We are excited to embark on a series of teardowns to explore the inner workings of various devices. In this particular teardown, our focus will be on the 1st-Generation of IKEA-SONOS SYMFONISK Speaker Lamp, unraveling its captivating inner workings. Please note that due to prior testing, certain screws, wires, and components have been temporarily removed from the appliance and may not be present during this analysis. However, for the purpose of this exercise, we have meticulously reassembled the SYMFONISK to its approximate original state.

Recently, I was trying out various exploitation techniques against a Linux kernel vulnerability, CVE-2022-3910. After successfully writing an exploit which made use of DirtyCred to gain local privilege escalation, my mentor Billy asked me if it was possible to tweak my code to facilitate a container escape by overwriting /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe instead. The answer was more complicated than expected; this led me down a long and dark rabbit hole… In this post, I will discuss the root cause of the vulnerability, as well as the various methods I used to exploit it.

TLDR prctl PR_SET_VMA (PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME) can be used as a (possibly new!) heap spray method targeting the kmalloc-8 to kmalloc-96 caches. The sprayed object, anon_vma_name, is dynamically sized, and can range from larger than 4 bytes to a maximum of 84 bytes. The object can be easily allocated and freed via the prctl syscall, and leaked information can be obtained via reading the proc/pid/maps file. The advantage of this method is that it does not require a cross-cache attack from cg/other caches (unlike other objects such as msg_msg) as anon_vma_name is allocated with the GFP_KERNEL flag.

Background The discovery and analysis of vulnerabilities is a critical aspect of cybersecurity research. Today, we will dive into CVE-2023-1829, a vulnerability in the cls_tcindex network traffic classifier found by Valis. We will explore the process of exploiting and examining this vulnerability, shedding light on the intricate details and potential consequences. We have thoroughly tested our exploit on Ubuntu 22.04 with kernel version 5.15.0-25, which was built from the official 5.

TLDR; We began our work on Samsung immediately after the release of the Pwn2Own Toronto 2022 target list. In this article, we will dive into the details of an open-redirect vulnerability discovered during the Pwn2Own 2022 event and how we exploited it on a Samsung S22 device. By breaking down the technical aspects and using code snippets, we aim to provide a comprehensive overview of this critical security flaw. To begin, I revisited our team’s paper (written by Li Jiantao and Nguyễn Hoàng Thạch) from previous year, where two bugs were identified.

Introduction While analyzing CVE-2022-41082, also known as ProxyNotShell, we discovered this vulnerability which we have detailed in this blog. However, for a comprehensive understanding, we highly recommend reading the thorough analysis written by team ZDI. To aid in understanding, we present a visual representation of CVE-2022-41082 below. The sink of ProxyNotShell: //System.Management.Automation.InternalDeserializer.ReadOneObject() internal object ReadOneObject(out string streamName) { //... Type targetTypeForDeserialization = psobject.GetTargetTypeForDeserialization(this._typeTable); //[1] if (null != targetTypeForDeserialization) { Exception ex = null; try { object obj2 = LanguagePrimitives.

Summary A command injection vulnerability exists in CS-Cart’s HTML to PDF converter (https://github.com/cscart/pdf) allowing unauthenticated attackers to achieve remote command execution (RCE). The vulnerability only affects the HTML to PDF converter service and the default hosted service at converter.cart-services.com (maintained by CS-Cart’s development team) used by the PDF converter plugin, and does not allow for RCE against base installations of CS-Cart. Product Background In CS-Cart v4.13.2, the HTML to PDF converter is an optional plugin (disabled by default) for printing PDF documents in CS-Cart.

Upon finding the vulnerability, our team member, Ngo Wei Lin (@Creastery), immediately reported it to the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) on 19th March 2022, who fixed the important issue with a fix commited in the repo within seven days, which is impressive and a much faster response than other Microsoft bugs which we reported previously. The fix was pushed down to Azure Cosmos DB Explorer on 31st March 2022.

STAR LABS SG PTE. LTD. (STAR Labs) announced today that it has become a CVE Numbering Authority (CNA) for the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE®) system, a global cybersecurity community. As a CNA, STAR LABS is authorized to assign CVE Identifiers（CVE IDs）to newly discovered vulnerabilities and publicly disclose information about these vulnerabilities through CVE Records. Identifying vulnerabilities with CVE IDs can speed up the awareness and understanding of those vulnerabilities, enabling security researchers and system managers to expedite solutions.

