482e33830a91b73a750aff3499da5caa100646607 0242673f6b5b086a61873f4773b8b7f119d025325f2724cb362b1151adccfc8b 02f7999d6693f08f5983effb8bee06145be3f7dc22ff1e5b745e8d0633fe19d6 038008283ccba00047b767169fd02554182310d7b32c6def8a3fc1c6a045daf1 0403b01de17d2130faa4eecf11111acf15bc672dfeb9394054e5aa05166b8289 044242411968ca1c92b3a645d7f470cf0cda1a220920da688558fde7f4108eb9 055014bbf3a21173e4e2d9fb22124d7d249bc8f8c748151197d6e985bdf06f67 05cf33a7202716161360fc0e6fd45091f9a290954ba26a64037745652fa4b487 066202dc95bd51220d42f603a030ef71527b8dc56e62200f0d175f09f3f89c27 06ee8bc6b3c35b3d3ea924f73db6da1df9061e69b487bad9718328f1d186f0c7 0780d91df0f27af4b00d51e531a1cf12d50bbb048a211e0b287820bd9313eab5 07c262357505c7bef31ebfe2bb6c13a3d386e38d262ba2bdbfb2e52c1bd066fd 080fc908405201cbf074d6343acf66ee3c4d57f231c399b87097f75b8ca7960f 08e6bfa50d4fe544c03474d1a23776762a47a0ceed44dbe5bbb6e09fce30b055 091b50c4a374f1fc1d15e81044c2b50f03fa7c3e8359eb09bb95dc25deeebd4d 098861c8b4411225b4fde8737ccb518052ef40c896ee4e42dfeecf322e56f07f 09c4a4a31a51590b27a82bcff450c29391d3dfde480df012f43020e858efb639 0b533cf67e6fd8298b62d3aaea82f07ad11c600fa8917f3b683a72da9ca2fa7e 0c33a1f3687e65daa8825856f309cc40ef97d0892ef7742a77355124e296b815 0ccab31b5610aac24a242c812f474ff24b8e345aa78fd4b7d0a92b690938f908 0cd25d45a5e31de0fc1b75ba65c5b43d934b60b7d07638aaa1ce0d83afd984ec 0d3fee19509a873e96a1b2559d9193cf046f7f35f49d16b180438d9df7da027f 0ea6a45d2ad1115ce7141f15693139b8bd9e5ffebb5a1321ab8c48e62d65fab9
*See JSON for more IOCs

Coverage

Product Protection
Secure Endpoint This has coverage
Cloudlock N/A
CWS This has coverage
Email Security This has coverage
Network Security This has coverage
Stealthwatch N/A
Stealthwatch Cloud N/A
Secure Malware Analytics This has coverage
Umbrella N/A
WSA This has coverage

Screenshots of Detection

Secure Endpoint



Secure Malware Analytics



MITRE ATT&CK





Win.Dropper.Remcos-9961392-0

Indicators of Compromise

  • IOCs collected from dynamic analysis of 14 samples
Registry Keys Occurrences
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\POULUS 14
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\POULUS\MICROMINIATURISER 14
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\UNINSTALL\BRUGERNAVNETS 14
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\UNINSTALL\BRUGERNAVNETS\TIVOLIET 14
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\POULUS\MICROMINIATURISER
Value Name: Komplettes
14
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\UNINSTALL\BRUGERNAVNETS\TIVOLIET
Value Name: Fins
14
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\[email protected] 7
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\[email protected]
Value Name: licence
7
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\[email protected]
Value Name: exepath
7
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUNONCE
Value Name: ornamenterne
1
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUNONCE
Value Name: Hyldetrs
1
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUNONCE
Value Name: lnglidninger
1
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUNONCE
Value Name: Vampirebat
1
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUNONCE
Value Name: Dereferencing
1
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUNONCE
Value Name: Sarkastisk
1
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUNONCE
Value Name: Martyrologistic
1
Mutexes Occurrences
Remcos_Mutex_Inj 7
[email protected] 7
Global\916138a1-15e4-11ed-9660-00151792685a 1
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness Occurrences
5[.]2[.]75[.]164 7
181[.]235[.]13[.]200 4
186[.]169[.]54[.]97 3
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness Occurrences
colpatvalidacionnuevo[.]xyz 7
Files and or directories created Occurrences
%HOMEPATH%\Desktop\Markedness.ini 14
%TEMP%\ns<random, matching '[a-z][A-F0-9]{1,4}'>.tmp 14
%TEMP%\ns<random, matching '[a-z][A-F0-9]{4}'>.tmp\System.dll 14
%TEMP%\logsflat458 7
%TEMP%\logsflat458\sasgs527.dat 7
\TEMP\en-US\22d69844486d029467b528c89bf763a6.exe.mui 1
\TEMP\en-US\ef6731323cff411f303c2bd29b9f15c8.exe.mui 1
\TEMP\en-US\b2a7538d257a51b1a506b646c248fcbe.exe.mui 1
\TEMP\en-US\570979659276a2a985f97f7965f97f76.exe.mui 1
\TEMP\en-US\f231d436f8d62de3082ea791da78ed50.exe.mui 1
\TEMP\en\f231d436f8d62de3082ea791da78ed50.exe.mui 1
\TEMP\en\ef6731323cff411f303c2bd29b9f15c8.exe.mui 1
%TEMP%\Selenitic 1
%TEMP%\Dextroamphetamine 1
%TEMP%\Selenitic\Uncooping.exe 1
%TEMP%\Dextroamphetamine\Lobcokt.exe 1
\TEMP\en\22d69844486d029467b528c89bf763a6.exe.mui 1
%TEMP%\Tiki124 1
%TEMP%\Tiki124\Unexpecting.exe 1
\TEMP\en\b2a7538d257a51b1a506b646c248fcbe.exe.mui 1
\TEMP\en\570979659276a2a985f97f7965f97f76.exe.mui 1
%TEMP%\Sekundrkommunens 1
%TEMP%\Giganter27 1
%TEMP%\Sekundrkommunens\Unpracticability174.exe 1
%TEMP%\Giganter27\Spandauerne.exe 1
*See JSON for more IOCs

