Intellyx Digital Innovator Award
Intellyx Digital Innovator Award 2024
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Intellyx Digital Innovator Award 2024
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Rising Cyber Award 2024
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Our last blog post on the FortiClient EMS SQL injection vulnerability, CVE-2023-48788, as it turns out only worked on 7.0.x versions. This article will discuss the differences in exploitation between FortiClient EMS’s two mainline versions: 7.0.x and 7.2.x.
When writing exploits for different versions of vulnerable software, the differences in the exploit are usually small, such as different offsets, renamed parameters, or changed endpoints. Exploitation of the 7.2.x attack path for CVE-2023-48788 was an interesting challenge, because the core vulnerability and endpoint being attacked were the same, but the code path traversed was largely different.
A quick review of the previous article shows that this vulnerability affects ‘binary components’ of this software suite. Rather than this being a web application based SQL injection, this SQL injection is performed against an endpoint written in C++ and Golang and compiled for a 64 bit x86 Windows target. It also uses a custom linefeed based protocol.
Windows and SQL injection? Sounds like XP_CMDSHELL. Delicious.
XP_CMDSHELL is a type of SQL stored procedure used to evaluate custom commands on input or output data. A trivial example would be to use the XP_CMDSHELL procedure to hash a user password before storing its digest in a registered users table.
Attackers, however, frequently abuse this capability to turn SQL Injection into Remote Code Execution. That is how the exploit we designed for NodeZero gains access to vulnerable EMS servers.
Mitigations exist to prevent damage caused by this feature of MSSQL. For example, by default, XP_CMDSHELL is disabled and must be re-enabled by the attacker to execute commands. The privilege needed to re-enable XP_CMDSHELL is also a removable privilege, so the account in use can be prevented from enabling this functionality. In practice, this is rarely done, so SQLi against an MSSQL server is almost always a path to RCE.
The original 7.0.x weaponization utilized MSSQL’s CONVERT
on a hex encoded payload to bypass a behavior of FortiClient that would always uppercase the entire SQL query. This behavior causes many arbitrary Windows commands to fail as most utilities are case sensitive.
Figure 1. Original 7.0.x payload
Running the 7.0.x variant of the exploit against a vulnerable 7.2.x target immediately shows an issue.
Figure 2. Errors on 7.2.x
The target returns an extremely opaque error message. From here, it seems prudent to observe the logs of a real client, and put the server in a debug logging state so we can observe any changes in the message type being sent to the server.
From this we can see that the format of the arguments for the registration message has changed (the SYSINFO field is now between the pipe characters). Further inspection of the base64 encoded system information parameter shows several required fields have been added to the message format.
Figure 3. Differences in agent registration
Compensating for these changes is easy enough, and we can use copy and pasted data from the sample registration we observed. This, however, requires performing version detection to determine the correct message format for the exploit. Fortunately, there is a request that provides us with this information.
Figure 4. Detecting FortiClient versions remotely
The new version of this output is as follows:
Figure 5. Updating to detect 7.2.x versions
Let’s look at what is going on. Now that we have a valid message, let’s attempt to reuse our previous exploit payload.
Figure 6. Errors after updating
A similarly opaque error message like before. That’s unfortunate. Let’s dig into what is going on here.
Figure 7. Detailed error showing SQL ending before equal sign
Interesting. 7.2.x appears to be using = as a delimiter on the input being provided to the vulnerable function. Another thing to note is that our input is being converted to upper case in the code path leading to the vulnerable function. This disqualifies base64 as an encoding method.
At this point, to diverge from the cool and dispassionate tone of most exploit deep dives, I’ll provide a glimpse into the reality of exploit development for people interested in this field, and encouragement for fellow exploit development professionals. We ran into three simple issues that coalesced into a difficult upgrade process. This set of issues disguised our success for over a week, in which we hammered this target with everything we could think of to get around the equals sign delimiter issue. The core issues follow:
The confluence of these issues was being unable to detect successful exploitation until we looked into the audit logs of the SQL server itself. At that point, we saw invocations of XP_CMDSHELL going back to the day after we began this project. Changing the test payload from calc.exe to notepad.exe demonstrated successful exploitation.