Background Lately, my focus has been on discovering any potential vulnerabilities in KEPServerEX. KEPServerEX is the industry’s leading connectivity platform that provides a single source of industrial automation data to all your applications. Users can connect, manage, monitor, and control diverse automation devices and software applications through one intuitive user interface. This software employs multiple anti-debugging measures, making it challenging to discover any vulnerabilities and performing fuzzing on it. In this regard, I would like to share my perspective on the issue and my strategy for circumventing these measures.

Introduction In this post, one of our recent intern, Wang Hengyue (@w_hy_04) was given the task to analyse CVE-2021-20617 & CVE-2021-20618 in acmailer since there isn’t any public information on it. Today, we’ll be sharing his journey in dissecting the vulnerabilities in acmailer. Both vulnerabilities were originally found by ma.la acmailer is a Perl-based email delivery application that provides functionality centered around sending mass emails, with associated functions such as registration and unregistration forms, surveys, and email templating.

As part of my internship at STAR Labs, I conducted n-day analysis of CVE-2020-6418. This vulnerability lies in the V8 engine of Google Chrome, namely its optimizing compiler Turbofan. Specifically, the vulnerable version is in Google Chrome’s V8 prior to 80.0.3987.122. In this article, I will give a step-by-step analysis of the vulnerability, from the root cause to exploitation. Background In JavaScript, objects do not have a fixed type. Instead, V8 assigns each object a Map that reflects its type.

Background Some time ago, we were playing with some Netgear routers and we learned so much from this target. However, Netgear recently patched several vulnerabilities in their RAX30 router firmware, including the two vulnerabilities in the DHCP interface for the LAN side and one remote code execution vulnerability on the WAN side which we prepared for Pwn2Own Toronto 2022. This blog post focuses on the vulnerabilities found in version 1.0.7.78You can download the firmware from this link, and easily extract the firmware by using binwalk.

Introduction CVE-2021-38003 is a vulnerability that exists in the V8 Javascript engine. The vulnerability affects the Chrome browser before stable version 95.0.4638.69, and was disclosed in October 2021 in google’s chrome release blog, while the bug report was made public in February 2022. The vulnerability will cause a special value in V8 called TheHole being leaked to the script. This can lead to a renderer RCE in a Chromium-based browser, and has been used in the wild.

Background Proxmox Virtual Environment (Proxmox VE or PVE) is an open-source type-1 hypervisor. It includes a web-based management interface programmed in Perl. Another Proxmox product written in Perl, Proxmox Mail Gateway (PMG), comes with a similar web management interface. They share some of the codebases. In this article, I will introduce how to debug PVE’s web service step-by-step and analyse three bugs I have found in PVE and PMG. [UPDATE] This is a quick and minor update to this blog post.

Overview Disclaimer: No anime characters or animals were harmed during the research. The bug had been fixed but it did not meet that criterion required to get CVE. Recently, we have found a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in Microsoft SharePoint Server 2019 which allows remote authenticated users to send HTTP(S) requests to arbitrary URL and read the responses. The endpoint <site>/_api/web/ExecuteRemoteLOB is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). The HTTP(S) request is highly customizable in request method, path, headers and bodies.

Late last year, I have focused my research on the CoreText framework for 2-3 months. In particular, the code related to the text shaping engine and the code responsible for parsing the AAT tables. During this research, I found an OOB (Out-Of-Bounds) Write in the morx table. This series of writeups is to document my whole process, from selecting this attack surface to finding the bug to writing an exploit for it in Safari.

Recently, ZDI released the advisory for a Safari out-of-bounds write vulnerability exploited by Manfred Paul (@_manfp) in Pwn2Own. We decided to take a look at the patch and try to exploit it. The patch is rather simple: it creates a new function (IntRange::sExt) that is used to decide the integer range after applying a sign extension operation (in rangeFor). Before this patch, the program assumes that the range stays the same after applying sign extension.

Initially, our team member, Đỗ Minh Tuấn, wanted to write about the RCA (Root Cause Analysis) of CVE-2021-1870 which APT used. But Maddie Stone pointed it to us that it was actually CVE-2021-1789. None-the-less, we would still want to share with everyone the analysis done by Đỗ Minh Tuấn. The bug is assigned CVE-2021-1789 in security content of Safari 14.0.3. We successfully exploited it on WebKitGTK <= 2.30.5 or equivalent on WebKit.