File Hashes

125b94822affbd4b1b67333905a91231c62e427334475ada0daa44d007e884c1 332cb82247db85cd4c772200938a7623c4161a15d680157cdc688b53aae2303a 3efb2166b220fd7d7e5df42739d998f6ed4c70fefdcb03b6a9b1810d6dcfcd77 42d77fbb29467078ade8ecba705a648d3d4aeacd5f6735a6d92d17cb55ff7049 6761e346725d0cfa3436b459176ff467f7b4a426af0559845032c912420747cd 72d9be63e832a89a04ffcfb48c30199d3461fe982bde962f57c7cf71e0f5f06a 8c420a6337376e20c987679a34e3d09194e504c444fbf50619328f5c0dda9217 942dcafe7a16cfdd1769048c73590ec2c29e9c76a9f6c46e6b6e88ac2220b0ef 9ead44844a24092afb456478686839852e04cd1ad8e081185ae432f1171baa1b a3ec71d27779875c7262d608c3c5e591fa7c12f0893e006bb6f7d2ad1d710142 a742e0a1f7939fdaf5eb615bac3da040781bd19e84e3f647186314ecb6e0fa5e ce2ff79b4178d9b7f142001bc227753dd395fcd1a28a385bfa379e0857181467 d52c22336b2e2efaeab6b8eb2be8726a36eaea553905b01102d9716d4c6184af e2deccb5d8cc1ec270d95501aaa7e53951bd7f89c2c0bcd50420bf94b7057675

Coverage

Product Protection
Secure Endpoint This has coverage
Cloudlock N/A
CWS This has coverage
Email Security This has coverage
Network Security This has coverage
Stealthwatch N/A
Stealthwatch Cloud N/A
Secure Malware Analytics This has coverage
Umbrella This has coverage
WSA This has coverage