To quote Vonnegut: “So it goes.”
We mitigated the equals delimiter and upper case issues by using a mix of PowerShell and url encoding.
The basic algorithm of the payload looks like this:
EXEC xp_cmdshell ‘Powershell.exe -command “cmd.exe /c “UrlDecode( “<url encoded attacker command>” ) “‘
It relies on powershell to decode the arguments passed to cmd.exe. `start /b` was not needed here, due to the fact that MSSQL spawns commands in it’s own session, which is not attached to a window.
Figure 8. 7.2.x payload utilizing case insensitive powershell decoding
And the post-ex process tree for our lovely defender siblings.
Figure 9. Successful arbitrary command execution
NodeZero Attack Path utilizing CVE-2023-48788 to load a remote access tool and dump LSASS
Horizon3.ai clients and free-trial users alike can run a NodeZero operation to determine the exposure and exploitability of this issue.
The post CVE-2023-48788: Revisiting Fortinet FortiClient EMS to Exploit 7.2.X appeared first on Horizon3.ai.
In November of 2023, preparing for a call for papers, I attempted to investigate the FortiSIEM patch for CVE-2023-34992. I kindly inquired with the PSIRT if I could have access to the most recent versions to some of their appliances to validate the patches, to which they declined. Acquiring access a different way, I eventually was able to analyze the patch.
While the patches for the original PSIRT issue, FG-IR-23-130, attempted to escape user-controlled inputs at this layer by adding the wrapShellToken()
utility, there exists a second order command injection when certain parameters to datastore.py
are sent. There exist two distinct vulnerabilities which were assigned CVE-2024-23108 and CVE-2024-23109, both with a CVSS3 score of 10.0, which allows remote, unauthenticated command execution as root. This blog will only cover the first, CVE-2024-23108, given they’re both patched in the same release.
In CVE-2023-34992, the phMonitor service on tcp/7900 was abused by sending it a handleStorageRequest message with a malicious server_ip
value. When phMonitor received this message the specific command to be executed would be:
/usr/bin/python3.9 /opt/phoenix/deployment/jumpbox/datastore.py nfs test ‘<server_ip>’ ‘<mount_point>’ online
. Inspecting the control flow of datastore.py
for this type of request, we see that the server_ip
field is validated by attempting to connect to the IP address.
Figure 1. datastore.py validating server_ip
After this, control is eventually passed to /opt/phoenix/deployment/jumpbox/datastore/nfs/test.py
. Here, a call to __testMount()
formats a call to os.system()
on line 23, which derives the nfs_string
value from our user-controlled mount_point
payload value.
Figure 2. __testMount() calls os.system()
By formatting a request to the phMonitor client with a command type of 81, and the following payload, an unauthenticated attacker can achieve remote code execution as root.
Figure 3. Exploiting for reverse shell
The astute reader will notice that there is very little difference in the exploitation of the previous command injection, CVE-2023-34992, to this one, CVE-2024-23108, reported 6 months later.
Figure 4. CVE-2023-34992 vs CVE-2024-23108
Our proof of concept exploit can be found on our GitHub.
The logs for the phMonitor service will verbosely log many details of messages it receives and can be found at /opt/phoenix/logs/phoenix.log
. Attempts to exploit CVE-2024-23108 will leave a log message containing a failed command with datastore.py nfs test
. These lines should be inspected for malicious looking input.
Figure 5. Malicious commands logged
29 November 2023 – Reported CVE-2024-23108
30 November 2023 – Reported CVE-2024-23109
3 January 2024 – PSIRT reproduces issues
16 January 2024 – Fortinet silently fixes the issues in v7.1.2 build 0160 with no mention of the vulnerabilities, PSIRT releases, or CVEs published
31 January 2024 – Fortinet publicly “discloses” the issues by adding unpublished CVE IDs to the PSIRT released for CVE-2023-34992 6 months prior without adding a changelog entry
7 February 2024 – Fortinet publicly publishes the CVE IDs, but states they were duplicates published in error, and then states they were real
Sometime later in 2024 – Fortinet eventually adds a changelog entry to the PSIRT and adds CVE IDs to the release documents
28 May 2024 – This blog
Horizon3.ai clients and free-trial users alike can run a NodeZero operation to determine the exposure and exploitability of this issue.