At the beginning of this month, GitLab released a security patch for versions 14->15. Interestingly in the advisory, there was a mention of a post-auth RCE bug with CVSS 9.9. The bug exists in GitLab’s Project Imports feature, which was found by @vakzz. Incidentally, when I rummaged in the author’s h1 profile. I discovered that four months ago, he also found a bug in the import project feature: Initially, I thought it was tempting after seeing the bounty, so I started learning Rails and debugged this bug!

For the past few weeks, I have been working on conducting N-day analysis and bug hunting in the io_uring subsystem of the Linux kernel with the guidance of my mentors, Billy and Ramdhan. In this article, I will briefly discuss the io_uring subsystem, as well as my approach to discovering and developing a new kernel exploit technique during my N-day analysis of CVE-2021-41073. I will also discuss two bugs I found while analyzing a new io_uring feature.

Introduction I recently discovered a very interesting kernel vulnerability that allows the reading of arbitrary kernel-mode address. Sadly, the vulnerability was patched in Windows 21H2 (OS Build 22000.675), and I am unsure of the CVE being assigned to it. In this short blog post, I will share my journey of trying to exploit this vulnerability. Although I didn’t finish the exploit in the end, I have decided to share this with everyone anyway.

Introduction Recently, I have had a some work which is related to Sharepoint, so I was learning on how to setup and debug old bugs of Sharepoint. In February, there was a Deserialization bug CVE-2022-22005 (post-auth of course). There is already a detailed analysis blog post about that written by a Vietnamese guy (here). The blog is written with great enthusiasm and detail. I also rely on the details in that blog to setup and debug.

Introduction On 13th September 2021, Google published the security advisory for Google Chrome. That advisory states that Google is aware of two vulnerabilities exploited in the wild, CVE-2021-30632 as RCE and CVE-2021-30633 as Sandbox Escape. In this post, I will talk about the bypass sandbox vulnerability CVE-2021-30633. Man Yue Mo had published a very detailed blog post explaining CVE-2021-30632, which is a Type Confusion bug that leads to RCE in Chrome.

Introduction Looking to practice on source code review, I had been diving into how open-source LMS codebases are structured in order to find undiscovered vulnerabilities. Initially, my main focus had been on Chamilo LMS (their source code can be found on GitHub). Afterwards, I looked into Moodle LMS (their source code can also be found on GitHub). The majority of the findings that were found are the ones you would think of when you hear the words “common web application vulnerabilities”, such as:

References: STARLabs Advisory STAR-21-1758 In February, Peter found a OOB read vulnerability in libFontParser.dylib. The latest tested version with the vulnerability is macOS Catalina 10.15.4 (19E287). I wrote a guide earlier on setting up a testing environment. Mac Resource Fork Font File References: Font Forge: Macintosh Font Formats Apple: MoreMacintoshToolbx fontTools: macRes It turns out that macOS can load something called a Mac Resource Fork font file.

In the past few months, Akash (@enigmatrix) and I (@daniellimws) worked on developing a taint analysis tool to find bugs in routers, with the guidance of Shi Ji (@puzzor) and Thach (@d4rkn3ss). We had developed a tool based on CVE-2019-8312 to CVE-2019-8319, which are command injection vulnerabilities on the D-Link DIR-878 router with firmware version 1.12A1. The goal was to automate the detection of such bugs. Ideally, the tool should be faster than finding the bugs manually.

Introduction During my research into Javascript Engine (V8), I have created a small tool to help you view recent V8 bugs that contains regression test on a single page. Since most of the time, regression test often contains PoC to trigger the bug, it’s pretty useful to analyze them to find the root cause and writing exploit for the n-day bug. For example, regress-1053604.js contains the PoC to trigger the side-effect in kJSCreate opcode (CVE-2020-6418).

What is WebDriver and How does it work? WebDriver is a protocol used for web browser automation. It can drive a browser to perform various tests on web pages as if a real user was navigating through them. It allows simulating user actions such as clicking links, entering text and submitting forms, which can help test if your website is working as intended. It is usually used for front-end testing and web crawling in a headless environment.