Screenshots of Detection

Secure Endpoint



Secure Malware Analytics



MITRE ATT&CK





Win.Dropper.Ramnit-9961396-0

Indicators of Compromise

  • IOCs collected from dynamic analysis of 26 samples
Registry Keys Occurrences
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\WOW6432NODE\MICROSOFT\SECURITY CENTER
Value Name: AntiVirusOverride
26
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\WOW6432NODE\MICROSOFT\SECURITY CENTER
Value Name: AntiVirusDisableNotify
26
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\WOW6432NODE\MICROSOFT\SECURITY CENTER
Value Name: FirewallDisableNotify
26
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\WOW6432NODE\MICROSOFT\SECURITY CENTER
Value Name: FirewallOverride
26
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\WOW6432NODE\MICROSOFT\SECURITY CENTER
Value Name: UpdatesDisableNotify
26
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\WOW6432NODE\MICROSOFT\SECURITY CENTER
Value Name: UacDisableNotify
26
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\POLICIES\SYSTEM
Value Name: EnableLUA
26
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\SHAREDACCESS\PARAMETERS\FIREWALLPOLICY\STANDARDPROFILE
Value Name: EnableFirewall
26
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\SHAREDACCESS\PARAMETERS\FIREWALLPOLICY\STANDARDPROFILE
Value Name: DoNotAllowExceptions
26
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\SHAREDACCESS\PARAMETERS\FIREWALLPOLICY\STANDARDPROFILE
Value Name: DisableNotifications
26
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\WSCSVC
Value Name: Start
26
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\WINDEFEND
Value Name: Start
26
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\MPSSVC
Value Name: Start
26
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\WOW6432NODE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS NT\CURRENTVERSION
Value Name: jfghdug_ooetvtgk
26
<HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: JudCsgdy
26
<HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\WUAUSERV
Value Name: Start
26
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\WOW6432NODE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
Value Name: Windows Defender
26
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS NT\CURRENTVERSION\WINLOGON
Value Name: Userinit
26
<HKLM>\SOFTWARE\WOW6432NODE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS NT\CURRENTVERSION\WINLOGON
Value Name: Userinit
26
Mutexes Occurrences
qazwsxedc 26
{7930D12C-1D38-EB63-89CF-4C8161B79ED4} 26
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness Occurrences
72[.]26[.]218[.]70 25
195[.]201[.]179[.]207 25
208[.]100[.]26[.]245 25
46[.]165[.]220[.]155 25
35[.]205[.]61[.]67 25
142[.]250[.]80[.]14 25
63[.]251[.]235[.]76 25
64[.]225[.]91[.]73 25
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness Occurrences
google[.]com 25
gjvoemsjvb[.]com 25
ahpygyxe[.]com 25
msoalrhvphqrnjv[.]com 25
rdslmvlipid[.]com 25
jpcqdmfvn[.]com 25
rrmlyaviljwuoph[.]com 25
maajnyhst[.]com 25
enbbojmjpss[.]com 25
oqmfrxak[.]com 25
tdccjwtetv[.]com 25
tpxobasr[.]com 25
xpdsuvpcvrcrnwbxqfx[.]com 25
fbrlgikmlriqlvel[.]com 25
boeyrhmrd[.]com 25
ugcukkcpplmouoah[.]com 25
gugendolik[.]com 25
Files and or directories created Occurrences
%LOCALAPPDATA%\bolpidti 26
%LOCALAPPDATA%\bolpidti\judcsgdy.exe 26
%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\judcsgdy.exe 26

File Hashes

081742e8ed56a1a933e0507ccd536aaaf7242ac76d47a1a49626ee71c6756b53 0e372167303e500219b580a1a0367d2b69ab693e56934584e05cd963736bd463 10cef31349a4842546edbc5244d0d3aaed1e3c058008800c889abf5dc43ec343 127ee9c2897fb600dec742861451fdcf48820c200e15df7479542ed4232c0584 155b0301ce2f88c396fb7aa77cbc82c51a01660e6a74b63f7ba8dc8f023ea7e8 1e1773938b5bdd08be479ca9186a30d3fad83ea67ae905f391508ac543c2a38f 263351025d462b47660ea4bacd71ae1fd694de45a3d9bd5b14e58be1c4362d00 2e2ac92783031efdde48674b0ed3362c81fac9b25756ee39af1629f39309ccc2 340833674362d0c01995cc8657a95a628fddeb853272b6d89dfcf98bbe106cbe 39b9cfa59e688e1d56e6499b80637f321f777d022dff4a9eaf691ba9a1e9cc86 3cc065b26f54c993606649d1679bca81068c10e3727fdf9ee811fa6a17c1ebad 41b21c4398fa089007a9a34aac8a3f5d14b61814ff036b555cc6b09c8efd81aa 4b183d215f86d026ef2bac0cf5dd4b28146612d52206e358169b0f1d3209c76d 4ed2cf991c4ed810cdbb5d567d33e1f1d94218ae43c506d6b33d2acc35009598 57fa2ea50d27a8cc8feec2867a680ae6e9a0d1a47d117733a73db86da3bf8416 5de59e2cc183ce5f34b2ca66fbd1edce54b3a6208ae7621c49cbd78835bdcbf5 699e006e4a6871ca898aacf55f84c36ea43d8b9e421b71dd20a0fe5a06378d66 6a216904abbf52246819029936c7e8705f50c61ba0ee6a62d8a14881cfca0a33 77aeccd3d538a6effc3623344a331d5190c747489a5cc511d4e7d973e879ff8a 77c966ca4088e8b918b4e40ed539a510fad2a2631ff17d1a1b01a1670e6fa400 79622d5b5ef3c93d32bcaaba64cfbbe4a88ec7f56d1f7f2160b9219321058f29 8c878b6608dba85c650ffda157cc14d885f14559e8c6b38a5ae0be85d5a73001 8d5f17bf76258cf83d0678cef645b0fa2f0b6df56858fb0ec4cab8894b59b316 a1574bfff6cebf0757ab5a7fc7634b7956fed8943e088b87820ff13be65789c4 af0aa7289a5770da3a158d0f0fbea1c5073b6ca4f6fe5a7bebdde44a55ca2c2e
*See JSON for more IOCs

Coverage

Product Protection
Secure Endpoint This has coverage
Cloudlock N/A
CWS This has coverage
Email Security This has coverage
Network Security This has coverage
Stealthwatch N/A
Stealthwatch Cloud N/A
Secure Malware Analytics This has coverage
Umbrella This has coverage
WSA This has coverage

Screenshots of Detection

Secure Endpoint



Secure Malware Analytics



MITRE ATT&CK





Before yesterdayCisco Talos

Threat Source newsletter (Aug. 11, 2022) — All of the things-as-a-service

11 August 2022 at 18:00

By Jon Munshaw. 

Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. 

Everyone seems to want to create the next “Netflix” of something. Xbox’s Game Pass is the “Netflix of video games.” Rent the Runway is a “Netflix of fashion” where customers subscribe to a rotation of fancy clothes. 

And now threat actors are looking to be the “Netflix of malware.” All categories of malware have some sort of "as-a-service" twist now. Some of the largest ransomware groups in the world operate “as a service,” allowing smaller groups to pay a fee in exchange for using the larger group’s tools.  

Our latest report on information-stealers points out that “infostealers as-a-service" are growing in popularity, and our researchers also discovered a new “C2 as-a-service" platform where attackers can pay to have this third-party site act as their command and control. And like Netflix, this Dark Utilities site offers several other layers of tools and malware to choose from. This is a particularly scary trend to me because of how easy — relatively speaking — this makes things for anyone with a basic knowledge of computers to carry out a cyber attack. Netflix made it easy for people like my Grandma to find everything she needs in one place to watch anything from throwback shows like “Night Rider” to the live action of “Shrek: The Musical” and everything in between.  

How much longer before anyone with access to the internet can log into a singular dark web site and surf for whatever they’re in the mood for that day? As someone who has spent zero time on the actual dark web, this may already exist and I don’t even know about it, but maybe a threat actor will one day be smart enough to make a website that looks as sleek as Netflix so you can scroll through suggestions and hand-pick the Redline information-stealer followed up by a relaxing evening of ransomware from Conti.  

With everything going “as a service” it means I don’t necessarily have to have the coding skills to create my own bespoke malware. So long as I have the cash, I could conceivably buy an out-of-the-box tool online and deploy it against whoever I want.  

This is not necessarily as easy as picking a show on Netflix. But it’s not a huge leap to look at the skills gap Netflix closes by allowing my Grandma to surf for any show she wants without having to scroll through cable channels or drive to the library to check out a DVD, and someone who knows how to use PowerShell being able to launch an “as-a-service" ransomware attack.  

I have no idea what the easy solution is here aside from all the traditional forms of detection and prevention we preach. Outside of direct law enforcement intervention, there are few ways to take these “as a service” platforms offline. Maybe that just means we need to start working on the “Netflix of cybersecurity tools.” 
  

The one big thing 


Historically, cybercrime was considered white-collar criminal behavior perpetrated by those that were knowledgeable and turned bad. Now, technology has become such an integral part of our lives that anyone with a smartphone and desire can get started in cybercrime. The growth of cryptocurrencies and associated anonymity, whether legitimate or not, has garnered the attention of criminals that formerly operated in traditional criminal enterprises and have now shifted to cybercrime and identity theft. New research from Talos indicates that small-time criminals are increasingly taking part in online crime like phishing, credit card scams and more in favor of traditional “hands-on” crime. 

Why do I care? 

Everyone panics when the local news shows a graph with “violent crime” increasing in our respective areas. So we should be just as worried about the increase in cybercrime over the past few years, and the potential for it to grow. As mentioned above, “as a service” malware offerings have made it easier for anyone with internet access to carry out a cyber attack and deploy ransomware or just try to scam someone out of a few thousand dollars.  

So now what? 

Law enforcement, especially at the local level, is going to need to evolve along with the criminals as they are tasked with protecting the general public. The future criminal is going to be aware of operational security and technologies like Tor to make their arrests increasingly difficult. This is just as good a time as any to remember to talk to your family about cybersecurity and internet safety. Remind family members about common types of scams like the classic “I’m in the hospital and need money.” 

 

Other news of note


Microsoft Patch Tuesday was headlined by another zero-day vulnerability in the Microsoft Support Diagnostics Tool (MSDT). CVE-2022-35743 and CVE-2022-34713 are remote code execution vulnerabilities in MSDT. However, only CVE-2022-34713 has been exploited in the wild and Microsoft considers it “more likely” to be exploited. MSDT was already the target of the so-called “Follina” zero-day vulnerability in June. In all, Microsoft patched more than 120 vulnerabilities across all its products. Adobe also released updates to fix 25 vulnerabilities on Tuesday, mainly in Adobe Acrobat Reader. One critical vulnerability could lead to arbitrary code execution and memory leak. (Talos blog, Krebs on Security, SecurityWeek

Some of the U.K.’s 111 services were disrupted earlier this week after a suspected cyber attack against its managed service provider. The country’s National Health System warned residents that some emergency calls could be delayed and others could not schedule health appointments. Advance, the target of the attack, said it was investigating the potential theft of patient data. As of Thursday morning, at least nine NHS mental health trusts could face up to three weeks without access to vulnerable patients’ records, though the incident has been “contained.” (SC Magazine, Bloomberg, The Guardian

An 18-year-old and her mother are facing charges in Nebraska over an alleged medicated abortion based on information obtained from Facebook messages. Court records indicate state law enforcement submitted a search warrant to Meta, the parent company of Facebook, demanding all private data, including messages, that the company had for the two people charged. The contents of those messages were then used as the basis of a second search warrant, in which additional computers and devices were confiscated. Although the investigation began before the U.S. Supreme Court’s reversal of Roe v. Wade, the case highlights a renewed focus on digital privacy and data storage. (Vice, CNN

Can’t get enough Talos? 