The post CVE-2024-23108: Fortinet FortiSIEM 2nd Order Command Injection Deep-Dive appeared first on Horizon3.ai.
Business Wire 05/21/2024
Horizon3.ai, a leader in autonomous security solutions, is pleased to announce the appointments of Erick Dean as Vice President of Product Management and Drew Mullen as Vice President of Revenue Operations. These key executive hires underscore the management team Horizon3.ai continues to build, fueling significant growth.
Read the entire article here
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As enterprises continue to transition on-premises infrastructure and information systems to the cloud, hybrid cloud systems have emerged as a vital solution, balancing the benefits of both environments to optimize performance, scalability, and ease of change on users and administrators. However, there can be risks involved when connecting a misconfigured or ill-protected network to cloud services. Particularly, Microsoft Active Directory environments that are compromised could lead to a full compromise of a synchronized Microsoft Entra ID tenant. Once this critical IAM platform is breached all integrity and trust of connected services is lost.
Formally known as AzureAD, Entra ID is Microsoft’s cloud-based Identity and Access Management (IAM) solution that is integrated with several Microsoft products and services – including Azure cloud resources, Office 365, and any third-party applications integrated to use the platform for identity management. To capitalize on the dominance of Active Directory (AD) for on-premises domain management and ease the transition of enterprises to cloud services, Microsoft designed Entra ID to integrate seamlessly with existing AD infrastructure using a dedicated on-premises application called MS Entra Connect (formally known as AzureAD Connect). This setup allows users to access the on-premises domain and cloud services/resources using the same credentials.
In the most common hybrid setup, known as Password Hash Synchronization (PHS), the Entra Connect application has highly-privileged access to both the AD and Entra environments to synchronize authentication material between the two. If an attacker breaches the Entra Connect server, they have potential paths to compromising both environments. Additionally, Entra Connect has a feature known as Seamless SSO that, when enabled, allows for password-less authentication to Microsoft cloud services, like Office 365, by utilizing the Kerberos authentication protocol.
A client conducted an assumed-breach internal pentest using NodeZero. NodeZero was given no prior knowledge of the client’s Entra ID account or hybrid setup.
Initial Access to Domain Compromise
In this example case, NodeZero:
Domain Compromise to Entra Tenant Compromise
It took NodeZero an hour to compromise the on-premises AD domain, and just shy of 2 hours to fully compromise the associated Entra ID tenant.
The attack path above was enabled by several common on-premises misconfigurations that when combined not only compromised the AD domain, but the Entra ID tenant as well. Key findings include:
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VSA Top Innovation Award 2024
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VSA Channel Program of the Year 2024
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In early 2023, given some early success in auditing Fortinet appliances, I continued the effort and landed upon the Fortinet FortiSIEM. Several issues were discovered during this audit that ultimately lead to unauthenticated remote code execution in the context of the root user. The vulnerabilities were assigned CVE-2023-34992 with a CVSS3.0 score of 10.0 given that the access allowed reading of secrets for integrated systems, allowing for pivoting into those systems.
The FortiSIEM allows customers to do many of the expected functions of a typical SIEM solution such as log collection, correlation, automated response, and remediation. It also allows for simple and complex deployments ranging from a standalone appliance to scaled out solutions for enterprises and MSPs.
In a FortiSIEM deployment, there are four types of roles that a system can have:
● Supervisor – for smaller deployments this is all that’s needed, and supervises other roles
● Worker – handles all the data coming from Collectors in larger environments
● Collector – used to scale data collection from various geographically separated network
environments, potentially behind firewalls
● Manager – can be used to monitor and manage multiple FortiSIEM instances
For the purposes of this research, I deployed an all-in-one architecture where the appliance contains all of the functionality within the Supervisor role. For more information about FortiSIEM key concepts refer to the documentation.
One of the first things we do when auditing an appliance is to inspect the listening services given you have some time of shell access. Starting with the most obvious service, the web service, we see that it listens of tcp/443 and the proxy configuration routes traffic to an internal service listening on tcp/8080.
Figure 2. httpd.conf proxying traffic
We find that the backend web service is deployed via Glassfish, a Java framework similar to Tomcat in that it provides a simple way to deploy Java applications as WAR files. We find the WAR file that backs the service, unpack it, and decompile it. Inspecting some of the unauthenticated attack surface, we happen upon the LicenseUploadServlet.class
.
Figure 4. LicenseUploadServlet doPost method
We follow the code into this.notify()
, where we eventually observe it calling sendCommand()
, which interestingly sends a custom binary message with our input to the port tcp/7900.
We find that tcp/7900 hosts the phMonitor service, which listens on all interfaces, not just localhost.
Figure 6. phMonitor on tcp/7900
And it is also a compiled C++ binary.
Now that we’ve identified a pretty interesting attack surface, let’s build a client to interact with it in the same way the web service does. The message format is a pretty simple combination of:
Constructing the LicenseUpload message in little-endian format and sending it over an SSL wrapped socket will succeed in communicating with the service. Re-implementing the client messaging protocol in Python looks like the following:
Figure 7. phMonitor Python client
As a test that the client works, we send a command type of 29, mapped to handleProvisionServer
, and can observe in the logs located at /opt/phoenix/log/phoenix.log
that the message was delivered.
Figure 8. phMonitor client successful message sent
The phMonitor service marshals incoming requests to their appropriate function handlers based on the type of command sent in the API request. Each handler processes the sent payload data in their own ways, some expecting formatted strings, some expecting XML.
Inside phMonitor, at the function phMonitorProcess::initEventHandler()
, every command handler is mapped to an integer, which is passed in the command message. Security Issue #1 is that all of these handlers are exposed and available for any remote client to invoke without any authentication. There are several dozen handlers exposed in initEventHandler()
, exposing much of the administrative functionality of the appliance ranging from getting and setting Collector passwords, getting and setting service passwords, initiating reverse SSH tunnels with remote collectors, and much more.
Figure 9. Sampling of handlers exposed
Given the vast amount of attack surface available unauthenticated within the phMonitor service, we begin with the easiest vulnerability classes. Tracing the calls between these handlers and calls to system()
we land of the handler handleStorageRequest()
, mapped to command type 81. On line 201, the handler expects the payload to be XML data and parses it.
Figure 10. handleStorageRequest() expecting XML payload
Later, we see that it attempts to extract the server_ip
and mount_point
values from the XML payload.
Further down on line 511, the handler formats a string with the parsed server_ip
and mount_point
values, which are user controlled.
Figure 12. Format string with user-controlled data
Finally, on line 556, the handler calls do_system_cancellable()
, which is a wrapper for system()
, with the user controlled command string.
Figure 13. do_system_cancellable command injection
Exploiting this issue is straightforward, we construct an XML payload that contains a malicious string to be interpreted, such as a reverse shell.
Figure 14. Reverse shell as root
Our proof of concept exploit can be found on our GitHub.
The logs in /opt/phoenix/logs/phoenix.logs
verbosely log the contents of messages received for the phMonitor service. Below is an example log when exploiting the system:
Figure 15. phoenix.logs contain payload contents
5 May 2023 – Initial report
10 October 2023 – Command injection vulnerability fixed
22 February 2024 – RingZer0 BOOTSTRAP conference talk disclosing some of these details
20 May 2024 – This blog
Horizon3.ai clients and free-trial users alike can run a NodeZero operation to determine the exposure and exploitability of this issue.
The post CVE-2023-34992: Fortinet FortiSIEM Command Injection Deep-Dive appeared first on Horizon3.ai.