Upcoming events where you can find Talos 


USENIX Security '22 (Aug. 10 - 12, 2022) 
Las Vegas, Nevada 

DEF CON (Aug. 11 - 14, 2022) 
Las Vegas, Nevada 

Virtual 

Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week  


SHA 256: e4973db44081591e9bff5117946defbef6041397e56164f485cf8ec57b1d8934  
MD5: 93fefc3e88ffb78abb36365fa5cf857c  
Typical Filename: Wextract  
Claimed Product: Internet Explorer  
Detection Name: PUA.Win.Trojan.Generic::85.lp.ret.sbx.tg  

MD5: 2c8ea737a232fd03ab80db672d50a17a    
Typical Filename: LwssPlayer.scr    
Claimed Product: 梦想之巅幻灯播放器    
Detection Name: Auto.125E12.241442.in02    

MD5: a087b2e6ec57b08c0d0750c60f96a74c     
Typical Filename: AAct.exe     
Claimed Product: N/A       
Detection Name: PUA.Win.Tool.Kmsauto::1201  

MD5: 8c69830a50fb85d8a794fa46643493b2  
Typical Filename: AAct.exe  
Claimed Product: N/A   
Detection Name: PUA.Win.Dropper.Generic::1201  

MD5: 311d64e4892f75019ee257b8377c723e  
Typical Filename: ultrasurf-21-32.exe  
Claimed Product: N/A    
Detection Name: W32.DFC.MalParent 

Cisco Talos shares insights related to recent cyber attack on Cisco

10 August 2022 at 19:30

Update History


Date Description of Updates
Aug. 10th 2022 Adding clarifying details on activity involving active directory.
Aug. 10th 2022 Update made to the Cisco Response and Recommendations section related to MFA.

 Executive summary


  • On May 24, 2022, Cisco became aware of a potential compromise. Since that point, Cisco Security Incident Response (CSIRT) and Cisco Talos have been working to remediate. 
  • During the investigation, it was determined that a Cisco employee’s credentials were compromised after an attacker gained control of a personal Google account where credentials saved in the victim’s browser were being synchronized. 
  • The attacker conducted a series of sophisticated voice phishing attacks under the guise of various trusted organizations attempting to convince the victim to accept multi-factor authentication (MFA) push notifications initiated by the attacker. The attacker ultimately succeeded in achieving an MFA push acceptance, granting them access to VPN in the context of the targeted user. 
  • CSIRT and Talos are responding to the event and we have not identified any evidence suggesting that the attacker gained access to critical internal systems, such as those related to product development, code signing, etc. 
  • After obtaining initial access, the threat actor conducted a variety of activities to maintain access, minimize forensic artifacts, and increase their level of access to systems within the environment. 
  • The threat actor was successfully removed from the environment and displayed persistence, repeatedly attempting to regain access in the weeks following the attack; however, these attempts were unsuccessful. 
  • We assess with moderate to high confidence that this attack was conducted by an adversary that has been previously identified as an initial access broker (IAB) with ties to the UNC2447 cybercrime gang, Lapsus$ threat actor group, and Yanluowang ransomware operators. 
  • For further information see the Cisco Response page here.


Initial vector


Initial access to the Cisco VPN was achieved via the successful compromise of a Cisco employee’s personal Google account. The user had enabled password syncing via Google Chrome and had stored their Cisco credentials in their browser, enabling that information to synchronize to their Google account. After obtaining the user’s credentials, the attacker attempted to bypass multifactor authentication (MFA) using a variety of techniques, including voice phishing (aka "vishing") and MFA fatigue, the process of sending a high volume of push requests to the target’s mobile device until the user accepts, either accidentally or simply to attempt to silence the repeated push notifications they are receiving. Vishing is an increasingly common social engineering technique whereby attackers try to trick employees into divulging sensitive information over the phone. In this instance, an employee reported that they received multiple calls over several days in which the callers – who spoke in English with various international accents and dialects – purported to be associated with support organizations trusted by the user.  

Once the attacker had obtained initial access, they enrolled a series of new devices for MFA and authenticated successfully to the Cisco VPN. The attacker then escalated to administrative privileges, allowing them to login to multiple systems, which alerted our Cisco Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT), who subsequently responded to the incident. The actor in question dropped a variety of tools, including remote access tools like LogMeIn and TeamViewer, offensive security tools such as Cobalt Strike, PowerSploit, Mimikatz, and Impacket, and added their own backdoor accounts and persistence mechanisms. 