In this webinar. Horizon3.ai cybersecurity expert Brad Hong covers our new Rapid Response service, including:
– How this service enables you to preemptively defend against high-profile threats
– How our Attack Team develops its tailored threat intelligence for NodeZero users
– Best practices for monitoring the progress of nascent threats and getting ahead of mass exploitation
The post Outpace Emerging Cyber Threats with Horizon3.ai Rapid Response appeared first on Horizon3.ai.
Cybersecurity is paramount for the public safety sector as it safeguards critical infrastructure, sensitive data, and communication systems vital for emergency response, law enforcement, and national security. In an increasingly interconnected world, where digital technologies infiltrate every aspect of society, vulnerabilities in these systems can be exploited by malicious actors to disrupt emergency services, compromise sensitive information, or even endanger lives. A robust cybersecurity posture not only protects against potential cyber threats and attacks but also ensures the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) of essential services, thereby upholding resilience of public safety systems.
Specifically, 911 call centers, also known as Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs), frequently draw the attention of cyber threat actors because of their pivotal function in emergency response, making them attractive targets for disruption and ransomware attacks capable of incapacitating essential services. Additionally, the sensitive information stored within PSAP networks and systems, including Personal Identifiable Information (PII) and Personal Health Information (PHI), present lucrative opportunities for data theft and exploitation.
To make a big impact worldwide in thwarting ransomware and other cyberattacks by making sophisticated cyber defense solutions with human supervision affordable to organizations worldwide.
In May 2023, a ransomware attack targeted the city of Dallas by the Royal Ransomware gang, leading to the shutdown of court systems and disruptions in 911 emergency services. The attack affected various city services, including the police department’s ability to access certain databases. The outage has also impacted Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) systems, which are used by dispatchers and 911 operators to prioritize and record incident calls. While city officials assured that emergency calls were still being answered, the incident highlighted the significant impact cyberattacks can have on critical infrastructure and essential services.
In a recent interview with Brian Beckwith, Chief Technology Officer (CTO) at Intuitus, he explained that Intuitus “deals primarily in helping 911 call centers (PSAPs), and who those call centers support, to make sure their environments are secure.” Intuitus, a full-service cybersecurity and consulting solution with a 24/7 Security Operations Center (SOC), is the leading voice in cybersecurity for 911/NG911 PSAP organizations worldwide. Additionally, they participate in industry organizations such as National Emergency Number Association (NENA), Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials (APCO) international, and other 911/NG911 PSAP community members.
“When there is a cyberattack on a PSAP, there is the potential for loss of life due to the caller not being able to get through to the 911 call center. Our job is to prevent that situation. We specialize in knowing the cyber threat actor’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) so we can protect organizations from those things.”
“With legacy 911 systems, moving to a more IP-based solution is opening up a new world for 911,” explains Brian. So, rewriting and iterating on NG911 cybersecurity regulations, policies, and guidelines is key to keeping pace with the evolving cyber threats and fortify cybersecurity defenses. According to CISA, “the 911 system requires stable, safe, and resilient communications” and pointed to two things that all PSAPs should do to improve their overall cybersecurity:
Cybersecurity risk assessments are crucial for PSAPs because they help identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses within their systems proactively, allowing them to prioritize resources and implement effective security measures to mitigate risks. Additionally, having robust cyber incident response and vulnerability response plans is essential, as they enable PSAPs security teams to respond swiftly and effectively to cyberattacks. Intuitus also offers its customers SOC as a Service with Managed Detection & Response (MDR) as a fully self-contained solution that can be rapidly deployed into the existing infrastructure.
In the context of cybersecurity risks assessments, we at Horizon3.ai have seen our customers implement a regular cadence of penetration (aka “pen”) testing to ensure that they are continuously assessing their infrastructure to stay ahead of cyber threats. In general, most facets of the public safety sector have yearly cyber risk assessment requirements. However, this infrequent assessment schedule means that any new threats introduced after the assessment won’t be identified or mitigated promptly, leaving the organization exposed to potential breaches or attacks.
“Most PSAPs only conduct a once-a-year pentest, and don’t do pentesting all the time.”
Further, changes in the organization’s IT infrastructure, software updates, and the introduction of new technologies can also introduce new vulnerabilities that would remain unaddressed until the next annual assessment, further increasing the risk of cyber incidents.
With the increased focus on ensuring PSAPs are following national and international cybersecurity regulations, policies, and guidelines, as well as conducting cyber risk assessments yearly, Brian needed to find a solution that could increase Intuitus’ pentesting footprint and blast radius. He also wanted something that was easy to use, straightforward, and required less training time to learn. Moreover, he wanted something that could “enable digestible conversations with…customers and simplify what security measures must be taken to mitigate vulnerabilities in their environment quickly.” With Intuitus expanding not only in the U.S. but internationally, they needed a tool that could enable them to keep pace with their growing demand for continuous pentesting.
After testing a few competitors that offer similar functionality and capabilities as NodeZero, Brian mentions that the tools “just didn’t do it right, not the way NodeZero does.” What we often find is that other “pentesting tools” can’t do what NodeZero does, and sometimes involve on-prem solutions that are complex and require additional training for in-house pentesters. Brian can use NodeZero right away, without needing to train his pentesters or attend lengthy instruction on how to run a pentest, use 1-Click Verify, or read reports. Additionally, this ease of use allows Brian and his team to foster better relationships with his customers because the reports are not overly complicated, yet they provide detail and give actionable guidance for even the novice user.
“NodeZero enables me to have a relationship with a customer that I wouldn’t have otherwise had without the tool”
As with almost all sectors and industries worldwide, when it comes to cybersecurity compliance, there is always a regulation or policy to comply with to meet minimum operating standards. According to Brian, “most of our pentests are performed because of some compliance regulation that needs to happen or that our customer must comply with.” Intuitus customers often require an audit with proof of a pentest and mitigation results to meet compliance requirements.
Auditors require pentests for compliance reasons to verify that an organization’s cybersecurity defenses are robust and effective against cyber threats, ensuring adherence to industry standards and regulatory requirements. Pentesting provides concrete evidence of security posture and readiness, helping organizations demonstrate due diligence in protecting sensitive data and systems. “One of our supply chain customers needed a pentest, and we told them that we can easily do that so they could meet the newly established [at that time] supply chain compliance standards,” Brian shared – another example of how NodeZero is enabling Intuitus to meet nearly all of their customers cybersecurity needs/requirements.
“100% of our [Intuitus] pentesting business we’re doing today; we would not be doing if we didn’t have NodeZero… Horizon3.ai has given us 20% more capability than any other tool we have used or demo’d. We have added many more customers to our business because we offer pentesting services.”
By partnering with Horizon3.ai, Intuitus uses NodeZero as a force multiplier. Brian wanted to implement and offer in-house pentesting to ensure Intuitus is seen as a “trusted advisor, helping us continue to grow and maintain our full service offering to customers.” Additionally, Intuitus’ pivotal role within the public safety space ensures PSAPs are meeting and exceeding compliance standards, while also enabling them to stay ahead of threats and hardened against constantly evolving threats.
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2024 Cloud Security Awards
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2024 Cybersecurity Excellence Awards
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Business Wire 05/02/2024
Horizon3.ai, a leading provider of autonomous security solutions, today announced the appointment of Matt Hartley as Chief Revenue Officer (CRO), effective immediately.Hartley brings over 20 years of sales and operations excellence with a proven track record of building go-to-market (GTM) teams that achieve rapid scale and predictability…
Read the entire article here
The post Horizon3.ai Appoints Matt Hartley as Chief Revenue Officer to Spearhead Growth Initiatives appeared first on Horizon3.ai.
In the ever-evolving landscape of cybersecurity, the speed of your response to emerging cyber threats can be the difference between a minor security incident and a catastrophic breach. Horizon3.ai provides you with a strategic advantage by enabling preemptive action in the
steadily shrinking window of time between the public disclosure of a vulnerability and its exploitation in the wild.
The post Get Ahead of Emerging Threats with Horizon3.ai’s Rapid Response Service appeared first on Horizon3.ai.