Post-compromise TTPs


Following initial access to the environment, the threat actor conducted a variety of activities for the purposes of maintaining access, minimizing forensic artifacts, and increasing their level of access to systems within the environment. 

Once on a system, the threat actor began to enumerate the environment, using common built-in Windows utilities to identify the user and group membership configuration of the system, hostname, and identify the context of the user account under which they were operating. We periodically observed the attacker issuing commands containing typographical errors, indicating manual operator interaction was occurring within the environment. 

After establishing access to the VPN, the attacker then began to use the compromised user account to logon to a large number of systems before beginning to pivot further into the environment. They moved into the Citrix environment, compromising a series of Citrix servers and eventually obtained privileged access to domain controllers.  

After obtaining access to the domain controllers, the attacker began attempting to dump NTDS from them using “ntdsutil.exe” consistent with the following syntax:
powershell ntdsutil.exe 'ac i ntds' 'ifm' 'create full c:\users\public' q q 
They then worked to exfiltrate the dumped NTDS over SMB (TCP/445) from the domain controller to the VPN system under their control.

After obtaining access to credential databases, the attacker was observed leveraging machine accounts for privileged authentication and lateral movement across the environment. 

Consistent with activity we previously observed in other separate but similar attacks, the adversary created an administrative user called “z” on the system using the built-in Windows “net.exe” commands. This account was then added to the local Administrators group. We also observed instances where the threat actor changed the password of existing local user accounts to the same value shown below. Notably, we have observed the creation of the “z” account by this actor in previous engagements prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. 
C:\Windows\system32\net user z Lh199211* /add 
C:\Windows\system32\net localgroup administrators z /add
This account was then used in some cases to execute additional utilities, such as adfind or secretsdump, to attempt to enumerate the directory services environment and obtain additional credentials. Additionally, the threat actor was observed attempting to extract registry information, including the SAM database on compromised windows hosts.  
reg save hklm\system system 
reg save hklm\sam sam 
reg save HKLM\security sec
On some systems, the attacker was observed employing MiniDump from Mimikatz to dump LSASS. 
tasklist | findstr lsass 
rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump [LSASS_PID] C:\windows\temp\lsass.dmp full
The attacker also took steps to remove evidence of activities performed on compromised systems by deleting the previously created local Administrator account. They also used the “wevtutil.exe” utility to identify and clear event logs generated on the system. 
wevtutil.exe el 
wevtutil.exe cl [LOGNAME]
In many cases, we observed the attacker removing the previously created local administrator account.  
net user z /delete
To move files between systems within the environment, the threat actor often leveraged Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) and Citrix. We observed them modifying the host-based firewall configurations to enable RDP access to systems. 
netsh advfirewall firewall set rule group=remote desktop new enable=Yes
We also observed the installation of additional remote access tools, such as TeamViewer and LogMeIn. 
C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe /i C:\Users\[USERNAME]\Pictures\LogMeIn.msi
The attacker frequently leveraged Windows logon bypass techniques to maintain the ability to access systems in the environment with elevated privileges. They frequently relied upon PSEXESVC.exe to remotely add the following Registry key values:  
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\narrator.exe /v Debugger /t REG_SZ /d C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe /f 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\sethc.exe /v Debugger /t REG_SZ /d C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe /f
This enabled the attacker to leverage the accessibility features present on the Windows logon screen to spawn a SYSTEM level command prompt, granting them complete control of the systems. In several cases, we observed the attacker adding these keys but not further interacting with the system, possibly as a persistence mechanism to be used later as their primary privileged access is revoked.  

Throughout the attack, we observed attempts to exfiltrate information from the environment. We confirmed that the only successful data exfiltration that occurred during the attack included the contents of a Box folder that was associated with a compromised employee’s account and employee authentication data from active directory. The Box data obtained by the adversary in this case was not sensitive.  

In the weeks following the eviction of the attacker from the environment, we observed continuous attempts to re-establish access. In most cases, the attacker was observed targeting weak password rotation hygiene following mandated employee password resets. They primarily targeted users who they believed would have made single character changes to their previous passwords, attempting to leverage these credentials to authenticate and regain access to the Cisco VPN. The attacker was initially leveraging traffic anonymization services like Tor; however, after experiencing limited success, they switched to attempting to establish new VPN sessions from residential IP space using accounts previously compromised during the initial stages of the attack. We also observed the registration of several additional domains referencing the organization while responding to the attack and took action on them before they could be used for malicious purposes. 

After being successfully removed from the environment, the adversary also repeatedly attempted to establish email communications with executive members of the organization but did not make any specific threats or extortion demands. In one email, they included a screenshot showing the directory listing of the Box data that was previously exfiltrated as described earlier. Below is a screenshot of one of the received emails. The adversary redacted the directory listing screenshot prior to sending the email.