Business Wire 03/25/2024
Horizon3.ai, a pioneer in autonomous security solutions, today announced the launch of its Rapid Response service, now part of the NodeZero™ platform. This one-of-a-kind capability marks a significant advancement in autonomous penetration testing solutions by addressing a critical gap in measuring the real-world impact of exploitable vulnerabilities within the software many organizations…
Read the entire article here
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On April 12 (and then updated again on April 20), Palo Alto Networks released an advisory about a vulnerability in the PAN-OS® software that runs Palo Alto Networks® Next-Generation Firewalls (NGFWs). In the advisory it said, “A command injection as a result of arbitrary file creation vulnerability in the GlobalProtect feature of Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS software for specific PAN-OS versions and distinct feature configurations may enable an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code with root privileges on the firewall.”
A vulnerability that allows for the execution of arbitrary code with root privileges would be deemed critical since it would effectively allow an attacker to gain control over a device, and in this case, Palo Alto NGFWs running the vulnerable PAN-OS.
According to Shadowserver, there are several thousand internet-accessible Palo Alto Networks firewalls potentially affected by the vulnerability. Palo Alto Cloud NGFW, Panorama appliances, and Prisma Access are not impacted by this vulnerability.
On April 12 at 8:55AM EDT, Horizon3.ai sent all customers the beamer notification below via the NodeZero portal warning of the vulnerability, the fact it had been observed being exploited in the wild, saying that the Horizon3 Attack Team would continue to monitor the situation closely, and would provide updates as soon as possible.
Rapid Response Customer Notification #1
On Saturday, April 20 at 7:20 PM EDT, Horizon3.ai sent all customers the beamer notification below about NodeZero now having an exploit available so organizations can test for ‘exploitability’ of the vulnerability in their environments.
Rapid Response Customer Notification #2
The exploit developed by Horizon3.ai’s attack team is available on NodeZero to run as a targeted N-Day Test (or by running a standard internal or external pentest) using the configuration screen as shown below. Organizations can quickly determine if they are at risk of exploitation due to the known vulnerability – prior to patching their Palo Alto NGFWs. Organizations can also rerun the test after patching to verify the vulnerability is no longer exploitable in their environments.
Organizations who launch the above N-Day test would see something similar to the attack path below if their Palo Alto NGFWs were vulnerable to exploitation by NodeZero.
Below is a screenshot from NodeZero providing a short narrative about the vulnerability, mitigations, the NodeZero module used in the test, the action log, and the MITRE ATT&CK tactic.
Not only does NodeZero provide an attack path, but it also lists impacts and weaknesses. Even more important, NodeZero provides proof of exploitability. Seeing this proof allows security teams to fully understand their risk, and in this case, highlights two examples of post exploitation outcomes. In both of these cases below, arbitrary code execution with root privileges was completely possible.
CVE-2024-3400 was published on the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) on April 12. Palo Alto then updated their Advisory on April 20. Palo Alto previously noted that turning off device telemetry could mitigate the vulnerability, but that is no longer their guidance. Device telemetry does not need to be enabled for PAN-OS NGFWs to be exposed to attacks related to this vulnerability.
PAN-OS (10.2, 11.0, 11.1) with GlobalProtect Gateway or Portal enabled are affected. Palo Alto strongly advises customers to immediately upgrade to a fixed version of PAN-OS to protect their devices even when workarounds and mitigations have been applied.
NVD Analysts, who use publicly available information to associate vector strings and CVSS scores, assigned this vulnerability the Base Score of 10.0 Critical. Attackers being able to execute arbitrary code with root privileges via command injection is a worse-case scenario.
According to Unit 42, Palo Alto Networks is aware of an increasing number of attacks that leverage the exploitation of this vulnerability. Proof of concepts for this vulnerability have been publicly disclosed by third parties. Here is one example.
CVE-2024-3400 was added to the KEV on April 12 since the vulnerability was observed being exploited in the wild.
Horizon3.ai’s attack team’s rapid response to this critical vulnerability demonstrates the value the team provides in the context of advising our customers, researching the vulnerability, rapidly developing an exploit, making the exploit available on NodeZero, and proving the exploit works.
Today, customers of Horizon3.ai are actively testing their internal and external environments with NodeZero to determine their risk exposure, quickly remediating those risks, and verifying they are no longer exploitable to this known vulnerability.
Vulnerabilities like this represent a critical security risk and organizations must immediately patch their PAN-OS software to mitigate the possibility of exploitation, especially if the software is exposed to the internet with the GlobalProtect feature enabled.
The post NodeZero: Testing for Exploitability of Palo Alto Networks CVE-2024-3400 appeared first on Horizon3.ai.
Horizon3.ai Principal Security SME Stephen Gates and JTI Cybersecurity Principal Consultant Jon Isaacson discuss:
– What JTI does to validate things like access control, data loss prevention, ransomware protection, and intrusion detection approaches.
– How #pentesting and red team exercises allow orgs to validate the effectiveness of their security controls.
– Why offensive operations work best to discover and mitigate exploitable vulnerabilities in their client’s infrastructures.
The post Fireside Chat: Horizon3.ai and JTI Cybersecurity appeared first on Horizon3.ai.
Horizon3.ai Breaks Down Fortinet Vulnerability
Zach Hanley, Horizon3.ai Chief Attack Engineer, and James Horseman, Exploit Developer, join John Furrier of theCUBE to discuss Fortinet CVE 2022 40864.
The post Horizon3.ai Breaks Down Fortinet Vulnerability appeared first on Horizon3.ai.
Many penetration tests are only point-in-time and/or manual. In this Horizon3.ai sponsored webcast from SANS, take a First Look at how Horizon3.ai’s NodeZero takes on the pen test problem.
Listen to SANS Senior Instructor Dave Shackleford and Horizon3.ai’s CEO and Co-Founder Snehal Antani discuss the platform’s highlights and why it might be right for your organization.
The post SANS Webcast w/ Sponsor Horizon3.ai appeared first on Horizon3.ai.
Managed security service providers (MSSPs) and managed services providers (MSPs) tell us that in today’s cyber threat
environment, securing customer environments while still maintaining profit margins and growing adoption of their services is an ongoing challenge. The NodeZeroTM platform enables you to proactively and efficiently probe your customers’ networks for weaknesses that go beyond known and patchable vulnerabilities, such as credentials open to compromise, exposed data, misconfigurations, poor security controls, and weak policies.
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State, local and education (SLED) organizations have unique cybersecurity pain points. Because they rely on taxpayer dollars, SLED organizations are often trying to do more with less.
The post SLED U.S. State, Local, & Education appeared first on Horizon3.ai.
Demand for #pentesting expertise is at an all-time high, and many orgs are struggling to meet their annual requirements for the PCI DSS v4.0. This webinar explains how our services fulfill your pentesting requirements and help you streamline your remediation efforts. You’ll learn about:
– Horizon3.ai’s human-machine teaming approach for compliance pentesting
– How we fully address requirement 11.4 of the PCI DSS and pentesting for the Self-Assessment Questionnaires (SAQs)
– A practitioner’s view of how #NodeZero helps orgs efficiently interpret and remediate their penetration test report
The post No waiting, no wondering: Streamline your PCI pentesting process with Horizon3.ai appeared first on Horizon3.ai.
See your enterprise through the eyes of an attacker – More than a concept — a Proof of Value
The post NodeZero: More than a concept — a Proof of Value appeared first on Horizon3.ai.
Horizon3.ai delivers sophisticated and timely penetration testing services tailored to fulfill the internal and external pentesting requirements of your cardholder data environment outlined by the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) v4.0. Our offerings are executed with comprehensive coverage and meticulous attention to detail to fully address these stringent pentesting requirements.
The post Horizon3.ai PCI 11.4 Pentesting Engagement appeared first on Horizon3.ai.
Winner, Security Today Govies for Autonomous Penetration Testing
The post Security Today Govies Award appeared first on Horizon3.ai.