Backdoor analysis


The actor dropped a series of payloads onto systems, which we continue to analyze. The first payload is a simple backdoor that takes commands from a command and control (C2) server and executes them on the end system via the Windows Command Processor. The commands are sent in JSON blobs and are standard for a backdoor. There is a “DELETE_SELF” command that removes the backdoor from the system completely. Another, more interesting, command, “WIPE”, instructs the backdoor to remove the last executed command from memory, likely with the intent of negatively impacting forensic analysis on any impacted hosts. 

Commands are retrieved by making HTTP GET requests to the C2 server using the following structure: 
/bot/cmd.php?botid=%.8x
The malware also communicates with the C2 server via HTTP GET requests that feature the following structure: 
/bot/gate.php?botid=%.8x
Following the initial request from the infected system, the C2 server responds with a SHA256 hash. We observed additional requests made every 10 seconds.  

The aforementioned HTTP requests are sent using the following user-agent string: 
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/99.0.4844.51 Safari/537.36 Edg/99.0.1150.36 Trailer/95.3.1132.33
The malware also creates a file called “bdata.ini” in the malware’s current working directory that contains a value derived from the volume serial number present on the infected system. In instances where this backdoor was executed, the malware was observed running from the following directory location:  
C:\users\public\win\cmd.exe
The attacker was frequently observed staging tooling in directory locations under the Public user profile on systems from which they were operating.  

Based upon analysis of C2 infrastructure associated with this backdoor, we assess that the C2 server was set up specifically for this attack. 


Attack attribution


Based upon artifacts obtained, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) identified, infrastructure used, and a thorough analysis of the backdoor utilized in this attack, we assess with moderate to high confidence that this attack was conducted by an adversary that has been previously identified as an initial access broker (IAB) with ties to both UNC2447 and Lapsus$. IABs typically attempt to obtain privileged access to corporate network environments and then monetize that access by selling it to other threat actors who can then leverage it for a variety of purposes. We have also observed previous activity linking this threat actor to the Yanluowang ransomware gang, including the use of the Yanluowang data leak site for posting data stolen from compromised organizations. 

UNC2447 is a financially-motivated threat actor with a nexus to Russia that has been previously observed conducting ransomware attacks and leveraging a technique known as “double extortion,” in which data is exfiltrated prior to ransomware deployment in an attempt to coerce victims into paying ransom demands. Prior reporting indicates that UNC2447 has been observed operating  a variety of ransomware, including FIVEHANDS, HELLOKITTY, and more. 

Apart from UNC2447, some of the TTPs discovered during the course of our investigation match those of the Lapsus$. Lapsus$ is a threat actor group that is reported to have been responsible for several previous notable breaches of corporate environments. Several arrests of Lapsus$ members were reported earlier this year. Lapsus$ has been observed compromising corporate environments and attempting to exfiltrate sensitive information. 

While we did not observe ransomware deployment in this attack, the TTPs used were consistent with “pre-ransomware activity,” activity commonly observed leading up to the deployment of ransomware in victim environments. Many of the TTPs observed are consistent with activity observed by CTIR during previous engagements. Our analysis also suggests reuse of server-side infrastructure associated with these previous engagements as well. In previous engagements, we also did not observe deployment of ransomware in the victim environments. 


Cisco response and recommendations


Cisco implemented a company-wide password reset immediately upon learning of the incident. CTIR previously observed similar TTPs in numerous investigations since 2021. Our findings and subsequent security protections resulting from those customer engagements helped us slow and contain the attacker’s progression. We created two ClamAV signatures, which are listed below.  

  • Win.Exploit.Kolobko-9950675-0  
  • Win.Backdoor.Kolobko-9950676-0 

Threat actors commonly use social engineering techniques to compromise targets, and despite the frequency of such attacks, organizations continue to face challenges mitigating those threats. User education is paramount in thwarting such attacks, including making sure employees know the legitimate ways that support personnel will contact users so that employees can identify fraudulent attempts to obtain sensitive information. 

Given the actor’s demonstrated proficiency in using a wide array of techniques to obtain initial access, user education is also a key part of countering MFA bypass techniques. Equally important to implementing MFA is ensuring that employees are educated on what to do and how to respond if they get errant push requests on their respective phones. It is also essential to educate employees about who to contact if such incidents do arise to help determine if the event was a technical issue or malicious. 

For Duo it is beneficial to implement strong device verification by enforcing stricter controls around device status to limit or block enrollment and access from unmanaged or unknown devices. Additionally, leveraging risk detection to highlight events like a brand-new device being used from unrealistic location or attack patterns like logins brute force can help detect unauthorized access.

Prior to allowing VPN connections from remote endpoints, ensure that posture checking is configured to enforce a baseline set of security controls. This ensures that the connecting devices match  the security requirements present in the environment. This can also prevent rogue devices that have not been previously approved from connecting to the corporate network environment. 

Network segmentation is another important security control that organizations should employ, as it provides enhanced protection for high-value assets and also enables more effective detection and response capabilities in situations where an adversary is able to gain initial access into the environment.  

Centralized log collection can help minimize the lack of visibility that results when an attacker take active steps to remove logs from systems. Ensuring that the log data generated by endpoints is centrally collected and analyzed for anomalous or overtly malicious behavior can provide early indication when an attack is underway.  

In many cases, threat actors have been observed targeting the backup infrastructure in an attempt to further remove an organization’s ability to recover following an attack. Ensuring that backups are offline and periodically tested can help mitigate this risk and ensure an organization’s ability to effectively recover following an attack. 

Auditing of command line execution on endpoints can also provide increased visibility into actions being performed on systems in the environment and can be used to detect suspicious execution of built-in Windows utilities, which is commonly observed during intrusions where threat actors rely on benign applications or utilities already present in the environment for enumeration, privilege escalation, and lateral movement activities.  


Mitre ATT&CK mapping


All of the previously described TTPs that were observed in this attack are listed below based on the phase of the attack in which they occurred. 

Initial Access 


Execution 


Persistence 


Privilege Escalation 


Defense Evasion 


Credential Access 


Lateral Movement 


Discovery 


Command and Control 


Exfiltration 




Indicators of compromise


The following indicators of compromise were observed associated with this attack. 

Hashes (SHA256) 

184a2570d71eedc3c77b63fd9d2a066cd025d20ceef0f75d428c6f7e5c6965f3 
2fc5bf9edcfa19d48e235315e8f571638c99a1220be867e24f3965328fe94a03 
542c9da985633d027317e9a226ee70b4f0742dcbc59dfd2d4e59977bb870058d 
61176a5756c7b953bc31e5a53580d640629980a344aa5ff147a20fb7d770b610 
753952aed395ea845c52e3037f19738cfc9a415070515de277e1a1baeff20647 
8df89eef51cdf43b2a992ade6ad998b267ebb5e61305aeb765e4232e66eaf79a 
8e5733484982d0833abbd9c73a05a667ec2d9d005bbf517b1c8cd4b1daf57190 
99be6e7e31f0a1d7eebd1e45ac3b9398384c1f0fa594565137abb14dc28c8a7f 
bb62138d173de997b36e9b07c20b2ca13ea15e9e6cd75ea0e8162e0d3ded83b7 
eb3452c64970f805f1448b78cd3c05d851d758421896edd5dfbe68e08e783d18 

IP Addresses 

104.131.30[.]201 
108.191.224[.]47 
131.150.216[.]118 
134.209.88[.]140 
138.68.227[.]71 
139.177.192[.]145 
139.60.160[.]20 
139.60.161[.]99 
143.198.110[.]248 
143.198.131[.]210 
159.65.246[.]188 
161.35.137[.]163 
162.33.177[.]27 
162.33.178[.]244 
162.33.179[.]17 
165.227.219[.]211 
165.227.23[.]218 
165.232.154[.]73 
166.205.190[.]23 
167.99.160[.]91 
172.56.42[.]39 
172.58.220[.]52 
172.58.239[.]34 
174.205.239[.]164 
176.59.109[.]115 
178.128.171[.]206 
185.220.100[.]244 
185.220.101[.]10 
185.220.101[.]13 
185.220.101[.]15 
185.220.101[.]16 
185.220.101[.]2 
185.220.101[.]20 
185.220.101[.]34 
185.220.101[.]45 
185.220.101[.]6 
185.220.101[.]65 
185.220.101[.]73 
185.220.101[.]79 
185.220.102[.]242 
185.220.102[.]250 
192.241.133[.]130 
194.165.16[.]98 
195.149.87[.]136 
24.6.144[.]43 
45.145.67[.]170 
45.227.255[.]215 
45.32.141[.]138 
45.32.228[.]189 
45.32.228[.]190 
45.55.36[.]143 
45.61.136[.]207 
45.61.136[.]5 
45.61.136[.]83 
46.161.27[.]117 
5.165.200[.]7 
52.154.0[.]241 
64.227.0[.]177 
64.4.238[.]56 
65.188.102[.]43 
66.42.97[.]210 
67.171.114[.]251 
68.183.200[.]63 
68.46.232[.]60 
73.153.192[.]98 
74.119.194[.]203 
74.119.194[.]4 
76.22.236[.]142 
82.116.32[.]77 
87.251.67[.]41 
94.142.241[.]194 
 

Domains 

cisco-help[.]cf 
cisco-helpdesk[.]cf 
ciscovpn1[.]com 
ciscovpn2[.]com 
ciscovpn3[.]com 
devcisco[.]com 
devciscoprograms[.]com 
helpzonecisco[.]com 
kazaboldu[.]net 
mycisco[.]cf 
mycisco[.]gq 
mycisco-helpdesk[.]ml 
primecisco[.]com 
pwresetcisco[.]com  
 

Email Addresses 

costacancordia[@]protonmail[.]com 





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